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RE: Pipkin v. Haugen
Appellate Case No. 20011028-CA
Trial Court Case No. 010901074
Dear Appeals Clerk:
Our office is in receipt of the enclosed record.
being returned to you for the following reason:

The record is

The record was borrowed and is now being returned because this is
a civil appeal and the record is to stay with the trial court
until briefing is completed.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at
578-3905.
Sincerely,

Janet Alexander
'Deputy Couru Clerk
Enclosure

EtanE. Rosen (SBN 173728)
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916)369-9750

I '-•

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801)576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiffs,
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR -DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs,
vs.
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50
INCLUSIVE,

Case No.

OtO^OlOV4* I'D

Judge

Defendants.

Plaintiffs allege:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.
of Utah.

Plaintiff is and at all times herein mentioned a resident of Weber County, State

2.

Defendant RANDY HAUGEN, is and at all times herein mentioned was, a

resident of Weber County, Utah.
3.

Defendant KIP CASHMORE, is and at all times herein mentioned was, a resident

of Weber County, Utah.
4.

Defendant, QUICK CASH, LLC (hereinafter "QUICK CASH") is a limited

liability company and who, at all times herein mentioned, and was doing business in the State of
Utah, County of Weber.
5.

Defendant, USA CASH STORES (hereinafter "USA CASH") is a

business organization whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who, at all times herein
mentioned, and was doing business in the State of Utah, County of Weber.
6.

Defendant, USA CASH SERVICES (hereinafter "CASH SERVICES") is a

business organization whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who, at all times herein
mentioned, and was doing business in the State of Utah, County of Weber.
7.

Defendant, QC INSTANT CASH (hereinafter "QC") is a business organization

whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who, at all times herein mentioned, and was
doing business in the State of Utah, County of Weber.
8.

Defendant, RKT HOLDING (hereinafter "RKT") is a business organization

whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who, at all times herein mentioned, and was
doing business in the State of Utah, County of Weber.
9.

Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as
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Does 1 through 50, Inclusive, and therefore sues these defendants by such fictitious names.
Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained.
Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the fictitiously named
defendants is responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and plaintiffs
injuries.
10.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times herein

mentioned each of the defendants was the agent and the employee of their co-defendants, and in
doing the things hereinafter alleged were acting within the course and scope of their authority as
such agents, servants and employees, and with the permission and consent of their co-defendants.
11.

The unlawful conduct complained of herein occurred in Weber County, Utah as

did the other acts complained herein.
12.

On or about January 1985, plaintiff and defendant Haugen began a business

relationship involving an Amway distributorship which has since become very successful.
Defendant Haugen and defendant Cashmore were also involved with Amway as well as various
other business partnerships and ventures.
13.

On or about the fall of 1994, Mark Archer, an individual in plaintiffs Amway

organization, approached plaintiff with a business idea, which was to form a credit service
company utilizing post dated checks. At the time it was a relatively new concept and Mr. Archer
did not have the capital to fund its development. Plaintiff told Mr. Archer it was a great idea and
proposed entering an equal three way partnership with plaintiff and defendant Haugen providing
the funds and Mr. Archer as the manager. Defendant Haugen agreed to plaintiffs proposal and
3

the three way partnership entitled Quick Cash was formed. Additionally, plaintiff and Haugen
decided to keep their involvement in Quick Cash private so that it would not be detrimental to
their Amway business which they both agreed was their first priority.
14.

The next few years proved to be very successful for Quick Cash as it expanded to

eight (8) stores in Utah, California and Nevada. However, in the fall of 1996, plaintiff and
defendant Haugen suspected the third partner of embezzling. When confronted by them he left
the partnership leaving plaintiff and Haugen to be equal partners.
15.

On or about July of 1997, defendant Haugen told plaintiff that defendant

Cashmore knew a company that was interested in purchasing the Quick Cash stores. Plaintiff
had no active interest at the time of selling his interest in the stores. Defendants Haugen and
Cashmore met with plaintiff to discuss what the value of the stores. Defendant Cashmore
received information from another cash store chain that the Quick Cash stores were valued at
approximately 1.2 million dollars. Plaintiff informed defendant Haugen that he would not sell
the stores for 1.2 million or even 1.5 million and defendant Haugen agreed.
16.

On or about September 1997, defendant Haugen told plaintiff that defendant

Cashmore had an idea regarding the business and that plaintiff should hear defendant Cashmore
out. The three men met wherein defendant Cashmore revealed his plan to develop the business
to be large enough to take public with defendants Haugen, Cashmore and plaintiff as partners.
Plaintiff and defendant Haugen agreed to keep the existing stores as a separate entity between
them and start a new partnership with defendant Cashmore. Defendant Cashmore proposed a
figure that would be needed to start up the new stores which plaintiff and Haugen agreed to.
4

Defendant Cashmore then approached them a second time and a third time, each time raising the
amount of the capital needed from $100,000.00 to close to a half a million dollars. Plaintiff did
not want to borrow close to a half a million dollars and suggested that he and Haugen put up their
stores as their share of the venture and have defendant Cashmore put up the balance needed.
Defendant Cashmore informed plaintiff he was against this suggestion and that he did not want
the existing stores. Plaintiff believes and based on this belief alleges that it was at this time that
defendant Haugen and defendant Cashmore became at odds with plaintiff because plaintiff would
not agree with them on a satisfactory purchase price.
17.

On or about October 1997, defendant Haugen gave defendant Cashmore full

access to the stores so defendant Cashmore could obtain any information he needed to assist
defendant Cashmore in expanding and taking public his own stores. Defendant Haugen never
consulted plaintiff regarding allowing defendant Cashmore full access to the stores.
Additionally, it was at this time that defendant Haugen began to pressure plaintiff into selling
their stores. Defendant Haugen told plaintiff that he no longer wanted the stores as it was
detrimental to his Amway business. Additionally, defendant Haugen also told plaintiff that
defendant Cashmore had made an offer of $250,000.00 on their Sacramento store. A week later,
Haugen told plaintiff that Cashmore had offered $750,000.00 on all the stores including the
Sacramento store and that plaintiff had to sell and so that defendant Haugen could get out of the
check cashing business . Plaintiff believes and based on his belief alleges that he accepted the
offer of $750,000.00 because had he not defendant Cashmore would have opened additional
stores on his own without justly compensating plaintiff. Defendant Haugen specifically told
5

plaintiff that he wanted out of the business so that he could concentrate on Amway. Plaintiff and
Haugen agreed to sell and end their partnership after pressure from defendant Haugen because
defendant Haugen wanted out of the check cashing business.
18.

At different times throughout 1998, plaintiff asked defendant Haugen if he was in

partnership with defendant Cashmore in the business plaintiff and Haugen owned. Each time
defendant Haugen denied that he was still a partner in the business and told plaintiff that it was
not good for their Amway business to let anyone know about plaintiffs or Cashmore's check
cashing business.
19.

On or about May 1998, plaintiff, through the discovery of various documents,

discovered that defendant Haugen never sold his part of the partnership to defendant Cashmore
but instead continued the partnership with Cashmore instead of plaintiff. Plaintiff is informed
and believes and based on this belief alleges that if not for the representations of defendants
Haugen and Cashmore made to him he would not have sold his share of the partnership.
Additionally, because of the representations of defendants and each of them, plaintiff was forced
to sell at a price lower than the true value of the business and was forced to expend additional
capital to restart his own business.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Misrepresentation of Fact)
(Against All Defendants)
20.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 19 of his

complaint as though fully set forth herein.
21.

The above-stated representations were made to plaintiff to induce him to sell his
6

share of his partnership so that defendant Haugen and defendant Cashmore could be partners in
the same business.
22.

Defendant Haugen represented to plaintiff that he no longer wanted the stores'as it

was detrimental to his Amway business and that defendant Cashmore offered $750,000.00 to
purchase the business. This fact was a primary inducement in plaintiffs decision to sell his share
of the partnership and venture out on his own.
23.

The representations made by representatives of defendants were in fact false. The

true facts were that because of the existing business relationship between defendants Haugen and
Cashmore, Haugen wanted Cashmore to replace plaintiff as his partner. This was never revealed
to plaintiff. Additionally, plaintiff was never informed of the fact that defendant Haugen never
intended to receive any monies from the sale but rather intended to keep the money in the
business. In addition to QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company, defendants Haugen and
Cashmore branched out from Quick Cash, LLC and formed USA Cash Stores and USA Cash
Services. Had plaintiff been aware of the true facts, plaintiff would not have agreed to sell his
portion of the partnership.
24.

When defendants made these representations, they knew them to be false and

made these representations with the intention to deceive and defraud plaintiff and to induce
plaintiff to act in reliance on these representation in the manner hereafter alleged, or the with
expectation that plaintiff would so act.
25.

Plaintiff, at the time these representations were made by defendants and at the

time plaintiff took the actions herein alleged, was ignorant of the falsity of defendants'
7

representations and believed them to be true. In reliance on these representations, plaintiff was
induced to and did sell his portion of the partnership. Had plaintiff known the actual facts, he
would not have taken such action. Plaintiffs reliance on defendant's representations was
justified because plaintiff had no reason to believe defendants did not represent the truth of
various facts relating to plaintiffs sale of his portion of the partnership.
26.

As a proximate result of the fraudulent conduct of defendants as herein alleged,

plaintiff was induced to sell his portion of the partnership and has been damaged in an amount
according to proof at time of trial.
27.

The aforementioned conduct of defendants was an intentional misrepresentation,

deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendants with the intention on the part of
the defendants of thereby depriving plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing
injury, and was despicable conduct that subjected plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of plaintiff s rights, so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive
damages.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligent Misrepresentation of Fact)
(Against All Defendants)
28.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 27 of his

complaint as though fully set forth herein.
29.

When defendants made these representations, they had no reasonable ground for

believing them to be true.
8

30.

Defendants made these representations with the intention of inducing plaintiff to

act in reliance on these representations in the manner herein alleged, or with the expectation that
plaintiff would so act.
31.

As a proximate result of the fraudulent conduct of defendants as herein alleged,

plaintiff was induced to sell his portion of the partnership and by reason of which plaintiff has
been damaged in an amount according to proof at time of trial.
32.

The aforementioned conduct of defendants was a negligent misrepresentation,

deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendants with the intention on the part of
the defendants of thereby depriving plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing
injury, and was despicable conduct that subjected plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of plaintiff s rights, so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive
damages.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Relief Based on Rescission)
(Against All Defendants)
33.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 32 of his

complaint as though fully set forth herein.
34.

Plaintiff, at the time the aforementioned representations were made by defendants

and at the time plaintiff took the actions herein alleged, was ignorant of the falsity of defendants'
representations and believed them to be true. In reliance on these representations, plaintiff was

9

induced to and did enter into the contract with defendant Cashmore to sell his share of the
business.
35.

Plaintiff has and will suffer substantial harm and injury under the contract if it is

not rescinded in that as a result of defendants' conduct, plaintiff has and will be deprived of his
share and income derived from the aforementioned partnership.
36.

Plaintiff intends service of the summons and complaint in this action to serve as

notice of rescission of the contract, and hereby offers to restore all consideration furnished by
defendant Cashmore under the contract, on condition that defendants restore to him the
consideration furnished by plaintiff in an amount to be proven at time of trial.
37.

As a result of entering into the contract with defendant, plaintiff has incurred

expenses in addition to those alleged above (and will continue to incur them in an amount
unknown to him at this time) in an amount to be proven at time of trial. Plaintiff prays leave of
this court to amend this complaint to insert the true amount of those expenses when they are
ascertained.
38.

In performing the acts herein alleged, defendants intentionally misrepresented to

plaintiff material facts known to defendants, as stated above with the intention on the part of
defendants of depriving plaintiff of his money and property, thereby justifying an award of
punitive damages against the defendants.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Interference With Business Relations)
(Against All Defendants)
39.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 38 of his

complaint as though fully set forth herein.
40.

On or about the fall of 1994, plaintiff and defendant Haugen entered into a written

partnership agreement at Ogden, Utah for the purpose of carrying on the business of check
cashing service, under the name of Quick Cash, LLC, with its principal place of business at
Ogden, Utah.
41.

Defendant Cashmore knew of the above described relationship existing plaintiff

and defendant Haugen. As stated above, defendants and plaintiff all have a business relationship
involving Amway. Defendant Haugen falsely represented to plaintiff that it was in the best
interests of their Amway relationship for them to sell their Quick Cash business to defendant
Cashmore, all with the intent to harm plaintiff financially and to induce plaintiff to sell his share
of the Quick Cash business.
42.

The aforementioned acts of defendants, and each of them, were willful and

fraudulent. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to punitive damages.,
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Accounting)
(Against All Defendants)
43.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 42 of his

complaint as though fully set forth herein.
11

44.

On or about the fall of 1994, plaintiff and defendant Haugen entered into a written

partnership agreement at Odgen, Utah for the purpose of carrying on the business of check
cashing service, under the name of Quick Cash, LLC, with its principal place of business at Ogden, Utah.
45.

Thereafter and until about December, 1997, the partnership conducted the

aforementioned business, acquired assets, and incurred liabilities resulting in an overall profit.
As stated above, plaintiff was fraudulently induced into entering a purchase/sale agreement with
the defendants thereby losing his share of the partnership. The amount of assets and liabilities is
unknown to plaintiff and cannot be ascertained without an accounting of the profits and losses
that occurred during the period of time defendants Haugen and Cashmore were in possession of
Quick Cash.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1.

For general and special damages according to proof at time of trial;

2.

For incidental and consequential damages according to proof at time of trial;

3.

For punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and deter Defendants;

4.

For prejudgment interest at the highest possible rate from the earliest possible

5.

For an accounting of the profits and losses;

6.

For a rescission of the contract;

7.

For costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees herein incurred; and

8.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

date;
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DATED this " ^ > day of January, 2000.
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN

By.
-Den^r'tTSnuffer, Jr.
Attorney fWlPWintiff
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$25

•

$40

Q

$30

•

$25 Q
$0 Q
$120 •
$120 •
$120 •
$120 Q
$120 •
$120 Q
$120 Q
$120 •
$120 •
$120 •
$120 •
$0 •
$25 Q
$0 •
$0 •
$0 Q
$0 •
$25 Q
$0
$25

•
•

$25

•

Case Type
Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act (UIFSA)
— JUDGMENTS
Abstract of Foreign Judgment or
Decree
Abstract of Judgment or Order of
Utah Court or Agency
Abstract of Judgment or Order of
Utah State Tax Commission
Judgment by Confession
Renew Judgment
PROBATE
Adoption
Conservatorship
Estate Personal Rep - Formal
Estate Personal Rep - Informal
Guardianship
Involuntary Commitment
Minor's Settlement
Name Change
Supervised Administration
Trusts
Unspecified Probaate
<sPFrTAT MATTFR<\

O r E U l r t L . IVlrY JL 1 J3JtvO

Administrative Search Warrant
Arbitration Award
Criminal Investigation Search
Warrant
Deposit of Will
Determination of Competency in
Criminal Case
Extradition
Foreign Probate or Child
Custody Document
Hospital Lien
Judicial Approval of Document
not part of a Pending Case
Notice of deposition in out-ofstate case

Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728)
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916) 369-9750
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiffs,
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiffs,

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50
INCLUSIVE,
Defendants.

]
)
;)

MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF ETAN
EMANUEL ROSEN PRO HAC VICE

]
]
]
;
); Case No. 010901074
;
> Judge Roger S. Dutson
]

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., a resident attorney, moves this court to admit Etan Emanuel Rosen
pro hac vice for the limited purpose of this case.
This motion is made for the reasons that:

1.

I am a resident practicing attorney in the State of Utah, and an active member of

the Utah State Bar Association in good standing.
2.

I have examined the Affidavit of Etan Emanuel Rosen filed with this motion. I

find Mr. Rosen to be a reputable attorney and recommend his admission to practice before this
court during pendency of this matter.
3.

I hereby agree to do the following:
A.

Serve as local counsel for this case;

B.

Readily communicate with opposing counsel and the court regarding the

conduct of this case;
C.

Accept papers when served; and

D.

Recognize my responsibility and full authority to act for and on behalf of

the client in all case-related proceedings, including hearings, pretrial conferences, and trials,
should Mr. Rosen fail to respond to any order of this court.
DATED this2( day of February, 2001.
NELSpN), SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

DenverC^Smjffer, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
S \Pipkin\Pro-Hac-Motion

?

t Served

?y<-f

C^^Ju I^AJL

] Date/Time •. 3 -S~-0
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728)
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916)369-9750

I .am, pm

Server.
IW

IUJ

Tit's

. Process Server

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiffs,
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
SUMMONS
Plaintiffs,
vs.
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50
INCLUSIVE,

Case No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

Defendants.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: USA Cash Services
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in writing to the attached
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at Second District Court, Weber County,

_

2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401, and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiffs attorney, Denver
C. Snuffer, Jr., Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, UT 84070 a copy of
said Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded
in said Complaint, which has beenfiledwith the Clerk of said Court, a copy of which is hereto
annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED t h i s ? _ day of February, 2001.
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

DenVgfC. Snuffett Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Serve Defendant at:
USA Cash Services
c/o Kip Cashmore
Registered Agent
2522 Bonneville Terr. Dr.
Ogden, UT 84403
S:\Pipkin\Summons-USAServices

1

STATE OF

UTAH

:SS
Countv

of Salt Lake j
RETURN

1, R I C H A R D B. A L L R E D , being
say :

first duly

sworn upon o a t h , depose

and

I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the
time of service h e r e i n , and not party to or interested in the
w i t h i n titled action.
I received the within and hereto annexed Summons and Comp1 ai nt, on
the 23rd day of F e b r u a r y , 2 0 0 1 , and served the same upon U S A Cash
Services the said defendant on the 3_t_h day of M a r c h , 2 0 0 1 , by then
and there delivering and leaving with Kip C a s h m o r e the Registered
Agent of said d e f e n d a n t , being
a person of suitable age
and
d i s c r e t i o n there residing and served at the place of abode of said
defendant at 2522 Bonnev i 1 1 e T e r r . D r . . Q g d e n , in the countv of
W e b e r , State of U t a h , a true copy of the attached Summons and
Comp1 a int.
I do further certify and return that at the time of said service
upon said p e r s o n , I endorsed upon said copy so served, the d a t e ,
adding thereto my name and official title.
Dated at M i d v a i e , County
of M a r c h , 2 0 0 1 .

of Salt

L/arFT^, State of U t a h ,

the 5th

day

<iUJ_ A- (MuJ^
Process
Subscribed
2001 .
*

j

,«<* ? ^;>v

ffi^£§\

and

sworn

to before

Notary Public"*" " 1

LAU
REL D. ALLIED ,
74? 7 Sou*;:-.) Ens'

«

w ,,-,---,» - y

kUy <>, 2001

3

^;^"

state of Utah

me

Server

this 5 ~~ day of

(VIMLJ

' l B_ Wu^L

^

Notary

Pub1i c

^_JL0JL

iervic e

_J>.

Mi i eage

C a s e it: 0 1 0 9 0 1 0 7 ^
Matter#:
I r i ps @

* 1

M i ies

Other
$

6.00
TOTAL

Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728)
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916) 369-9750
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)
*•<&

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801) 576-1400

IJ**

r>

Attorney for Plaintiffs,
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
AFFIDAVIT OF ETAN
EMANUEL ROSEN

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50
INCLUSIVE,

Case No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

Defendants.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF

)

^StUttMth )

ss.

ETAN EMANUEL ROSEN, having been first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1.

I am a member of the firm BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN, 3230 Ramos Circle,

Sacramento, CA 95827 (Telephone: 916-369-9750).
2.

I received a J.D. from

3.

I am an active member in good standing of the State Bar Associations of

California.
4.

I have not been denied admission in the courts of any state or to any federal court.

5.

I am familiar with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and will abide by and

comply with them.
6.

The resident attorney with whom I am associated for the purposes of this case is

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. of the law firm of Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C., 10885 South
State Street, Sandy, Utah. 84070.84111.
DATED this f ± _ day of February, 2001.

\

Etan Emanuel Rosen
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ZZjday of February, 2001.

lA_J
NOTARY PUBLIC
NOTARY
Residing at: .:i33&^^>c-^u> £<u_<rJ<~
My Commission Expires:
i , , , . . .

^SSS^K

S:\Pipkin\Pro-Hac-Affidavit

(0

. ,

|

%

DONNA JEAN BROWN j>
Comm. # 1 2 7 4 1 2 8
.2
NOTARY PUBLIC-CAUF0BN1A (/J

rt vSaSSSrv
Sacramento County
*"
T ^ ^ S a p E ^ My Comrrj. Expires Aug. 17,2004 7*

'

•

r .,.,., I

Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728)
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916) 369-9750
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiffs,
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiffs,

]
)
]

vs.

]

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50
INCLUSIVE,

;
]
]
])
]
I
;

Defendants.

SUMMONS

Case No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

]

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: USA Cash Stores
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in writing to the attached
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at Second District Court, Weber County,

2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401, and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiff's attorney, Denver
C. Snuffer, Jr., Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, UT 84070 a copy of
said Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded
in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said Court, a copy of which is hereto
annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this ^ i day of February, 2001.
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

DenvepC: S nuffer J Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Serve Defendant at:
USA Cash Stores
c/o Kip Cashmore
2522 Bonneville Terr. Dr.
Ogden, UT 84403
S:\Pipkin\Summons-USACash

2

STATE OF UTAH
:SS
County of Sait Lake }
RETURN
I, RICHARD B. ALLRED, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and
say :
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the
time of service herein, and not party to or interested in the
within titled action.
i received the within and hereto annexed S ummon s and C omp1 a int, on
the 23rd day of February, 2001, and served the same upon USA Cash
Stores the said defendant on the 5th day of March, 2001. by then
and there delivering and leaving with Kip Cashmore the REgi stereo
Agent of said defendant, being a person of suitable age and
at the place of abode of s id
d i s c r etion
t e there
~. ~ residing
.
._
0 and served
"
"
"'"
"
Dr.,
O R d e n , in the county of
defendant at 2522 Bonneville Terr.
the
attached Summons and
Weber , State of Utah, a true copy of
Complaint.
I do further certify and return that at the time of said service
upon said person, I endorsed upon said copy so served, the date,
adding thereto my name and official titie.
Dated at Midvale, County of Sait La^re ,JState of Utah, the 51 h day
of March, 2001.

•l^j_Aaskju
Process
Subscribed
2001 .
!

to before

Mcrar/ Public

i /tfZ^h

MM

u n

aaera c a

Wv Ccr.rn.ss.on E>p,M't,
May o. 2001
state of Utah
rjir.-ji « • • *

wcwm -~nm -„.,

me t h i s

5"

d a y of

i

LAUREL CAUSED

--:.\.'« w \ , ^
,
v ^ - r ^ ' '
S
- - ^ " ^
"**

and sworn

Server

s

Notarv Pubi ic

jj
}

._£

MmlMm.

6_..,0_0

Service

Case \i: 01 090!07^
Matter^:
Trips (3

Mi I es

_£

M i i eag e

Other
6.00
TOTAi

i Served _ j i ^ ?
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728)
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916) 369-9750

^.,ik.,

j Date/Time « 4 ^ ^ . a m , p n i
Server^
J^4
™3

- Process Server

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiffs,
N THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
SUMMONS
Plaintiffs,
vs.
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50
INCLUSIVE,

Case No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

Defendants.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: RKT Holding Company
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in writing to the attached
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at Second District Court, Weber County,

2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401, and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiffs attorney, Denver
C. Snuffer, Jr., Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, UT 84070 a copy of
said Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded
in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said Court, a copy of which is hereto
annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED t h i s l L day of February, 2001.
NELSON; SNfUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

Deaver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Attorneys foiiPlaintiff
Serve Defendant at:
RKT Holding Company
c/o Kip Cashmore
Registered Agent
2522 Bonneville Terr. Dr.
Ogden, UT 84403
S:\Pipkin\Summons-RKT

2

STAVE OF UTAH

)
:SS
County of Salt Lake )
RETURN
I, RICHARD B. ALLRED, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and
say :
I a m a c i t i z e n of the U n i t e d S t a t e s over t h e a g e of 2! y e a r s at the
t i m e of s e r v i c e h e r e i n , a n d not p a r t y to or i n t e r e s t e d in the
within titled action.
I r e c e i v e d t h e w i t h i n and h e r e t o a n n e x e d S u m m o n s a n d C o m p l a i n t , o n
the 2 3rd d a y of F e b r u a r y , 2 0 0 1 , and s e r v e d t h e s a m e upon R_K_7
H o 1ding C o m p a n y the said d e f e n d a n t on the 5t h d a y of M a r c h , 200 1.
by then a n d there d e l i v e r i n g and l e a v i n g w i t h K i p C a s h m e r e the
R E g i s t e r e d A g e n t of said d e f e n d a n t , b e i n g a p e r s o n of s u i t a b l e a g e
and d i s c r e t i o n t h e r e r e s i d i n g a n d s e r v e d at the p l a c e of a b o d e ox
said d e f e n d a n t at 2 5 2 2 B o n n e v ij_l e T e r r . D r . , O g d e n , in th e c o u n t y
of W e b e r , S t a t e of U t a h , a true copy of t h e a t t a c h e d S u m m o n s and.
C o m p l a i n t.
I do f u r t h e r c e r t i f y and r e t u r n that at the time of said s e r v i c e
u p o n said p e r s o n , I e n d o r s e d u p o n said copy so s e r v e d , the d a t e ,
add i ng t h e r et o m y n a m e and o f f i c i a l t i t l e .
D a t e d at M i d v a l e , C o u n t y of Salt Lake,] S t a t e of U t a h , the 5 t h day
of M a r c h , 2 0 0 1 .
/ J
)

Process

Server

Subscribed and sworn to before m e this K ^ d a y of
2001 .

M ^i-L.>

,

Notar y Pub1 i c

$

Servi c e

6.00

Case it: 0 10901074
Mat teril:
T r i p s ($

Wiles

$

Mi i eage
Other

$
6.00
= = = = --- = - = —

TOTAL

\ Served
1 Date/Time 3 - 2 o I
| Server.^ M^
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728)
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916) 369-9750

T m

Process Ssn/ar

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiffs,
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
9

Plaintiffs,

\
)
]

vs.

]

RANDY HAUGEN, KJP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50
INCLUSIVE,

]
;
;
])
;
;)

Defendants.

SUMMONS

Case No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

)

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: Quick Cash, LLC
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in writing to the attached
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at Second District Court, Weber County,

sni, pm

2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401, and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiffs attorney, Denver
C. Snuffer, Jr., Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, UT 84070 a copy of
said Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded
in said Complaint, which has beenfiledwith the Clerk of said Court, a copy of which is hereto
annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this lk_ day of February, 2001.
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

©enVeTc.s|ilffe^Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Serve Defendant at:
Quick Cash LLC
c/o Travis L. Bowen, P.C.
Registered Agent
175 South West Temple, Suite 710
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0637
S.\Pipkin\Summons-QuickCash

2

STATE OF I TAH
:SS
Count) ol Salt Lake )
RETLR.N
I, RICHARD B. ALLRED, being first dul> sworn upon oath, depose and
say :
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at tht
time of service herein, and not part) to or interested in the
within titied action.
I received the within and hereto annexed Summons and complaint, on
the 2 3rd day ot February, 2001, ana served the same upon Qui C K
Cash. LLC the said defendant on the 2_n_d da> of Mareh. 2001, by then
and there delivering
and
leaving with
Travis L. Bowen
the
Registered Agent of said defendant, being a person of suitable age
and discretion there residing and served at the place of business
of said defendant at 173 So. West TtrinpU, #7 10, Salt Lakt City, i n
the county of Salt Lake, State of Utah, a true copy of the attached
Summons and Complaint.
1 do further certify and return that at the time of said service
upon said person, I endorsed upon said copy so served, the date,
adding thereto my name and official title.
Dated at Midvale, Count) of Salt La^t, jstate of Utah, the k th day
of March, 2001.

'KX*cX__
Process Server
Subscribed and sworn to before me this H ~- dav of
2001 .
s'ZF'

-'iX

' ' Uv^v^tvJ

hj'ary Public
LAURtLD.ALL.1E J

Nc t a r > Public
J \

I5

A

*Df *f^' '.* /

W~
^7/
"-—;>'

f 'v C O P ; : . . , ^ i r vo ^

KU) C 20'J1
S t a t e of U»-V.

.1

b^JX;

Service

ease it: 010^01070
Mattertt:
_ Trips (3

Miles

Mil *--dge
Other
$
6.00
- = :=-- = = -- = - TOTAL

Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728) -jf*
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916)369-9750

\ Date/Time A^ d-'^l—am, pm
trv^- c -^ v -

I Server-,
5

Title

.

Process Sen/er

1IWUWWIM 'I. I I'M

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiffs,
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiffs,

]
)
;

vs.

]

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50
INCLUSIVE,

;
;
]
]1
)
)1

Defendants.

SUMMONS

Case No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

)

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: Randy Haugen
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in writing to the attached
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at Second District Court, Weber County,

2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401, and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiffs attorney, Denver
C. Snuffer, Jr., Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, UT 84070 a copy of
said Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded
in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said Court, a copy of which is hereto
annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this J^l day of February, 2001.
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

JDenver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Attorneys Ur Plaintiff
Serve Defendant at:
Randy Haugen
S.\Pipkin\Summons-Haugen

2

STATE OF UTAH

:SS
County of Salt Lake )
RETURN
I, RICHARD B. ALLRED, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and
say:
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the
time of service herein, and not party to or interested in the
within titled action.
I received the within and hereto annexed S ummons and Comp1 a i n t, on
fhe 2 3rd day of February, 2001. and served the same upon Randy
Haugen the said defendant on the 2jid day of March, 2001. by then
and there delivering and leaving with V a l o v I e Haugen the spouse of
said defendant, being a person of suitable age and discretion there
residing and served at the place of abode of said defendant at 2kSS
Bonneville Terrace Dr., Ogden. in the county of Weber, State of
Utah, a true copy of the attached S ummons a nd Comp1 a int.
I do further certify and return that at the time of said service
upon said person, I endorsed upon said copy so served, the date,
adding thereto my name and official title.
Dated at Midvale, County of Salt Lj&e)
of March, 200 1.

State of Utah, the 4th day

fl (at-

Jl

Process Server
Subscribed and sworn to before me this *\

200
*

L
—_
^'"^-^

j /tf£*£i?\

day of

PA l**w\J

Notary Public

LAURELD.ALL3E0

t

Notary

Public

fv!v Cop'.miiiv.or. E x o : ' ^
May 6 H'OOl

State of u»..-nh

S

6.00

S e r vice

Case #: 01090 1 074
Matter*:
i Trips @ .40 Miles

$ 40.00

Mi 1eage
Other

$ 46.00
====zr=_===

TOTAL

i Served
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728)
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916) 369-9750

p - 5~ -O I

Date/Time

gm, pm

_ ILL

Server.
\'L^

?on»

Title

Process Server

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiffs,
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
SUMMONS
Plaintiffs,
vs.

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50
INCLUSIVE,

Case No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

Defendants.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: Kip Cashmore
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in writing to the attached
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at Second District Court, Weber County,

2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401, and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiffs attorney, Denver
C. Snuffer, Jr., Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, UT 84070 a copy of
said Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded
in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said Court, a copy of which is hereto
annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this ^ _ day of February, 2001.
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

Denver G. Snuffer, Jr.
U^

j

Attorneys-'for Plaintiff
Serve Defendant at:
Kip Cashmore
2522 Bonneville Terr. Dr.
Osden, UT 84403
S \Pipkin\Summons-Kip

1

STATE OF UTAH

)
:SS
Countv of Salt Lake )
RETURN
I, RICHARD B. ALLRED, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and
say:
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the
time of service herein, and not party to or interested in the
within titled action.
1 received the within and hereto annexed S urnmo n s and C onip 1 a i n t , on
the 23rd day of February , 2001, and served the same upon Kip
Cashmor e the said defendant on the 31. h (Jay of March, 2001, by then
and there delivering and leaving with Kip Cashmore the person of
said defendant, being a person of suitable age and discretion there
residing and served at the place of abode of said defendant at 2322
Bonneville Terr. Dr., O^den , in t h e c o u n t y of Weber., State of Ufa h .
a true copy of the attached Summons and Cornp la i n t .
I do further certify and return that at the time of said service
upon said person, I endorsed upon said copy so served, the date,
adding thereto my name and official title.
Dafed at Midvaie, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the 3th day
of March, 2001.
/

tuL
)

Process Server

Subscribed and sworn to before nit- this -5 — ' day of 1*1 vs^\X\^J
2001 .
~S*Z?zZ

i/^£3§\
1
iii 'irt:£ Q

\ V*V^4-|^V^/
. ^Tr^-V

" t o ^ Public*"" ~]

LAUREL D.ALLflED
:4'7 s ° l - r - • ° ^ MvComin;ss.on6xp:«?s
May 6. 2001
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J ^ g ^ L J L Ht<>^\
Notary Public

J^ 2^~*
State o\ Utah
i
—
^.mmmmmam
« _ .^
C a s e # : 0 1 090 1 07M.
Matter*:
2 Trips @ kQ Miles

^

6 . 00

Ser v i ce

$120.00

Mileage
Other

$126.00
= = = = = = = — = = TOTAL

Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728)
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916)369-9750
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Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiffs,
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiffs,

]
)
]

vs.

]

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50
INCLUSIVE,

]
;
]
;1
;
]1

Defendants.

SUMMONS

Case No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

)

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: QC Instant Cash
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in writing to the attached
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at Second District Court, Weber County,

2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401, and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiffs attorney, Denver
C. Snuffer, Jr., Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, UT 84070 a copy of
said Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded
in said Complaint, which has beenfiledwith the Clerk of said Court, a copy of which is hereto
annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this^L day of February, 2001.
NELSON, SUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.

Denver C. f njiiffer, Jr.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Serve Defendant at:
QC Instant Cash, LLC
c/o Travis L. Bowen, P.C.
Registered Agent
175 South West Temple, Suite 710
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0637
S:\Pipkin\Summons-QC

2

STATE OF UTAH
SS
County of Salt Lake )
RETURN
I, RICHARD B. ALLRED, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and
say:
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the
time of service herein, and not party to or interested in the
within titled action.
t received the within and hereto annexed Summons and Complaint, on
the 23rd day of February, 2001, and served the same upon QC Instant
Ca,sji the said defendant on the 2nd day of March, 2001, by then and
there delivering and leaving with Travis L. Bower, the Res i s ter ed
Agent of said defendant. being a person of suitable age: and
discretion there residing and served at the place of b u s i n es s of
said defendant at 175 So, West Temple, #710, Salt lake City , i n t h e
county of Salt Lake, State of Utah, a true copy of the attached
Summons and Complaint.
I do further certify and return that at the time of said service
upon said person, I endorsed upon said copy so served, the date,
adding thereto my name and official title.
Dated at Midvale, County of Salt L
of Majrch., 2001 .

State of Utah, the ^th day

Process S e rv e r
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
2001 .

M -Jday of

pi

*SA.\-4>~>

Notary Pubiic

LAURtLD.ALinEL

Notary

Public

May 6. 2001

State of Utah

6.00

5er v ice

6.00

Mi ieage

Case #: 0 1090107^
Matters:
2 T r i p s @ ._2 M l i e s

$

12.00
TOTAL

»em'eo'u'i&'
30 2 56 PH '01
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,

]
DEFENDANTS' ANSWER
(Jury Demand)

vs.

])
1
]

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

])
]
])
]
;

Civil No. 010901074

Defendants.

]

Judge Roger S. Dutson

Defendants Randy.JHaugen, Kip_Cashmoxe, Quick Cash, LLC, USA^ Cash Stores, USA
Cash Services, QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company ("Defendants") hereby answer
Plaintiffs complaint and demand trial by jury.

1.

Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to

the truth of each and every averment contained in paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint and,
therefore, deny paragraph 1 of Plaintiff s Complaint.
2.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

3.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

4.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

5.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

6.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

7.

Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

8.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

9.

Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

10.

Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
11.

Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
12.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
13.

Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to

the truth of each and every averment contained in paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs Complaint and,
therefore, deny each and every averment contained therein, except Defendants admit that Mr.
Haugen was involved in the establishment of Quick Cash.

14.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
15.

Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs

Complaint, but admit that Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore met with Plaintiff to discuss the stores
in 1997.
16.

Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
17.

Defendants deny in part the averments contained in paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs

Complaint, but admit that when Mr. Cashmore offered $750,000 to purchase seven of the stores,
Plaintiff and Mr. Haugen agreed to sell their interests in their partnership.
18.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs

Complaint, except admit that Mr. Haugen did tell the Plaintiff truthfully that he was not a partner
with Mr. Cashmore in the check cashing business.
19.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
20.

Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment,

admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 19 above.
21.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
22.

Defendants admit that Mr. Cashmore offered $750,000 to purchase the business

and that Mr. Haugen told Plaintiff he wanted to sell the business. Defendants deny each and
every other averment contained in paragraph 22 of Plaintiff s Complaint.

23.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
24.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
25.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
26.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
27.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
28.

Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment,

admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 above.
29.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
30.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
31.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
32.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
33.

Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment,

admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 32 above.

34.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
35.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
36.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
37.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
38.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
39.

Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment,

admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 above.
40.

Defendants admit that Plaintiff and Mr. Haugen entered into a business

arrangement in 1994 concerning check cashing services, but deny each and every other averment
contained in paragraph 40 of Plaintiffs Complaint.
41.

Defendants admit that Mr. Cashmore knew that there was an existing business

relationship between Plaintiff and Mr. Haugen and that Mr. Cashmore, Mr. Haugen and Plaintiff
did have a business relationship involving Amway, but deny each and every other averment
contained in paragraph 41 of Plaintiff s Complaint.
42.
Complaint.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 42 of Plaintiffs

M.

Defendants itptat and incotpoiate htitin by ttfeitnct each and tvtr/ avtra\tnt,

admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 42 above.
44.

Defendants admit that Mr. Haugen and Plaintiff entered into a business

relationship in 1994 for the purpose of carrying on a check cashing business, but deny each and
every other averment contained in paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs Complaint.
45.

Defendants admit that the check cashing business was carried on until about

December 1997, but deny each and every other averment contained in paragraph 45 of Plaintiffs
Complaint.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
46.

Plaintiffs Complaint and each claim for relief contained therein fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
47.

Plaintiffs Complaint and each claim for relief contained therein is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
48.

Plaintiffs Complaint and each claim for relief contained therein is barred by the

doctrine of waiver.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
49.

Plaintiff is estopped by reasons of his own actions in selling the business with the

advice and assistance of counsel and Plaintiff, therefore, is barred from pursuing the claims
contained in the Complaint.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
50.

Any damages caused to Plaintiff as a result of any of the claims contained in

Plaintiffs Complaint, which damages Defendants specifically deny occurred, were incurred as a
result of Plaintiffs own fault which is greater than or equal to the fault of the Defendants, which
fault these Defendants specifically deny exists, and, therefore, Plaintiff is barred from recovering
any damages from the Defendants.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
51.

Plaintiffs Complaint and each and every claim from relief contained therein is

barred by the doctrine of laches.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for relief as follows:
.1.

That Plaintiff take nothing by his action;

2.

That Defendants be awarded all costs of suit incurred herein, including reasonable
attorneys fees;

3.

For such further and other relief as the Court deems proper.

DATED:

March 29, 2001.
ANDERSON A KARRENBERG

Thomas R. Karfenberg
James H. Tily
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the 29th
day of March, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of Defendants' Answer to be served, via
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827

"TM/'aAW/ts&Sffrvie^^^

LAW OFFICES
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A PHOFESsJWt CO&ORAnON

THOMAS R. KARRENBERG
JOHN T. ANDERSON
FRANCIS J. CARNEY
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY
S C O n A. CALL
JOHN P. MULLEN
JON V. HARPER
NATHAN B. WILCOX
STEPHEN P. HORVAT
SHAYNE R. KOHLER
JAMES H. TILY

700 BANK ONE TOWER

MM
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50 WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101-2006
TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700
TELECOPIER (801) 364-7697

March 29, 2001
Via U.S. Mail
Clerk of the Court
Second District Court, Weber County
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Re:

Kerry Pipkin v. Randy Haugen, et al.
Civil No. 010901074

Dear Clerk:
Enclosed please find the original and one copy of Defendants' Answer (Jury
Demand), along with a check in the amount of $50 to cover the fee for filing a jury
demand. Please file the original in the above-referenced action and date-stamp and
return the copy to the undersigned in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope.
Thank you for your help in this matter.
Very truly yours,

Michelle R. Somers
Secretary

Enclosure

2001 MAY 2 3 P lc 2 5

Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728)
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916) 369-9750

SECOND DISTRICT COURT

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801) 576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiffs,
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiffs,

]
)
])

vs.

,

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50
INCLUSIVE,

\
]
]
]
]
;)

Defendants.

ORDER ADMITTING ETAN
EMANUEL ROSEN PRO HAC VICE

Case No. 010901074

]> Judge Roger S. Dutson

The Court having reviewed the Affidavit of Etan Emanuel Rosen Pro Hac Vice and the
Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Etan Emanual Rosen, and good cause appearing
therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Etan Emanual Rosen is admitted to practice before this
Court in this matter during the pendency of this matter.
nATCnf..
DATED
this

,
,
day of

MAY 2 3 2001

, 2001.

BYTHFCQURT

Hefterjrole William-A. Thornc—
District Court Judge

S:\Pipkin\Pro-Hac-Order
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Utah §tatc Bar
*0

•

/•'^,
*#

645 South 200 East • Suite 310
Salt Lake City Utah 84111-3834
Telephone 801-531-9077- 1-800-698-9077
FAX 801-531-0660
www utahbarorg

fl;p,rP »0ONT*

ftps 30 12 5u W "01

in C Baldwin
cutive Director

April 25, 2001

RECEIPT OF PRO HAC VICE FILING FEE

Re:

Pro Hac Vice Filing Fee Receipt
010901074
Case No.:
Case Name: Kerry Pipkin v. Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore,
Quick Cash, LLC, USA Cash Stores, USA Cash
Services, QC Instant Cash, RKT Holding Company
And Does 1 through 50 inclusive

Clerk of the Court:
This letter serves as receipt that the $75.00 pro hac vice filing fee for
Etan Emanuel Rosen, in the above referenced case, has been paid to the Utah
State Bar. If you have any questions, please call the Bar at (801) 531-9077.
Very truly yours,

Phylli^A. Yardley (j
Assistant to General Counsel
Fox/prohac/recpt 110
)ard of Commissioners
*vid O Nuffer
ssident
-ott Daniels
ssident Elect
hn A Adams
inci Snow Bockelie
leresa M Cook
George Dames
laronA Donovan
sniseA Dragoo
alvin Gould
andy S Kester
Dbert K Merrell, CPA
?bra J Moore
Dane Nolan

(J

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
~~.il

]\

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,

])

vs.
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
Defendants.

w w

M

"*

w

~

>~ 7 (^P')

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

]
) Civil No. 010901074
;
]> Judge Roger S. Dutson
]
]
]
]

I hereby certify that on the

day of July, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of

Defendants' Rule 26(a) Disclosures to be served via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070

Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
DATED:

July j Z

,2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

Thomas R. Mrrenberg
Jathes H. Tily
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the

1^

day of July, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Certificate of Service was
served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827

^i/v^JSj/^

LAW OFFICES

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

THOMAS R. KARRENBERG
JOHN T. ANDERSON
FRANCIS J. CARNEY
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY
SCOTT A. CAU
JOHN P. MULLEN
JON V. HARPER
NATHAN B. WILCOX
STEPHEN P. HORVAT
SHAYNE R. KOHLER
JAMES H. T1LY

700 BANK ONE TOWER
50 WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101-2006
TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700
TELECOPIER (801) 364-7697

July 12, 2001

Clerk of the Court
Second District Court, Weber County
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Re:

Kerry Pipkin v. Randy Haugen, et al.
Civil No. 010901074

Dear Clerk:
Enclosed please find the original and one copy of a Certificate of Service in the
above-referenced action. Please file the original and date-stamp and return the copy to
the undersigned in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope.
Thank you for your assistance.

Ol

' Suzanne H. Hurst
Secretary to James H. Tily

Enclosures

J

VA

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,

]
]>
1

VS.

]

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

;)
;
;)
;
;

Defendants.

]

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

Defendants Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore, Quick Cash, LLC, USA Cash Stores, USA
Cash Services, QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company ("Defendants") hereby move the
court for an order of summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The grounds for Defendants' motion are set forth in the accompanying memorandum of points
and authorities.

DATED:
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

Lrl/Lv

Thomas R. Karrenberg
James H. Tilj
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or c-h.,.i..vo . v ,-.Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake Citv

\ nrrn ~f 'Vnderson &
*» I.? day

of July, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
i iMlJgi1 fliquid, upon

Denver C. Snuffei, -..
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 9582 7

C;R^6U^-.
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LAW OFFICES

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

THOMAS R. KARRENBERG
JOHN T. ANDERSON
FRANCIS J. CARNEY
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY
SCOn A. CALL
JOHN P. MULLEN
JON V. HARPER
NATHAN B. WILCOX
STEPHEN P. HORVAT
SHAYNE R. KOHLER
JAMES H. TILY

-n

700 BANK ONE TOWER
5 0 WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101-2006
TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700
TELECOPIER (801) 364-7697

Clerk of the Court
Second District Court, Weber County
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Re:

Kerry Pipkin v. Randv Haugen, et al.
Civil No. 010901074

Dear Clei k:
Enclosed please find the original and one copy of the following papers to be filed in the
above-referenced action:
9

1

Motion for Summary Judgment;

2.

Memorandi im in Support of Motion for Sum mar j Ji ldgment;

4

\ffidavit of Kip Cashmore; and
\ffidavit of Randy Haugen.

Please file the originals and date-stamp and return the copies to the undersigned in the
enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope.
Thank you for your assistance.
t'

Sincerely,
^

Suzann^H. Hursi
Secretary to Tame
Enclosures

20GI .:\. \': ."=> 2 - 2 5
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 841ui
Telephone: (801)534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)

KERRY PIPKIN,

)
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

)
Civil No. 010901074
I m l g L R»>)?,i'i ,N D u l M i n

)

Defendants.

)
)

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
December 1997, Quick Cash, LLC ("Quick Cash") operated seven check-cashing
stores. Defendant Randy Haugen ("Haugen") and Plaintill Ken\ Pipkin I'Tipkm i VK \\ M\\ uril
a one-half, 50% membership interest in Quick Cash. Defendant Kip Cashmore ("Cashmore")
pin chased Quit k ( ;isli Irmu

einki I1'*)/

hpkin now claims he was

ddiutidtxi (M in.!1! lili'M'iiill', m l n t n n l 'villi I1, I'lpkin ui.l

iislunun mlr selling lui; mlu "il in

Quick Cash and should somehow still be entitled to profits from oi included in the continuing
businesses of Cashmore.
Pipkin alleges fraud and negligent misrepresentation against the Defendants but cannot
identity a single untrue or negligent statement or omission made by any of the Defendants.
Pipkm alleges iiiluilioiul mlrifrrrnn 1 i1 illli irnimmn ICLIIIUILS jjvtiiis! Drlcndanls 1: it it
is predicated on the failed fraud claims and Pipkin cannot identify a single other wrongful act by
Defendants to support such a claim. Pipkin claims the equitable remedies of accounting and
rescission but lacks any basis for equitable relief. Pipkin assert

h> • i u

Pendants

besides Cashmore and Haugen yet fails to identity a single act committed ! . :- -se Defendants or
i vh;! these Defenda nts shoi ild be liable fc i ai i) • 3f Plaintif f s cla
remorse for which there is no legal remed)

• *

For the reasons outlined l~u,^

..;

* !.- "s
f J ^kii s 'amis

against all Defendants fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed pursuant to Utah K

J

56.
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.
Quick Cash
("Haugen .
2.

"

i« I.JIIM IUU 1 in.iiMi.ii.ii null Pipkiii iMI:IIi I'AiinJI ;i SlH iiienihei >lii|i mien, si in

* v . Complaint :• * - attached hereto as Exhibit A; Affidavit of Randy Haugen
attached hereto as Exhibit B.)
In or around October 1997, Haugen told Pipki:

membership interest in Quick Cash, because he wanted longer wanted to be iiivoh ed in owning

Quick Cash or any other check-cashing businesses.

(See Exhibit A, Complaint at H 22; See

Exhibit B, Haugen Aff. at 1 5.)
3.
Exhibit A, Complaint at f 1 7; Exhibit B, I laugen Aff. at "f 6; Affidavit of Kip Cashmore
("Cashmore Aff.'' ) at "f 2, attached hereto as Exhibit C.)
4.

Cashmore paid $750,000 for Quick Cash. Cashmore paid $375, 000 t< > PIpl; i n f< n

Pipkin's 50% ownership interest in Quick Cash

Cashmore paid $375,000 •

!!.*•:,•

between Pipkin and Cashmore ("Pipkin Agreement') at f 2(a), attached hereto as Exhibit D;
Membership Purchase Agreement between Haugen and Cashmore ("Haugen Agreement") at f
i. attached hereto as Exhibit E; Cashmore ** ff at ff 2 !•; I lai lgen \ ff at f ' 7 )
I >ipkin, Haugen and Cashmore were represented by the North Carolina law firm
o! iJlliull n ul|i mil I u | M i il i ni in diiiliiii)" 11 it ripkm .null ll.iiiLjeii Ayimnenh

(See I'xlliihil ( ,

Cashmore Aff. at 1 5; Exhibit B, Haugen Aff. at 1 7.)
6

Cashmore paid Pipkiii > 5 ? 000 pursuant to the Pipkin Agreement

(See Exhibit

C, Cashmore Aff. at 1 3 . )
7

Pipkin, Haugen and Cashmore have each fully performed under the Pipkin and

Haugen Ayjcniinils
8,

I Src I'Wululll Ihuuni Ml .ill ' I \luhl (' l 'asluiiDic A11 Jill I I l
received and has retained $375,000 in consideration for the Pipkin

Agreement in 1997. Pipkin has not tendered any payments back to Cashmore nor has he ever

offered to tender back the consideration he received under the Pipkin Agreement.

(See Exhibit

ashmore
9.

Haugen and Cashmore have fully performed the Haugen Agreement. (See Exhibit

B, Haugen Aff. at 1 7 ; Exhibit C, Cashmore Aff. at 1 4 . )
'I "jsiiniore nc v\ promised

HI .IIJL'HTHJ

1 i include Pipkin in any nl his hiluiv business.

ventures as a condition of his agreement with Pipkin to purchase Pipkin's interest in Quick Cash.
^

E x h i b i t

^

ii.

C a s h m o r e

A

j|

|1(

i|

u

|

The Pipkin Agreement provides for the sak ^* :i\

- ••

Quick Cash. There is no provision that entitles Pipkin to future royalties o:r future profits from
Qi lick Cash <

lei: Ibi isiness \ entures of Cashmnie

I Sre E:

> Pipkin Igreeiiie lit at

f 11(d)'("... Agreement contains the sole and entire agreement between the parties ....").)
1 laugen did not sell his interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore in order to replace
Pipkin as his partner in Quick Cash. (See Exhibit B

* I)

\fter Haugen sold his interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore, Haugen has had no
illfftTMII III <,hlli I' I .1 Jl HI a i d

Ullli'l I !l"*1

l

« MOIITIO liii'-Ult'SM * HJllll | JsliliHiH 1

\\u

I \\ |||| i|| jR,

Haugen Aff. at if 8; Exhibit C, Cashmore \t'\ at « >
1 dendant liKT Holding company is . , an company that holds real property to
sell later for development.

Cashmore and Haugen are eu owners nl M r lloldnif ('ninpanv.

RKT Holding Company does not operate any check-cashing or similar businesses and is entirely
sqwrale fmm .in nl ('.isliinim

i link osliiiijj busincssi . (, See Exh ibit C, Cashmore Aff. at f

8; Exhibit B, Haugen Aff. at 110.)
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Defendant USA Cash Stores was a DBA for Quick Cash but that name is no

longei used li ' I'ashnioie nil .in, ' ol lus check-cashing businesses or any other entity i n 'which
Cashmore has an interest. (See Exhibit C, Cashmore Aff. at f 9.)
1

*

Defendant QC Instant Cash is a California limited liability company operating a

check-cashinp
was sold to Cashmore
Cashmore ^
i/.

Cashmore is the only member of QC Instant Cash. (See Exhibit C,
)

Defendant USA Cash Services is a unr

*

Cashmore Aff. at 11.)
il il I

ARGUMENT

DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL OF
PIPKIN'S CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS. BECAUSE HE CANNOT
PRESENT ANY SET OF FACTS TO HIS SUPPORT CLAIMS AGAINST ANY OF THE
DEFENDANTS.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Under well-settled principles o( lliuli law, ill IN Court may properly grant Defendants'
summary judgment, dismissing Pipkin's claims if "there i^ IK fact and the [Defendant] is entitled to judgment as a mat*
also Malonc v 1 aiku 8Jfi !' Ml I

r

KJ I*

i

^6(c). See

I U (I lull |«w,'i Waneii v. Frovu City Coip *

1125, 1127 (Utah 1992); Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank. 827 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 1992).
Under the undisputed material facts of this ease, Pipkin cannot provide any set of facts
that would support his Causes of Action I'm Vt\\\w\ fNruit^nK Miisirpresentalinii
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liiinilmnal

Interference with Economic Relations, Rescission or Accounting agai nst any of the Defendants.
Pipkin's claims therefore fail as a matter of law, and should be dismissed pursuant to Utah R.
I "mi • P 56
1

Pipkin's Claims for Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Fail as a Matter
of Law Because Pipkin's Alleged Misrepresentations Are All True.

Tn iiiruiiiiliiiiii i\ trj'iiii i il.'iiiii a plamlill in in ".I1 h" .ill IV" ih pirsenl fat1 io ".Jtislh ' .ill lllllii"
essential elements r\ «s :r 4 n.
presen

••-••.

ii-:\.

i ncsL* include
..:.-.

. representation; (2) concerning a
»e representor either knew tube

false or made recklessly knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which the base of such
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other
thereby induced to act; (8) to the plaintiff's injury and damage. See Dugan v. Jones. 615 P.2d
L! Wllllah icAH0i
Pipkin cannot identify a single untrue or negligent representation made by Hauuen "
Cashmore, a fundamental prerequisite for maintaining his fraud or negligent misrepresentation
claims See Duuan v. Jones fih P M I M'MHiah I'M)! lajdme v^ LijjJJis^ikLt.Vip , 4/1 P M
659 (Utah 1967) (false statement is an essential element of a negligent nils representation claim).
Pipkin luiiiiiiioi i1 i" jiil IdiriK 1 ,i i| i[ IN, HI i Hi!', III jinn I mi negligent misrepresentation claims foi the
simple reason that he fails to identify a single untrue statement or negligent misrepresentation
made by Haugen or Cashmore, Pipkin's alleged misrepresentations are nothing more than true
statemi
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affidavits. The alleged misrepresentations or material omissions upon which Pipkin bases his
fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are identified below and the insufficiency of each
allegation as a basis for a misrepresentation claim is discussed.
Pipkin's Alleged Misstatements and Omissions:
h p h n rlwiih flkil lliiu i in 11>liI I'lpkin llul ('ii hninit n fined $7Sf),IHHI in puidiasi1 IJuitl
Cash. See Exhibit A, Complaint at \ ,.,.

This would have been a ti ue statement and could not

give rise to a fraud or negligent misrepresentation claim. Cashmore offered and paid $750,000
for Quick Cash. See Exhibit D, Pipkin Agreement; Exhibit E, 1 lai igeri Agreement
Pipkin asserts that Haugen told Pipkin that Haugen no longer wanted to own Haugen's
interest in Qi lick Cash

See Ex 1 libit "I| C

iigen readilj admits he told pipkin

that he no longer wanted to own his interest in Quick Cash and no longer wanted to be involved
in any check-cashing businesses. See Exhibit B, Haugen Aff, at f
fraud claim with true statements made bj

c

Parkin cannot support, his

\,\wv\\ inn IIHIIIHT wmtvd in In nil business

with Pipkin or that Haugen wanted to sell his interest to concentrate on his other businesses
Pipkin i Linn1, il "vvii". .1 It.Hiilttlni'i iimisMim 111„11 ILniiicii si/urll) wanted Cashmore to be
his partner in Quick Cash instead of Pipkin. See Exhibit A, Complaint at if 23. This claim is
absurd on its face. Haugen sold his interest to Cashmore in 1997 and has had no involvement in
any check-cashing businesses with Cashmore since that tin1-;

Viv Fxhibit I! Ihupni AJI „il ]\ S

Exhibit C, Cashmore Aff, at: f 7 Pipkin claims that Cashmore and Haugen have continued to be
ill " ol\ ed In check ca shing businesses to^dlta lull Pipkin .in mi in I ulaiuly a single I.nl to support
this conclusory claim. See Exhibit A, Complaint at t 1 19, 21, 23. In fact, the allegation is
033001 Memo in Support of Motion for Summary
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completely false. Sec l-'xhihil II, ILmi'ni All «it 1 K, Cishmmc <Ai II .nil "I

Ill ' .iftidjrvil11 ill

Haugen and Cashmore establish that Haugen has had absolutely no involvement or interest in
Cashn
1997.

.

,<

)ecember

kl
Pipkin further makes the irrelevant allegation that he only agreed to sell his interest in

Quick f\ish hiTiiusr" hi bdicvni 111,il ill In iliull mil fiishinnir \\nu\t\ npcn hi1* mui

4\W\,K IMIIHHII

"justly compensating" Pipkin. See Exhibit A, Complaint at f .1 7 I his fact, even if true, would
nevertheless be insufficient to suppoi t a ft and claim

Pipkin fails to identify a single statement

made by Haugen or Cashmore that would lead Pipkin to believe Cashmore was goiiig to open his
own stores without "justly compensating" Pipkin or why Pipkin would be entitled In
< --*

"I "astininit1 Ofinied t-vithoiii Pipkin

'

Becauv , i.!:

JIIL-Z.-

• ; usrepresentation is true and there were no material omissions,

Pipkin cannot support a tram,

,; i..,..

misrepresentation claim against Pipkin ur 1 laugen as a

matter of law and these claims fail as a matter of law.
0

Pipkin's Third Cause of Action for Intentional Interference with Economic
Relations Against the Defendants Fail as a Matter of Law Because Pipkin Has
Not and Cannot Present Facts to Satisfy the Elements of That Claim.

Pipkin cannot support his claim for interference with economic relations against any of
llit DHunLiiil i

I ni •tii ill Iin11in

IUMUI!

iill iniiileiiliuii.il mierference with economic relations. a

plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or
potential economic relations (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing

injury to the plaintiff. See Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah
1982). Pipkin cannot meet these elements.
Indeed, Pipkin's claim for intentional interference against Haugen, his former partner, is
nonsensical. Pipkin asserts that Haugen interfered with his economic relations with Pipkin by
expressing to Pipkin that he thought it was in their best business interests to sell Quick Cash to
Cashmore. See Exhibit A, Complaint at 1 41. Haugen could not have interfered with his own
economic relations with Pipkin and there were no future economic relations with which Haugen
could have interfered.
Furthermore, courts have uniformly recognized that a claim for intentional interference is
predicated an improper motive or improper means used by the defendant. See Leigh Furniture.
657 P.2d at 304. Pipkin cannot present any facts to show that Cashmore or Haugen acted for an
improper purpose or used improper means in any way. Pipkin alleges only that "Cashmore knew
of the ... relationship existing between plaintiff [Pipkin] and defendant Haugen." See Exhibit A,
Complaint at % 41. The fact of whether Cashmore knew about Haugen and Pipkin's business
relationship when he purchased Quick Cash is entirely insufficient to support a claim for
intentional interference with economic relations.
Equally fatal to Pipkin's claim, Pipkin cannot show any injury as a result of the alleged
interference. Pipkin alleges that Haugen told Pipkin that Haugen wanted to sell his interest with
"the intent to harm plaintiff financially...." See Exhibit A, Complaint at f 41. Yet Pipkin does
not identify how he was injured, because he cannot. He executed and arms length agreement
with Cashmore to sell his interest in Quick Cash in 1997 and has retained the $375,000
033001 Memo in Support of Motion for Summary
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consideration he received under the Pipkin Agreement. Because Pipkin has not and cannot
present facts to satisfy the requisite elements of his claim for intentional interference with
economic relations against Pipkin and Cashmore, this claim fails as a matter of law.
C.

Pipkin's Fourth and Fifth Causes Of Action For Accounting and Rescission
Fail As A Matter Of Law.

As outlined above, Pipkin has no claims of relief against Cashmore or Haugen.
Presumably, Pipkin's equitable claims are predicated on his legal claims that fail as a matter of
law as demonstrated above. Thus, Pipkin cannot support his equitable claims for accounting and
rescission, because equitable remedies will grant relief only legal remedies are insufficient and
"when fairness and good conscience so demand." Jacobson v. Jacobson. 557 P.2d 156, 158
(Utah 1977).

Pipkin cannot show that legal remedies would be insufficient.

Furthermore,

equitable remedies are an extraordinary relief and are not available to parties who slumber on
their rights. Jacobson, 557 P.2d at 158-59. Pipkin alleges he became aware of the actions that
gave rise to this complaint in May 1998. Yet despite Pipkin's allegation of discovering his injury
in May 1998, Pipkin chose to retain the $375,000 he received under the Pipkin Agreement and
did not assert any claims until January 31, 2001. Pipkin was not vigilant in pursuing his rights
and he is therefore not entitled to any equitable remedies. IcL Pipkin's equitable claims for
accounting and rescission therefore fail as a matter of law.
D.

Pipkin's Claims Against the Other Named Defendants Fail as a Matter of
Law,

Pipkin named RKT Holding Company, QC Instant Cash, and John Does 1 through 10 in
the Complaint.

Pipkin does not and cannot identify any actions by these other defendants that

033001 Memo in Support of Motion for Summary
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would give rise to any causes of action against them. RKT Holding Company is and has always
been an entirely separate business entity from the matters in this Complaint and separate from
Quick Cash; RKT Holding Company is a company that holds real property to sell later for
development. See Exhibit C, Cashmore Aff. at f 8; Exhibit b, Haugen Aff. at f 10. QC Instant
Cash is a California limited liability company operating a check-cashing business in California
and was an asset owned by Quick Cash when Quick Cash was sold to Cashmore. See Exhibit C,
Cashmore Aff. at K 10. Thus, Pipkin has not and cannot present any facts to show that the
entities of RKT Holding Company, QC Instant Cash, or any other entity are in any way liable to
Pipkin for anything. Accordingly, summary judgment is warranted on Pipkin's claims against
RKT Holding Company, QC Instant Cash, and any other unrelated defendants.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, Defendants should be awarded summary judgment on all
of Pipkin's Causes of Action against the Defendants pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56.
DATED:

July / 3

,2001.
ANDERSON & kARRENBERG

JM'f//
lipomas R. &arrenberg
James H. Tily
Attorney for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the 1 ^
day of July, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Memorandum in Support of Defendants1
Motion for Summary Judgment to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070

Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
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Etan E. Rosen (SBN 17372S)
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916) 369-9750
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801)576-1400
Attorney for Plaintiffs,
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,

j
)
]

Plaintiffs,

COMPLAINT

vs.
RANDY HAUGEN. KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH. LLC. USA CASH
STORES. USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH. RKT HOLDING
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50
INCLUSIVE.

;
;
;
])
]
)

Case No. 010901074
t

Judge Roger S. Dutson

Defendants.

Plaintiffs allege:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.
of Utah.

Plaintiff is and at all times herein mentioned a resident of Weber County, State

2.

Defendant RANDY HAUGEN. is and at all times herein mentioned was. a

resident of Weber County. Utah.
3.

Defendant KIP CASHMORE. is and at all times herein mentioned was. a resident

of Weber County, Utah.
4.

Defendant, QUICK CASH. LLC (hereinafter "QUICK CASH") is a limited

liability company and who, at all times herein mentioned, and was doing business in the State of
Utah. County of Weber.
5.

Defendant. USA CASH STORES (hereinafter "USA CASH") is a

business organization whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who. at all times herein
mentioned, and was doing business in the State of Utah. County of Weber.
6.

Defendant. USA CASH SERVICES (hereinafter "CASH SERVICES") is a

business organization whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who, at all times herein
mentioned, and was doing business in the State of Utah. County of Weber.
7.

Defendant. QC INSTANT CASH (hereinafter "QC") is a business organization

whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who, at all times herein mentioned, and was
doing business in the State of Utah. County of Weber.
S.

Defendant, RKT HOLDING (hereinafter "RKT') is a business organization

whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who. at all times herein mentioned, and was
doing business in the State of Utah. County of Weber.
9.

Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as

o

the three way partnership entitled Quick Cash was formed.

Additionally, plaintiff and Haugen

decided to keep their involvement in Quick Cash private so that it would not be detrimental to
their Am way business which they both agreed was their first priority.
14.

The next few years proved to be very successful for Quick Cash as it expanded to

eight (8) stores in Utah, California and Nevada. However, in the fall of 1996. plaintiff and
defendant Haugen suspected the third partner of embezzling. When confronted by them he left
the partnership leaving plaintiff and Haugen to be equal partners.
15.

On or about July of 1997, defendant Haugen told plaintiff that defendant

Cashmore knew a company that was interested in purchasing the Quick Cash stores. Plaintiff
had no active interest at the time of selling his interest in the stores. Defendants Haugen and
Cashmore met with plaintiff to discuss what the value of the stores. Defendant Cashmore
received information from another cash store chain that the Quick Cash stores were valued at
approximately 1.2 million dollars. Plaintiff informed defendant Haugen that he would not sell
the stores for 1.2 million or even 1.5 million and defendant Haugen agreed.
16.

On or about September 1997. defendant Haugen told plaintiff that defendant

Cashmore had an idea regarding the business and that plaintiff should hear defendant Cashmore
out. The three men met wherein defendant Cashmore revealed his plan to develop the business
to be large enough to take public with defendants Haugen, Cashmore and plaintiff as partners.
Plaintiff and defendant Haugen agreed to keep the existing stores as a separate entity between
them and start a new partnership with defendant Cashmore.

Defendant Cashmore proposed a

figure that would be needed to start up the new stores which plaintiff and Haugen agreed to.
4

plaintiff that he wanted out of the business so that he could concentrate on Amway. Plaintiff and
Haugen agreed to sell and end their partnership after pressure from defendant Haugen because
defendant Haugen wanted out of the check cashing business.
18.

At different times throughout 1998, plaintiff asked defendant Haugen if he was in

partnership with defendant Cashmore in the business plaintiff and Haugen owned. Each time
defendant Haugen denied that he was still a partner in the business and told plaintiff that it was
not good for their Amway business to let anyone know about plaintiffs or Cashmore's check
cashing business.
19.

On or about May 1998, plaintiff, through the discovery of various documents,

discovered that defendant Haugen never sold his part of the partnership to defendant Cashmore
but instead continued the partnership with Cashmore instead of plaintiff. Plaintiff is informed
and beiieves and based on this belief alleges that if not for the representations of defendants
Haugen and Cashmore made to him he would not have sold his share of the partnership.
Additionally, because of the representations of defendants and each of them, plaintiff was forced
to sell at a price lower than the true value of the business and was forced to expend additional
capital to restart his own business.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Misrepresentation of Fact)
(Against All Defendants)
20.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 19 of his

complaint as though fully set forth herein.
21.

The above-stated representations were made to plaintiff to induce him to sell his
6

share of his partnership so that defendant Haugen and defendant Cashmore could be partners in
the same business.
22.

Defendant Haugen represented to plaintiff that he no longer wanted the stores as it

was detrimental to his Amway business and that defendant Cashmore offered S750.000.00 to
purchase the business. This fact was a primary inducement in plaintiffs decision to sell his share
of the partnership and venture out on his own.
23.

The representations made by representatives of defendants were in fact false. The

true facts were that because of the existing business relationsliip between defendants Haugen and
Cashmore. Haugen wanted Cashmore to replace plaintiff as his panner. This was never revealed
to plaintiff. Additionally, plaintiff was never informed of the fact that defendant Haugen never
intended to receive any monies from the sale but rather intended to keep the money in the
business. In addition to QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company, defendants Haugen and
Cashmore branched out from Quick Cash. LLC and formed USA Cash Stores and USA Cash
Services. Had plaintiff been aware of the true facts, plaintiff would not have agreed to sell his
portion of the partnership.
24.

When defendants made these representations': they knew them to be false and

madr these representations with the intention to deceive and defraud plaintiff and to induce
plaintiff to act in reliance on these representation in the manner hereafter alleged, or the with
expectation that plaintiff would so act.
25.

Plaintiff, at the time these representations were made by defendants and at the

time plaintiff took the actions herein alleged, was ignorant of the falsity of defendants'
i

representations and believed them to be true. In reliance on these representations, plaintiff was
induced to and did sell his portion of the partnership. Had plaintiff known the actual facts, he
would not have taken such action. Plaintiffs reliance on defendant's representations was
justified because plaintiff had no reason to believe defendants did not represent the truth of
various facts relating to plaintiffs sale of his portion of the partnership.
26.

As a proximate result of the fraudulent conduct of defendants as herein alleged,

plaintiff was induced to sell his portion of the partnership and has been damaged in an amount
according to proof at time of trial.
27.

The aforementioned conduct of defendants was an intentional misrepresentation,

deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendants with the intention on the part of
the defendants of thereby depriving plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing
injury* and was despicable conduct that subjected plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of plaintiff s rights, so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive
damages.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligent Misrepresentation of Fact)
(Against All Defendants)
28.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 27 of his

complaint as though full}' set forth herein.
29.

When defendants made these representations, they had no reasonable ground for

believing them to be true.
8

30.

Defendants made these representations with the intention of inducing plaintiff to

act in reliance on these representations in the manner herein alleged, or with the expectation that
plaintiff would so act.
31.

As a proximate result of the fraudulent conduct of defendants as herein alleged,

plaintiff was induced to sell his portion of the partnership and by reason of which plaintiff has
been damaged in an amount according to proof at time of trial.
32.

The aforementioned conduct of defendants was a negligent misrepresentation,

deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendants with the intention on the part of
the defendants of thereby depriving plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing
injury, and was despicable conduct that subjected plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of plaintiffs rights, so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive
damages.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Relief Based on Rescission)
(Against All Defendants)
33.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 32 of his

complaint as though fully set forth herein.
34.

Plaintiff, at the time the aforementioned representations were made by defendants

and at the time plaintiff took the actions herein alleged, was ignorant of the falsity of defendants'
representations and believed them to be true. In reliance on these representations, plaintiff was

9

induced to and did enter into the contract with defendant Cashmore to sell his share of the
business.
35.

Plaintiff has and will suffer substantial harm and injury under the contract if ius

not rescinded in that as a result of defendants' conduct, plaintiff has and will be deprived of his
share and income derived from the aforementioned partnership.
36.

Plaintiff intends service of the summons and complaint in this action to serve as

notice of rescission of the contract, and hereby offers to restore all consideration furnished by
defendant Cashmore under the contract, on condition that defendants restore to him the
consideration furnished by plaintiff in an amount to be proven at time of trial.
37.

As a result of entering into the contract with defendant, plaintiff has incurred

expenses in addition to those alleged above (and will continue to incur them in an amount
unknown to him at this time) in an amount to be proven at time of trial. Plaintiff prays leave of
this court to amend this complaint to insert the true amount of those expenses when the\ are
ascertained.
38.

In performing the acts herein alleged, defendants intentionally misrepresented to

plaintiff material facts known to defendants, as stated above With the intention on the part of
defendants of depriving plaintiff of his money and property, thereby justifying an award of
punitive damages against the defendants.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Interference With Business Relations)
(Against All Defendants)
39.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 38 of his

complaint as though fully set forth herein.
40.

On or about the fall of 1994, plaintiff and defendant Haugen entered into a written

partnership agreement at Ogden, Utah for the purpose of carrying on the business of check
cashing service, under the name of Quick Cash. LLC. with its principal place of business at
Ogden, Utah.
41.

Defendant Cashmore knew of the above described relationship existing plaintiff

and defendant Haugen. As stated above, defendants and plaintiff all have a business relationship
involving Amway. Defendant Haugen falsely represented to plaintiff that it was in the best
interests of their Amway relationship for them to sell their Quick Cash business to defendant
Cashmore. all with the intent to harm plaintiff financially and to induce plaintiff to sell his share
of the Quick Cash business.
42.

The aforementioned acts of defendants, and each of them, were willful and

fraudulent. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to punitive damages^
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Accounting^
(Against All Defendants)
43.

Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 42 of his

complaint as though fully set forth herein.
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44.

On or about the fall of 1994. plaintiff and defendant Haugen entered into a written

partnership agreement at Odgen, Utah for the purpose of carrying on the business of check
cashing service, under the name of Quick Cash. LLC. with its principal place of business aT
Ogden. Utah.
45.

Thereafter and until about December. 1997. the partnership conducted the

aforementioned business, acquired assets, and incurred liabilities resulting in an overall profit.
As stated above, plaintiff was fraudulently induced into entering a purchase/sale agreement with
the defendants thereby losing his share of the partnership. The amount of assets and liabilities is
unknown to plaintiff and cannot be ascertained without an accounting of the profits and losses
that occurred during the period of time defendants Haugen and Cashmore were in possession of
Quick Cash.
• WHEREFORE. Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1.

For general and special damages according to proof at time of trial:

2.

For incidental and consequential damages according to proof at time of trial;

3.

For punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and deter Defendants;

4.

For prejudgment interest at the highest possible rate from the earliest possible

5.

For an accounting of the profits and losses:

6.

For a rescission of the contract:

7.

For costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees herein incurred: and

8.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

date:

12

DATED this ~x^ da\ of Januan. 2000
NELSON. SNUFFER. DAHLE & POULSEN

BY

-"-Den v efT!?$ nuffer. Jr.
Attorney forPlaintiff
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801)534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
;)

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

]
1
]
;>
]
;
;

Defendants.

;

AFFIDAVIT OF RANDY HAUGEN

Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Randy Haugen, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:

1.

I owned a 50% membership interest in Quick Cash, LLC ("Quick Cash") in

October 1997. Kerry Pipkin "Pipkin" owned the other 50 % membership interest in Quick Cash in
October 1997.
2.

Quick Cash operated check-cashing stores in October 1997.

3.

Around October 1997,1 decided that I no longer wanted to be in the check- cashing

business and no longer wanted to own my membership interest in Quick Cash.
4.

I wanted to sell my interest in Quick Cash, because I no longer wished to be

involved in Quick Cash or any check-cashing businesses.
5.

I told Pipken I wanted to sell my interest in Quick Cash, because I no longer wished

to be involved in Quick Cash or any check-cashing businesses.
6.

Cashmore offered $750,000 to purchase Quick Cash.

7.

I sold my membership interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore for $375,000 by

individual agreement and that agreement has been fully performed by Cashmore and myself.
Pipkin sold his interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore by a separate individual agreement. Pipkin,
Cashmore and myself were represented by the North Carolina law firm of Elliott, Culp and
Carpenter in drafting the individual agreements to sell our interests in Quick Cash to Cashmore.
8.

Apart from the payment I received from Cashmore for the sale of my interest in

Quick Cash, I received no other compensation from Cashmore for the sale of my interest nor have I
afterwards had any interest at all in Quick Cash or in any check-cashing business with Cashmore.
9.

I did not sell my interest in Quick Cash in order to replace Pipkin with Cashmore as

my partner in Quick Cash.

RKT Holding Company is a Utah company that holds real property to sell later for
development.

RKT Holding Company is entirely separate from and unrelated to Cashmore's

check-cashing businesses. I am a co-owner of RKT Holding Company with Cashmore.
QC Instant Cash is a California limited liability company operating a check-cashing
business in California and was an asset owned by Quick Cash when Quick Cash was sold to
Cashmore.
DA ITil >

Juner

'2-

/

,2001.

RANDY', H A U G ^

Jul/
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /X_ day of April-, 2001.

•SCA/v

NOTARY PUBLIC

-T-.FJ» . • • . . • » « * — ^ t .

J03VK.TAVlOa
612 North 3000 West
WestFotnt,UT84015
Mjf Cocmrtsston Expires
Noveater£4ft,20Oi

-J

CERTIFICATE O F SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake O h , Huh, K4NH , ;HKI th.n <TI ihe[J?T
day of July, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of AFFIDAVIT OF RANDY HAUGEN to
••» :•••

>

itage prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801)534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN ANI) !•( )K WFBFR COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,

j
]I

\1 1il) >vi 1 .pi K-i<

vs.

))

Civil No. 010901074

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES. USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1 -50, inclusive,

;)
;
;
]
]

Judge Roger S. Dutson

Defendants.

\SHMORE

]

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SAL! I AKE )
Kip Cashmore, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

"USA Cash Services" is a DBA for Quick Cash, LLC. ("Quick Cash").

2.

I offered to purchase and subsequently purchased Randy Ilaugen's ("Haugen") and

Kerry Pipkin's ("Pipkin") membership interests in Quick Cash in December 1997 for a total of
$750,000.
3.

I executed an individual agreement in December 1997 with Pipk ii i providing for

Pipkin to sell his 50% ownership in Quick Cash to me in consideration for $375,000. Both parties
have fully performed under that agreement. Pipkin has been fully paid under that agreement and
has never tendered back nor offered to tender back any part of the consideration he received for his
interest in Quick Cash.
4.

I executed an individual agreement in December 1997 with Haugen providing for

Haugen to sell his 50% ownership in Quick Cash to me in consideration for $375,000. Haugen and
I have fully performed under that agreement.
5.

In drafting the Pipkin and Haugen agreements, Pipkin,

.-ij. •

vself were

each represented by the North Carolina law firm of Culp, Elliott and Carpenter.
6.

I never stated or in any way implied oi prvitihet) ihat Pipkin would continue to be

involved in any of my check-cashing or other businesses after Pipkin sold his interest in Quick Cash
to me in December 1997.
7.

Haugen has no interest in any of my check-cashing businesses nor has he been

involved in any of my check-cashing businesses after the sale of his Quick Cash membership
interest to me in December 1997.
8

RK. 1 Holding Company is a Utah company that holds real propem \u *dl for

development. RKT Holding C'ornpanv is entirely separate from and has nothing to do with any of
my check-cashing businesses. I am a co-owner of RKT Holding Company with Randy Haugen.

9.

"USA Cash Stores," an entity named in the Complaint, was a DBA for Quick Cash

but no longer exists as an entity in which I have any interest.
10.

QC Instant Cash is a California limited liability company operating a check-cashing

business in California and was an asset owned by Quick Cash when Quick Cash was sold to me.
DATED:

JylvJ
Jurir

f'SL

, 2001.

C\

t. • » -

KIPjCASFMORE

ce

vjjiy

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _/£_ day o f W , 2001.
;

/!

^MA%y>u&\

NOT.

LIC

T

woDtforroaiic
612 North SQOOVfest
Wast Point UT 84016
My GomratssJon Expfces
l**wnber2«h f 2O01

SBHE8G7U1AH

STATE OF UTAH

)
)
)

C"01! NTT OF DAVIS

MEMBL^HIP TNTEREST
PURCHASE AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF A LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY MEMBERSHIP INTEREST (the "Agreement") is made and entered
into and effective as of the 1st day of December, 1997, by and among KERRY PIPKIN
("Seller"), QUICK CASH, LLC, a Utah limited liability company (the "Company") and KIP D.
CASHMORE ("Purchaser").
miEfcSSE.'lil:
WHEREAS, Seller owns a Membership Interest in the Company, which operates
i.i short-term financing business (the "Business"); and
WHEREAS, Seller desires to sell, and Purchaser desires to acquire, all of Seller's
Membership Interest in the Company representing 50% of the total Membership Interest in the
Company, and all rights thereunto appertaining (collectively, the "Membership Interest");
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants,
conditions, promises and agreements hereinafter set forth, and other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties do
hereby agree as follows:
1.
PURCHASE OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST. Seller, in consideration of
Purchaser's payment of the Purchase Price as set forth in Section 2 below, hereby agrees to sell,
transfer and assign to Purchaser, and Purchaser, in consideration of such sale, transfer and
assignment by Seller, agrees to purchase and acquirefromSeller, on the Closing Date (as defined
in Section 4(a) below), all of Seller's Membership Interest in the Company.
2.

PURCHASE PRICE.

(a)
The aggregate consideration (the "Purchase Price") for the Membership
Interest set forth in Section 1 shall be Three Hundred Sixty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Sixty
Five and 10/100's Dollars ($368,465.10). Including interest on the deferred payment of the
Purchase Price as calculated in Exhibit "B." the total payments by Purchaser shall total Three
Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand and No/100's Dollars ($375,000.00), The parties agree that the
Purchase Price shall be paid as follows:
(i)
One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($ 175,000) paid on .
oi before the 1 losing Date.
(ii)
The remaining portion of the purchase price, including interest,
paid in Twelve (12) monthly installments of Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000) per month for

twelve months, beginning on the Closing Date, due on or before the last day of each month. The
balance of the Purchase Price shall be due on January 2, 1999.
(b)
Purchaser will also pay an additional amount equal to one-half of the
amount of cash held in the accounts of the Company on the Closing Date, to be determined from
applicable bank records. Provided, however, in no event shall the Purchaser's payment
obligation under this Section 2(b) exceed Seventy Thousand Dollars ($70,000.00).
3.
NO OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY PURCHASER. Purchaser shall
not assume or become liable for any obligation, liabilities or indebtedness of any nature
whatsoever of or related to Seller, the Company, the Membership Interest or the Business arising
or related to the period prior to the Closing Date, whether due or to become due, asserted or
unasserted, and Sellfer shall be and remain liable therefor. Seller represents and warrants that as
of the Closing Date, all obligations, liabilities and indebtedness of the Company or otherwise
related to the Business shall have been paid, and does hereby agree to indemnify Purchaser and
hold Purchaser harmless from any and all such obligations, liabilities and indebtedness.
Except for the liabilities Purchaser expressly assumes herein, Purchaser hereby assumes
no liabilities of Seller or the Company, including, without limitation, liabilities, claims or actions
alleging or relating to any tort, product liability, environmental liability, taxes on Seller or the
Business, or breach of contract or otherwise seeking damages and relating to the operation of the
Business prior to the Closing Date.
4.

CLOSING: PAYMENT: DOCUMENTS.

(a)
The consummation of the transactions contemplated in this Agreement
(the "Closing") shall be held and effective as of December 1, 1997 (the "Closing Date").
(b)
Seller will deliver to Purchaser on the Closing Date a Bill of Sale in the
form attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
(c) \ Seller will deliver possession of and title to the Membership Interest to
Purchaser at Closing by a valid and duly executed document of assignment of Membership
Interest in the Company.
(d)
All representations, warranties, covenants and obligations in this
Agreement, or in any document delivered pursuant to this Agreement, shall survive the Closing.
5.
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER. Seller represents and
warrants as follows:
(a)
The Company is a limited liability company validly existing and in good
standing under the laws of the State of Utah. The Company has all necessary power and
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authority to carry on its Business as and where now conducted. All of the Membership Interest
in the Company has been duly and validly issued, is fully paid and nonassessable, and has been
offered and sold in compliance with all applicable federal and state laws.
(b)\ Seller and the Company have full power and authority to execute and
perform this Agreement. This Agreement has been duly and validly authorized and approved
by all necessary formal action on the part of Seller and the Company. This Agreement
constitutes the valid and legally binding obligation of Seller and the Company enforceable in
accordance with its terms. Neither the execution and delivery of this Agreement nor the consummation of the transactions hereby contemplated result in, or will result in, a violation or breach
of any provision of any other instrument to which Seller or the Company is a party or by which
the Membership Interest may be affected.
(c)
Seller has, and at all times up through and including the Closing Date will
have, good and marketable title to the Membership Interest, free and clear of all mortgages,
pledges, liens, security interests, conditional sale agreements, charges, encumbrances and restrictions of every kind and nature.
(d)
No representation or warranty of Seller or the Company in this Agreement,
nor any document furnished or to be furnished to Purchaser pursuant hereto or in connection with
the transaction contemplated herein, contains or will contain any untrue statement of a material
fact nor do such representations and warranties taken as a whole omit any statement necessary
in order to make any material statement contained herein or therein not misleading.
(e)
With regard to any purchase orders or other contracts issued or received
in the ordinary course of the Business by the Company and expressly agreed in writing to be
assumed by Buyer (the "Assumed Contracts'7), Seller warrants and represents that:
(i)
Each Assumed Contract is in full force and effect and is valid and
enforceable in accordance with its terms.
(ii)
The Company is in compliance in all material respects with all
applicable terms and requirements of each of the Assumed Contracts;
(iii) To the best of Seller's knowledge, each other person or entity that
has or had any obligation or liability under any of the Assumed Contracts is in
compliance in all material respects with all applicable terms and requirements of such
Assumed Contract;
(iv) No event has occurred or circumstance exists that (with or without
notice or lapse of time) may contravene, conflict with, or result in a violation or breach
of, or give Seller or other person or entity the right to declare a default or exercise any
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remedy under, or to accelerate the maturity or performance of, or to cancel, terminate,
or modify, any Assumed Contract;
(v)
Neither Seller nor the Company has given to or receivedfromany
other person or entity, at any time since January 1, 1997: any notice or other
communication (whether oral or written) regarding any actual, alleged, possible, or
potential violation or breach of, or default under, any Assumed Contract; and
(vi)
Other than in the ordinary course of the Business, there are no
renegotiations of, attempts to renegotiate, or outstanding rights to renegotiate any
material amounts paid or payable to the Company under current or completed contracts
with any person or entity included in the Assumed Contracts and no such person or entity
has made written demand for such renegotiation.
(f)
There are no actions, suits, litigations or governmental investigations
pending or, to the knowledge of Seller or the Company, threatened against or affecting Seller or
the Company, nor is either Seller or the Company subject to any order, judgment, decree,
stipulation or consent of or with any court, governmental body or agency that would impair the
ability of Seller and the Company to consummate the transactions contemplated by this
Agreement.
(g)
Neither the execution and delivery of this Agreement nor the
consummation or performance of any of the transactions contemplated hereby will give any
person or entity the right to prevent, delay or otherwise interfere with the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement pursuant to any legal requirement or Order to which Seller or
the Company may be subject, or any material contract to which Seller or the Company is a party
or by which either may be bound, nor will violate any law, order, judgment, decree, rule or
regulation of any court or governmental agency or body having jurisdiction over Seller or the
Company.
6.
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF PURCHASER. Purchaser
represents and warrants to Seller as follows:
(a)
This Agreement has been duly and validly executed and delivered by
Purchaser, and constitutes the valid and legally binding obligation of Purchaser enforceable in
accordance with its terms. Purchaser has the absolute and unrestrictedright,power and authority
to execute and deliver this Agreement and the other documents contemplated to be executed and
delivered at the Closing by Purchaser and to perform its obligations under this Agreement and
such other documents.
(b)
No representation or warranty of Purchaser in this Agreement, nor any
certificate furnished or to be furnished to Seller or the Company pursuant hereto or in connection
with the transaction contemplated herein, contains or will contain any untrue statement of a
-4-

material fact nor shall such representations and wananties taken as a whole omit any statement
necessary in order to make any material statement contained herein or dierein not misleading.
(c)
There are no actions, suits, litigations or governmental investigations
pending or, to the knowledge of Purchaser, threatened against or affecting Purchaser, nor is
Purchaser subject to any order, judgment, decree, stipulation or consent of or with any court,
governmental bodj or agency that would impair the ability of Purchaser to consummate the
transactions contemplated by this Agreement.
Purchaser makes no representation or warranty to Seller or the Company regarding the purchase
or sale of any limited liability company Membership Interest other than that which is the subject
of this Agreement
7.
COVENANTS. From time to time prior to, at and after the Closing, Seller will,
at its own expense, execute and deliver, or cause to be executed and delivered, such documents
to Purchaser as Purchaser may reasonably request in order to consummate the purchase of the
Membership Interest and to vest, confirm or evidence in Purchaser good title to the Membership
Interest. From time to time prior to, at and after the Closing, Purchaser will, at its own expense,
execute and deliver or cause to be executed and delivered such documents to Seller as Seller may
reasonably request in order to consummate the sale of the Membership Interest pursuant to this
Agreement.
8.
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO PURCHASER'S OBLIGATION TO CLOSE.
Purchaser's obligation to purchase the Membership Interest and to take the other actions required
to Be taken by Purchaser at the Closing is subject to the satisfaction of Purchaser, at or prior to
the Closing, that tttere have not been made or threatened by any person or entity any claim
asserting that such person or entity (a) is the holder or beneficial owner of, or has the right to
acquire or to obtain beneficial ownership of, the Membership Interest, or (b) is entitled to all or
any portion of the Purchase Price payable for the Membership Interest.
9.

INDEMNITY OBLIGATIONS.

(a)
Seller will indemnify and save Purchaser harmless from and against any
and all claims, demands, actions, controversies and suits, whether groundless or otherwise, and
from and against any and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees and other
expenses of every nature and character arising by reason of or resulting from (i) anything done,
suffered to be done, or omitted to be done by Seller or the Company on or before the Closing
Date specifically including (whether or not Seller has notice or knowledge on the Closing Date
of such matters), but not limited to, (ii) litigation involving Seller, the Company or the Business,
accruing, arising or relating to an event occurring or existing prior to the Closing Date; (iii) any
breach of any warranty or any misrepresentation of Seller contained in this Agreement, by or on
behalf of Seller; (iv) any misrepresentation in, or omission from, any instrument, document or
other consideration executed and/or delivered by or on behalf of Seller pursuant to the terms of
-5-

this Agreement; (v) any federal, state or local tax liabilities, assessments or obligations of Seller
or the Company in respect of the Membership Interest, the Business of the transaction
contemplated by this Agreement; (vi) any breach by Seller or the Company on or before the date
of closing of any contract; or (vii) any civil or criminal statutory violation or tort committed by
Seller, or the Company before the Closing Date.
(b)
Purchaser shall indemnify and save Seller harmless from and against any
and all claims, demands, actions, controversies and suits, whether groundless or otherwise, and
from and against any and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees and other
expenses of every nature and character arising by reason of or resulting from (i) anything done,
suffered to be done, or omitted to be done by Purchaser in relation to the Business on or after the
Closing Date, specifically including, but not limited to, (ii) litigation involving Purchaser or the
Company, relating to an event occurring or existing only after the Closing Date; (iii) any breach
of any warranty or any misrepresentation of Purchaser contained in this Agreement, by or on
behalf of Purchaser; (iv) any misrepresentation in, or omission from, any instrument, document
or other consideration executed and/or delivered by or on behalf of Purchaser pursuant to the
terms of this Agreement; (v) any federal, state or local tax liabilities, assessments or obligations
of Purchaser in rrispect of the Membership Interest ox the transaction contemplated by this
Agreement; or (vi) any civil or criminal statutory violation or tort committed by Purchaser, or
the Company after the Closing Date.
(c)
Purchaser and Seller agree to give one another prompt written notice of
any claim of one ('Indemnitee'*) against the other ("Indemnitor'") under this Agreement arising
from threatened or pending third party claims, specifically including, but not limited to, any
claim, demand, action, controversy, or suit which may give rise to a claim for indemnification
of Indemnitee by Indemnitor under this Agreement. Indemnitor shall undertake the defense of
any such claim, demand, action, controversy or suit by representatives of its own choosing, at
its own cost and expense, provided, however, that in the event Indemnitor, within a reasonable
time after notice of any such claim, demand, action, controversy or suit, shall fail to undertake
the defense thereof, then Indemnitee shall have the right to undertake the defense, compromise
or settlement thereof at the risk of Indemnitor, subject to therightof Indemnitor to assume such
defense at any time prior to compromise or final determination thereof. The Indemnitor may
settle any such claim with the consent of Indemnitee which consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld, provided that adequate financial security for the fulfillment of the Indemnitor's
indemnity obligations under this Section in cash lump sum is provided by Indemnitor to
Indemnitee.
10.
ASSIGNMENT RIGHTS. Purchaser may assign this Agreement to any other
person or entity without the consent of Seller. Seller may not assign its rights or delegate its *
duties under this Agreement.
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11.

MISCELLANEOUS.

(a)
The parties shall cooperate fully with each other in connection with any
steps required to be taken as part of their respective obligations under this Agreement, and all
parlies will use their best efforts to consummate the transactions contemplated in this Agreement.
(b)
All transfer taxes, including sales or use taxes, if any, payable by reason
of the sale, transfer or delivery of any of the Membership Interest shall be paid by Seller.
Purchaser hereby Waives compliance with any applicable bulk sale laws.
(c)
All notices shall be in writing and shall be deemed given when delivered
by hand or by facsimile transmission, telexed or mailed by reputable courier service or registered
or certified mail (return receipt requested), postage prepaid, to the parties at the addresses set
forth on the records of the Company (or at such other address for a party as shall be specified
by like notice; provided that notices of a change of address shall be effective only upon receipt
thereof). The parties may change the address for any such notice, request, demand, tender or
other communication by delivery of such notice of change of address in accordance with the
terms of this Section.
(d)
This Agreement supersedes all prior discussions and agreements between
the parties with respect to the matters contained herein, and this Agreement contains the sole and
entire agreement between the parties hereto with respect to the transactions contemplated herein.
This Agreement may be amended or modified only in a writing signed by all of the parties
hereto.
(e)
This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the
parties hereto and their respective legal representatives, successors and assigns.
(f)
This Agreement shall be construed and governed by the substantive laws
of the State of Utah.
(g)
The invalidity or unenforceability of any particular provision of this
Agreement shall not affect the other provisions, and this Agreement shall be construed in all
respects as if such invalid or unenforceable provision had not been contained herein.
(h)
Whenever in this Agreement a singular word is used, it shall also include
the plural wherever required by the context, and vice versa. Whenever in this Agreement a word
of one gender is used, it shall also include the other gender and the neuter.
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(i)«
The captions in this Agreement are for convenience and identification
purposes only, are*not an integral part of this Agreement, and are not to be considered in the
interpretation of any part hereof.
(j)
All representations, warranties, covenants and obligations in this
Agreement and any certificate or document delivered pursuant to this Agreement will survive
the Closing.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement under seal effective
on the date first above written.
SELLER:

(SEAL).

COMPANY:
QUICK CASH, LLC

£—(SEAL)
ember and Manager

PURCHASER:

.(SEAL)
^s-SSP^CTCASHMORE
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EXHIBIT A
BILL OF SALE
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, and in accordance with that certain Agreement (the
"Purchase Agreement") for Sale and Purchase of Certain Membership Interest of a Jimited
liability company Membership Interest, dated as of December 1,1997, by and between KERRY
PIPKIN ("Seller"), QUICK CASH, LLC (the "Company") and KIP D. CASHMORE
("Purchaser"), Seller does hereby sell, assign, transfer, deliver, and convey to Purchaser all right,
title and interest in and to the Membership Interest identified in the Purchase Agreement
(collectively, the Membership Interest").
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said Membership Interest unto Purchaser, its
successors and assigns, and Seller does hereby represent and warrant that such Membership
Interest is transferred to Purchaserfreeand clear of any security interests, liens, adverse claims,
encumbrances or other restrictions whatsoever, and Seller agrees to forever defend the title of
such Membership Interest unto Purchaser, its successors and assigns against all persons
whomsoever.
THIS BILL OF SALE is given pursuant and subject to the Purchase Agreement,
and in the event of any conflict between the terms hereof and those of the Purchase Agreement,
the Purchase Agreement shall be deemed controlling.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Seller has executed this Bill of Sale effective as of
the date first written above.
SELLER:

(SEAL)

: :0DMA\S0FTS0L\311 \CECVW89\0

12/16/1997

EXHIBIT "B"

Pagel

Quick Cash Sale

Compound Period
Nominal Annual Rate...
Effective Annual Rate ..
Periodic Rate
Daily Rate

: Monthly
• 5.610
5757
0.4675
0.01537

%
%
%

%

CASH FLOW DATA
Event

Start Date

1 Loan
2 Payment
3 Payment

11/30/1997
12/30/1997
01/02/1999

Amount
193,465.10
15,000.00
20.000.00

Number Period
1
12 Monthly
1

End Date
11/30/1998

AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE - Normal Amortization
Date
Loan 11/30/1997
1 12/30/1997
1997 Totals

Payment

Interest

Principal

Balance
193.465.10
179,369.55

15,000.00
15,000.00

904.45
904.45

14,095.55
14,095.55

01/30/1998
02/28/1998
03/30/1998
04/30/1998
05/30/1998
06/30/1998
07/30/1998
08/30/1998
09/30/1998
10/30/1998
11/30/1998
Totals

15,000.00
15,000.00
15,000.00
15,000.00
15,000.00
15,000.00
15,000.00
15,000.00
15.000.00
15,000.00
15,000.00
165,000.00

838.55
772.35
705.83
639.01
571.87
504.42
436.65
368.57
300.17
231.45
162.40
5,531.27

14.161.45
14,227.65
14,294.17
14,360.99
14,428.13
14,495.58
14,563.35
14,631.43
14,699.83
14,768.55
14,837.60
159,468.73

165,208.10
150,980.45
136,686.28
122,325.29
107,897.16
93,401.58
78,838.23
64,206.80
49,506.97
34,738.42
19,900.82

13 01/02/1999
1999 Totals

20,000.00
20,000.00

99.18
99.18

19,900.82
19,900.82

0.00

200,000.00

6,534.90

193,465.10

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1998

Grand Totals

STATE OF UTAH

)
)
)

COUNTY OF DAVIS

MEMBERSHIP INTEREST
PURCHASE AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF A LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY MEMBERSHIP INTEREST (the "Agreement") is made and entered
into and effective as of the 1st day of December, 1997, by and among RANDY L. HAUGEN
("Seller"), QUICK CASH, LLC, a Utah limited liability company (the "Company") and KIP D.
CASHMORE ("Purchaser").

WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Seller owns a Membership Interest in the Company, which operates
a short-term financing business (the "Business"); and
WHEREAS, Seller desires to sell, and Purchaser desires to acquire, all of Seller's
Membership Interest in the Company representing 50% of the total Membership Interest in the
Company, and all rights thereunto appertaining (collectively, the "Membership Interest");
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants,
conditions, promises and agreements hereinafter set forth, and other good and valuable
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties do
hereby agree as follows:
1.
PURCHASE OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST. Seller, in consideration of
Purchaser's payment of the Purchase Price as set forth in Section 2 below, hereby agrees to sell,
transfer and assign to Purchaser, and Purchaser, in consideration of such sale, transfer and
assignment by Seller, agrees to purchase and acquirefromSeller, on the Closing Date (as defined
in Section 4(a) below), ail of Seller's Membership Interest in the Company.
2.

PURCHASE PRICE.

(a)
The aggregate consideration (the "Purchase Price") for the Membership
Interest set forth in Section 1 shall be Three Hundred Sixty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Sixty
Five and 10/100's Dollars ($368,465.10). Including interest on the deferred payment of the
Purchase Price as calculated in Exhibit "B," the total payments by Purchaser shall total Three
Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand and No/100's Dollars ($375,000.00). The parties agree that the
Purchase Price shall be paid as follows:
(i)
or before the Closing Date.

One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($ 175,000) paid on

(ii)
The remaining portion of the purchase price, including interest,
paid in Twelve (12) monthly installments of Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000) per month for

twelve months, beginning on the Closing Date, due on or before the last day of each month. The
balance of the Purchase Price shall be due on January 2, 1999.
(b)
Purchaser will also pay an additional amount, equal to one-half of the
amount of cash held in the accounts of the Company on the Closing Date, to be determined from
applicable bank records. Provided, however, in no event shall the Purchaser's payment
obligation under this Section 2(b) exceed Seventy Thousand Dollars ($70,000.00).
3.
NO OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY PURCHASER. Purchaser shall
not assume or become liable for any obligation, liabilities or indebtedness of any nature
whatsoever of or related to Seller, the Company, the Membership Interest or the Business arising
or related to the period prior to the Closing Date, whether due or to become due, asserted or
unasserted, and Seller shall be and remain liable therefor. Seller represents and warrants that as
of the Closing Date, all obligations, liabilities and indebtedness of the Company or otherwise
related to the Business shall have been paid, and does hereby agree to indemnify Purchaser and
hold Purchaser harmless from any and all such obligations, liabilities and indebtedness.
Except for the liabilities Purchaser expressly assumes herein, Purchaser hereby assumes
no liabilities of Seller or the Company, including, without limitation, liabilities, claims or actions
alleging or relating to any tort, product liability, environmental liability, taxes on Seller or the
Business, or breach of contract or otherwise seeking damages and relating to the operation of the
Business prior to the Closing Date.
4.

CLOSING: PAYMENT: DOCUMENTS.

(a)
The consummation of the transactions contemplated in this Agreement
(the "Closing") shall be held and effective as of December 1, 1997 (the "Closing Date").
(b)
Seller will deliver to Purchaser on the Closing Date a Bill of Sale in the
form attached hereto as Exhibit "A."
(c)
Seller will deliver possession of and title to the Membership Interest to
Purchaser at Closing by a valid and duly executed document of assignment of Membership
Interest in the Company.
(d)
All representations, warranties, covenants and obligations in this
Agreement, or in any document delivered pursuant to this Agreement, shall survive the Closing.
5.
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER. Seller represents
and warrants as follows:
(a)
The Company is a limited liability company validly existing and in good
standing under the laws of the State of Utah. The Company has all necessary power and
-2-

authority to carry on its Business as and where now conducted. All of the Membership Interest
in the Company has been duly and validly issued, is fully paid and nonassessable, and has been
offered and sold in compliance with all applicable federal and state laws.
(b)
Seller and the Company have full power and authority to execute and
perform this Agreement. This Agreement has been duly and validly authorized and approved
by all necessary formal action on the part of Seller and the Company. This Agreement
constitutes the valid and legally binding obligation of Seller and the Company enforceable in
accordance with its terms. Neither the execution and delivery of this Agreement nor the consummation of the transactions hereby contemplated result in, or will result in, a violation or breach
of any provision of any other instrument to which Seller or the Company is a party or by which
the Membership Interest may be affected.
(c)
Seller has, and at all times up through and including the Closing Date will
have, good and marketable title to the Membership Interest, free and clear of all mortgages,
pledges, liens, security interests, conditional sale agreements, charges, encumbrances and restrictions of every kind and nature.
(d)
No representation or warranty of Seller or the Company in this
Agreement, nor any document furnished or to be furnished to Purchaser pursuant hereto or in
connection with the transaction contemplated herein, contains or will contain any untrue
statement of a material fact nor do such representations and warranties taken as a whole omit any
statement necessary in order to make any material statement contained herein or therein not
misleading.
(e)
With regard to any purchase orders or other contracts issued or received
in the ordinary course of the Business by the Company and expressly agreed in writing to be
assumed by Buyer (the "Assumed Contracts"), Seller warrants and represents that:
(i)
Each Assumed Contract is in full force and effect and is valid and
enforceable in accordance with its terms.
(ii)
The Company is in compliance in all material respects with all
applicable terms and requirements of each of the Assumed Contracts;
(iii) To the best of Seller's knowledge, each other person or entity that
has or had any obligation or liability under any of the Assumed Contracts is in
compliance in all material respects with all applicable terms and requirements of such
Assumed Contract;
(iv) No event has occurred or circumstance exists that (with or without
notice or lapse of time) may contravene, conflict with, or result in a violation or breach
of, or give Seller or other person or entity the right to declare a default or exercise any
-3-

remedy under, or to accelerate the maturity or performance of, or to cancel, terminate,
or modify, any Assumed Contract;
(v)
Neither Seller nor the Company has given to or received from any
other person or entity, at any time since January 1, 1997, any notice or other
communication (whether oral or written) regarding any actual, alleged, possible, or
potential violation or breach of, or default under, any Assumed Contract; and
(vi)
Other than in the ordinary course of the Business, there are no
renegotiations of, attempts to renegotiate, or outstanding rights to renegotiate any
material amounts paid or payable to the Company under current or completed contracts
with any person or entity included in the Assumed Contracts and no such person or entity
has made written demand for such renegotiation.
(f)
There are no actions, suits, litigations or governmental investigations
pending or, to the knowledge of Seller or the Company, threatened against or affecting Seller or
the Company, nor is either Seller or the Company subject to any order, judgment, decree,
stipulation or consent of or with any court, governmental body or agency that would impair the
ability of Seller and the Company to consummate the transactions contemplated by this
Agreement.
(g)
Neither the execution and delivery of this Agreement nor the
consummation or performance of any of the transactions contemplated hereby will give any
person or entity the right to prevent, delay or otherwise interfere with the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement pursuant to any legal requirement or Order to which Seller or
the Company may be subject, or any material contract to which Seller or the Company is a party
or by which either may be bound, nor will violate any law, order, judgment, decree, rule or
regulation of any court or governmental agency or body having jurisdiction over Seller or the
Company.
6.
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF PURCHASER. Purchaser
represents and warrants to Seller as follows:
(a)
This Agreement has been duly and validly executed and delivered by
Purchaser, and constitutes the valid and legally binding obligation of Purchaser enforceable in
accordance with its terms. Purchaser has the absolute and unrestricted right, power and authority
to execute and deliver this Agreement and the other documents contemplated to be executed and
delivered at the Closing by Purchaser and to perform its obligations under this Agreement and
such other documents.
(b)
No representation or warranty of Purchaser in this Agreement, nor any
certificate furnished or to be furnished to Seller or the Company pursuant hereto or in connection
with the transaction contemplated herein, contains or will contain any untrue statement of a
-4-

material fact nor shall such representations and warranties taken as a whole omit any statement
necessary in order to make any material statement contained herein or therein not misleading.
(c)
There are no actions, suits, litigations or governmental investigations
pending or, to the knowledge of Purchaser, threatened against or affecting Purchaser, nor is
Purchaser subject to any order, judgment, decree, stipulation or consent of or with any court,
governmental body or agency that would impair the ability of Purchaser to consummate the
transactions contemplated by this Agreement.
Purchaser makes no representation or warranty to Seller or the Company regarding the purchase
or sale of any limited liability company Membership Interest other than that which is the subject
of this Agreement.
7.
COVENANTS. From time to time prior to, at and after the Closing, Seller will,
at its own expense, execute and deliver, or cause to be executed and delivered, such documents
to Purchaser as Purchaser may reasonably request in order to consummate the purchase of the
Membership Interest and to vest, confirm or evidence in Purchaser good title to the Membership
Interest. From time to time prior to, at and after the Closing, Purchaser will, at its own expense,
execute and deliver or cause to be executed and delivered such documents to Seller as Seller may
reasonably request in order to consummate the sale of the Membership Interest pursuant to this
Agreement.
8.
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO PURCHASER'S OBLIGATION TO CLOSE.
Purchaser's obligation to purchase the Membership Interest and to take the other actions required
to be taken by Purchaser at the Closing is subject to the satisfaction of Purchaser, at or prior to
the Closing, that there have not been made or threatened by any person or entity any claim
asserting that such person or entity (a) is the holder or beneficial owner of, or has the right to
acquire or to obtain beneficial ownership of, the Membership Interest, or (b) is entitled to all or
any portion of the Purchase Price payable for the Membership Interest.
9.

INDEMNITY OBLIGATIONS.

(a)
Seller will indemnify and save Purchaser harmless from and against any
and all claims, demands, actions, controversies and suits, whether groundless or otherwise, and
from and against any and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees and other
expenses of every nature and character arising by reason of or resulting from (i) anything done,
suffered to be done, or omitted to be done by Seller or the Company on or before the Closing
Date specifically including (whether or not Seller has notice or knowledge on the Closing Date
of such matters), but not limited to, (ii) litigation involving Seller, the Company or the Business,
accruing, arising or relating to an event occurring or existing prior to the Closing Date; (iii) any
breach of any warranty or any misrepresentation of Seller contained in this Agreement, by or on
behalf of Seller; (iv) any misrepresentation in, or omission from, any instrument, document or
other consideration executed and/or delivered by or on behalf of Seller pursuant to the terms of
-5-

this Agreement; (v) any federal, state or local tax liabilities, assessments or obligations of Seller
or the Company in respect of the Membership Interest, the Business or the transaction
contemplated by this Agreement; (vi) any breach by Seller or the Company on or before the date
of closing of any contract; or (vii) any civil or criminal statutory violation or tort committed by
Seller, or the Company before the Closing Date.
(b)
Purchaser shall indemnify and save Seller harmless from and against any
and all claims, demands, actions, controversies and suits, whether groundless or otherwise, and
from and against any and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees and other
expenses of every nature and character arising by reason of or resulting from (i) anything done,
suffered to be done, or omitted to be done by Purchaser in relation to the Business on or after the
Closing Date, specifically including, but not limited to, (ii) litigation involving Purchaser or the
Company, relating to an event occurring or existing only after the Closing Date; (iii) any breach
of any warranty or any misrepresentation of Purchaser contained in this Agreement, by or on
behalf of Purchaser; (iv) any misrepresentation in, or omission from, any instrument, document
or other consideration executed and/or delivered by or on behalf of Purchaser pursuant to the
terms of this Agreement; (v) any federal, state or local tax liabilities, assessments or obligations
of Purchaser in respect of the Membership Interest or the transaction contemplated by this
Agreement; or (vi) any civil or criminal statutory violation or tort committed by Purchaser, or
the Company after the Closing Date.
(c)
Purchaser and Seller agree to give one another prompt written notice of
any claim of one ("Indemnitee") against the other ("Indemnitor") under this Agreement arising
from threatened or pending third party claims, specifically including, but not limited to, any
claim, demand, action, controversy, or suit which may give rise to a claim for indemnification
of Indemnitee by Indemnitor under this Agreement. Indemnitor shall undertake the defense of
any such claim, demand, action, controversy or suit by representatives of its own choosing, at
its own cost and expense, provided, however, that in the event Indemnitor, within a reasonable
time after notice of any such claim, demand, action, controversy or suit, shall fail to undertake
the defense thereof, then Indemnitee shall have the right to undertake the defense, compromise
or settlement thereof at the risk of Indemnitor, subject to the right of Indemnitor to assume such
defense at any time prior to compromise or final determination thereof. The Indemnitor may
settle any such claim with the consent of Indemnitee which consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld, provided that adequate financial security for the fulfillment of the Indemnitor's
indemnity obligations under this Section in cash lump sum is provided by Indemnitor to
Indemnitee.
10.
ASSIGNMENT RIGHTS. Purchaser may assign this Agreement to any other
person or entity without the consent of Seller. Seller may not assign its rights or delegate its
duties under this Agreement.
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11.

MISCELLANEOUS.

(a)
The parties shall cooperate fully with each other in connection with any
steps required to be taken as part of their respective obligations under this Agreement, and all
parties will use their best efforts to consummate the transactions contemplated in this Agreement.
(b)
All transfer taxes, including sales or use taxes, if any, payable by reason
of the sale, transfer or delivery of any of the Membership Interest shall be paid by Seller.
Purchaser hereby waives compliance with any applicable bulk sale laws.
(c)
All notices shall be in writing and shall be deemed given when delivered
by hand or by facsimile transmission, telexed or mailed by reputable courier service or registered
or certified mail (return receipt requested), postage prepaid, to the parties at the addresses set
forth on the records of the Company (or at such other address for a party as shall be specified
by like notice; provided that notices of a change of address shall be effective only upon receipt
thereof). The parties may change the address for any such notice, request, demand, tender or
other communication by delivery of such notice of change of address in accordance with the
terms of this Section.
(d)
This Agreement supersedes all prior discussions and agreements between
the parties with respect to the matters contained herein, and this Agreement contains the sole and
entire agreement between the parties hereto with respect to the transactions contemplated herein.
This Agreement may be amended or modified only in a writing signed by all of the parties
hereto.
(e)
This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the
parties hereto and their respective legal representatives, successors and assigns.
(f)
This Agreement shall be construed and governed by the substantive laws
of the State of Utah.
(g)
The invalidity or unenforceability of any particular provision of this
Agreement shall not affect the other provisions, and this Agreement shall be construed in all
respects as if such invalid or unenforceable provision had not been contained herein.
(h)
Whenever in this Agreement a singular word is used, it shall also include
the plural wherever required by the context, and vice versa. Whenever in this Agreement a word
of one gender is used, it shall also include the other gender and the neuter.
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(i)
The captions in this Agreement are for convenience and identification
purposes only, are not an integral part of this Agreement, and are not to be considered in the
interpretation of any part hereof.
(j)
All representations, warranties, covenants and obligations in this
Agreement and any certificate or document delivered pursuant to this Agreement will survive
the Closing.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement under seal effective
on the date first above written.
SELLER:

COMPANY:
QUICK CASH, LLC

*

{-SEAL)

Member and Manager

PURCHASER:

EXHIBIT A
BILL OF SALE
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, and in accordance with that certain Agreement (the
"Purchase Agreement") for Sale and Purchase of Certain Membership Interest of a limited
liability company Membership Interest, dated as of December 1,1997, by and between RANDY
L. HAUGEN ("Seller"), QUICK CASH, LLC (the "Company") and KIP D. CASHMORE
("Purchaser"), Seller does hereby sell, assign, transfer, deliver, and convey to Purchaser all right,
title and interest in and to the Membership Interest identified in the Purchase Agreement
(collectively, the "Membership Interest").
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said Membership Interest unto Purchaser, its
successors and assigns, and Seller does hereby represent and warrant that such Membership
Interest is transferred to Purchaser free and clear of any security interests, liens, adverse claims,
encumbrances or other restrictions whatsoever, and Seller agrees to forever defend the title of
such Membership Interest unto Purchaser, its successors and assigns against all persons
whomsoever.
THIS BILL OF SALE is given pursuant and subject to the Purchase Agreement,
and in the event of any conflict between the terms hereof and those of the Purchase Agreement,
the Purchase Agreement shall be deemed controlling.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Seller has executed this Bill of Sale effective as of
the date first written above.

0DMA\S0FTS0L\311\CEC\41107\0

12/16/1997

EXHIBIT "B"

Pagel

Quick Cash Sale
Compound Period
Nominal Annual Rate ...
Effective Annual Rate ..
Periodic Rate
Daily Rate

• Monthly
5.610 %
5.757 %
0.4675 %
0.01537%

CASH FLOW DATA
Event

Start Date

1 Loan
2 Payment
3 Payment

11/30/1997
12/30/1997
01/02/1999

Amount
193,465.10
15.000.00
20.000.00

Number Period
1
12 Monthly
1

End Date
11/30/1998

AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE - Normal Amortization
Date
Loan 11/30/1997
1 12/30/1997
1997 Totals

Payment

Interest

Principal

Balance
193,465.10
179,369.55

15,000.00
15,000.00

904.45
904.45

14,095.55
14,095.55

01/30/1998
02/28/1998
03/30/1998
04/30/1998
05/30/1998
06/30/1998
07/30/1998
08/30/1998
09/30/1998
10/30/1998
11/30/1998
Totals

15,000.00
15,000.00
15,000.00
15,000.00
15,000.00
15.000.00
15,000.00
15.000.00
15.000.00
15,000.00
15,000.00
165,000.00

838.55
772.35
705.83
639.01
571.87
'504.42
436.65
368.57
300.17
231.45
162.40
5,531.27

14,161.45
14,227.65
14,294.17
14,360.99
14,428.13
14,495.58
14,563.35
14,631.43
14,699.83
14,768.55
14,837.60
159,468.73

165,208.10
150,980.45
136,686.28
122.325.29
107.897.16
93,401.58
78,838.23
64,206.80
49,506.97
34,738.42
19,900.82

13 01/02/1999
1999 Totals

20,000.00
20,000.00

99.18
99.18

19,900.82
19,900.82

0.00

200,000.00

6,534.90

193,465.10

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1998

Grand Totals
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700

- ^

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
;I

AFFIDAVIT OF RANDY HAUGEN

]
i

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

;
;I
]
;
;

Defendants.

]

Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Randy Haugen, being first duly swom, deposes and states as follows:

1.

I owned a 50% membership interest in Quick Cash, LLC ("Quick Cash") in

October 1997. Kerry Pipkin "Pipkin" owned the other 50 % membership interest in Quick Cash in
October 1997.
2.

Quick Cash operated check-cashing stores in October 1997.

3.

Around October 1997,1 decided that I no longer wanted to be in the check- cashing

business and no longer wanted to own my membership interest in Quick Cash.
4.

I wanted to sell my interest in Quick Cash, because I no longer wished to be

involved in Quick Cash or any check-cashing businesses.
5.

I told Pipken I wanted to sell my interest in Quick Cash, because I no longer wished

to be involved in Quick Cash or any check-cashing businesses.
6.

Cashmore offered $750,000 to purchase Quick Cash.

•7.

I sold my membership interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore for $375,000 by

individual agreement and that agreement has been fully performed by Cashmore and myself.
Pipkin sold his interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore by a separate individual agreement. Pipkin,
Cashmore and myself were represented by the North Carolina law firm of Elliott, Culp and
Carpenter in drafting the individual agreements to sell our interests in Quick Cash to Cashmore.
8.

Apart from the payment I received from Cashmore for the sale of my interest in

Quick Cash, I received no other compensation from Cashmore for the sale of my interest nor have I
afterwards had any interest at all in Quick Cash or in any check-cashing business with Cashmore.
9.

I did not sell my interest in Quick Cash in order to replace Pipkin with Cashmore as

my partner in Quick Cash.

10.
development.

RKT Holding Company is a Utah company that holds real property to sell later for
RKT Holding Company is entirely separate from and unrelated to Cashmore's

check-cashing businesses. I am a co-owner of RKT Holding Company with Cashmore.
11.

QC Instant Cash is a California limited liability company operating a check-cashing

business in California and was an asset owned by Quick Cash when Quick Cash was sold to
Cashmore.
DATED:

tenr

12-

,2001.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /£_ day of April; 2001

NOTi^Y^tJBLIC
KOTwar prone
JO0VK.TAVLQR
012 North 3000 West
West Point UT 84015
My Comm&ston Expires
November 24&v 2001

8IATBC7tn*B

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the( J*
day of July, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of AFFIDAVIT OF RANDY HAUGEN to
be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827

Etan E. Rosen SBN 173728
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
Telephone: (916) 369-9750
Facsimile: (916) 369-9760

2001
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Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY OF
DISCOVERY

vs.

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive.
Defendants.

Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

Etan E. Rosen, BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN, counsel for Plaintiff, hereby certifies
that on the 12th day of July, 2001, he caused to 4?e served upon all counsel of record, by first-class
mail, postage prepaid. Plaintiff Kerry Pippin's Rule 26 Initial Disclosures.
DATED this
PONGRATZ & ROSEN
Etan E. Rosen
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of theforegoinginstrument was
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this / - ^
day oi ////
J^/ 2001, to the
following:
Denver Snuffer
Nelson, Snuffer, Dohle & Puisen
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
James Tily
Anderson & Karrenberg
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
SaltLak£LCity, UT 84101-2006

Sandra Smith

EtanE. Rosen SBN 173728
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
Telephone: (916) 369-9750
Facsimile: (916)369-9760
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Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY OF
DISCOVERY

Plaintiff,
vs.
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive.
Defendants.

Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

Etan E. Rosen, BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN, counsel for Plaintiff, hereby certifies
that on the 12* day of July, 2001, he caused to^pe served upon all counsel of record, by first-class
mail, postage prepaid. Plaintiff Kerry Pipkin's Rule 26 Initial Disclosures.
DATED this

day of
PONGRATZ & ROSEN
Etan E. Rosen
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
/

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and.wqept copy of the'foregoinginstrument was
day of / /[/ IjJ
2001, to the
mailed,first-class,postage prepaid, on this /<**
following:
^

Denver Snuffer
Nelson, Snuffer, Dohle & Pulsen
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
James Tily
Anderson & Karrenberg
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
SaltXake^ity, UT 84101-2006

Sandra Smith
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Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H.Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801)534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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Civil No. 010901074

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1 -50, inclusive,

])
;
;
;
;

Judge Roger S. Dutson

Defendants.

]

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Kip Cashmore, beingfirstduly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

"USA Cash Services" is a DBA for Quick Cash, LLC. ("Quick Cash").

2.

I offered to purchase and subsequently purchased Randy Haugen's ("Haugen") and

Kerry Pipkin's ("Pipkin") membership interests in Quick Cash in December 1997 for a total of
$750,000.
3.

I executed an individual agreement in December 1997 with Pipkin providing for

Pipkin to sell his 50% ownership in Quick Cash to me in consideration for $375,000. Both parties
have fully performed under that agreement. Pipkin has been fully paid under that agreement and
has never tendered back nor offered to tender back any part of the consideration he received for his
interest in Quick Cash.
4.

I executed an individual agreement in December 1997 with Haugen providing for

Haugen to sell his 50% ownership in Quick Cash to me in consideration for $375,000. Haugen and
I have fully performed under that agreement.
5.'

In drafting the Pipkin and Haugen agreements, Pipkin, Haugen and myself were

each represented by the North Carolina law firm of Culp, Elliott and Carpenter.
6.

I never stated or in any way implied or promised that Pipkin would continue to be

involved in any of my check-cashing or other businesses after Pipkin sold his interest in Quick Cash
to me in December 1997.
7.

Haugen has no interest in any of my check-cashing businesses nor has he been

involved in any of my check-cashing businesses after the sale of his Quick Cash membership
interest to me in December 1997.
8. RKT Holding Company is a Utah company that holds real property to sell for
development. RKT Holding Company is entirely separate from and has nothing to do with any of
my check-cashing businesses. I am a co-owner of RKT Holding Company with Randy Haugen.

9.

"USA Cash Stores," an entity named in the Complaint, was a DBA for Quick Cash

but no longer exists as an entity in which I have any interest.
10.

QC Instant Cash is a California limited liability company operating a check-cashing

business in California and was an asset owned by Quick Cash when Quick Cash was sold to me.
JqlvJ
DATED:
4*mfe~ /<l
, 2001.

—rsn-

lA

^CffLCASHMORE

vjjiy
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _/^_ day o f W , 2001

JOOTK.TWL0R
812 Ftofft 3000 test
WBStRATt, UT 84015

My Commtsston Expires
Nrasntera*m,200l

smmawta

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the \\)
day of July, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of AFFIDAVIT OF KIP CASHMORE to
be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827

iLAAs^L

2C0I JUL 1^ P 1: ^
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
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700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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)
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vs.
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)
)

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
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]
])
]
]

Civil No. 010901074

Defendants.

]

sJW. 2 7 £ 0(

Judge Roger S. Dutson

Defendants Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore, Quick Cash, LLC, USA Cash Stores, USA
Cash Services, QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company ("Defendants") hereby move the
Court for an order granting them leave to amend their Answer to assert counterclaims pursuant to
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy of the proposed Amended Answer and
Counterclaim is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." The basis for this motion, as more folly set
forth in the accompanying memorandum, is that the litigation has not advanced in any meaningful

a complete Rule 26 disclosure statement from the Plaintiff.

Accordingly, an amendment of

Defendants' Answer to include counterclaims will not be prejudicial nor will it delay these
proceedings. Defendants, therefore, respectfully request this Court grant Defendants' Motion to
Amend Answer to include the asserted counterclaims.
DATED:

July , ^ , 2 0 0 1 .
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

//

l
L^—•

Thomas R. Karrenberg
James H. Tily
Attorney for Defendants

J

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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of July, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of Defendants1 Motion to Amend Answer to
Assert Counterclaims to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
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Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
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Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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j

vs.
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)
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RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

;
;)
;
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;

Defendants.

]

DEFENDANTS' AMENDED ANSWER
AND COUNTERCLAIM
(Jury Demand)
Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

Defendants Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore, Quick Cash, LLC, USA Cash Stores. USA
Cash Services, QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company ("Defendants") hereby files his
amended answer and counterclaim regarding Plaintiffs complaint and demand trial by jury.

1.

Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to

the truth of each and every averment contained in paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint and,
therefore, deny paragraph 1 of Plaintiff s Complaint.
2.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

3.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

4.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

5.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

6.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

7.

Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

8.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

9.

Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

JO.

Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
11.

Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
12.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
13.

Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to

the truth of each and every averment contained in paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs Complaint and,
therefore, deny each and every averment contained therein, except Defendants admit that Mr.
Haugen was involved in the establishment of Quick Cash.

14.

Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
15.

Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs

Complaint, but admit that Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore met with Plaintiff to discuss the stores
in 1997.
16.

Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
17.

Defendants deny in part the averments contained in paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs

Complaint, but admit that when Mr. Cashmore offered $750,000 to purchase seven of the stores,
Plaintiff and Mr. Haugen agreed to sell their interests in their partnership.
18.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs

Complaint, except admit that Mr. Haugen did tell the Plaintiff truthfully that he was not a partner
with Mr. Cashmore in the check cashing business.
19.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
20.

Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by preference each and every averment,

admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 19 above.
21.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
22.

Defendants admit that Mr. Cashmore offered $750,000 to purchase the business

and that Mr. Haugen told Plaintiff he wanted to sell the business. Defendants deny each and
every other averment contained in paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs Complaint.

23.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
24.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
25.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
26.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
27.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
28.

Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment,

admissiqn or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 above.
29.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
30.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
31.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
32.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
33.

Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment,

admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 32 above.

34.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
35.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
36.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
37.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
38.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs

Complaint.
39.

Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment,

admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 above.
40.

Defendants admit that Plaintiff and Mr. Haugen entered into a business

arrangement in 1994 concerning check cashing services, but deny each and every other averment
contained in paragraph 40 of Plaintiff s Complaint.
41.

Defendants admit that Mr. Cashmore knew that there was an existing business

relationship between Plaintiff and Mr. Haugen and that Mr. Cashmore, Mr. Haugen and Plaintiff
did have a business relationship involving Amway, but deny each and every other averment
contained in paragraph 41 of Plaintiff s Complaint.
42.
Complaint.

Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 42 of Plaintiffs

43.

Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment,

admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 42 above.
44.

Defendants admit that Mr. Haugen and Plaintiff entered into a business

relationship in 1994 for the purpose of carrying on a check cashing business, but deny each and
every other averment contained in paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs Complaint.
45.

Defendants admit that the check cashing business was carried on until about

December 1997, but deny each and every other averment contained in paragraph 45 of Plaintiffs
Complaint.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
46.

Plaintiffs Complaint and each claim for relief contained therein fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
47.

Plaintiffs Complaint and each claim for relief contained therein is barred by the

applicable statute of limitations.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
48.

Plaintiffs Complaint and each claim for relief contained therein is barred by the

doctrine of waiver.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
49.

Plaintiff is estopped by reasons of his own actions in selling the business with the

advice and assistance of counsel and Plaintiff, therefore, is barred from pursuing the claims
contained in the Complaint.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
50.

Any damages caused to Plaintiff as a result of any of the claims contained in

Plaintiffs Complaint, which damages Defendants specifically deny occurred, were incurred as a
result of Plaintiffs own fault which is greater than or equal to the fault of the Defendants, which
fault these Defendants specifically deny exists, and, therefore, Plaintiff is barred from recovering
any damages from the Defendants.
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
51.

Plaintiffs Complaint and each and every claim from relief contained therein is

barred by the doctrine of laches.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for relief as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff take nothing by his action;

2.

That Defendants be awarded all costs of suit incurred herein, including reasonable
attorneys fees;

3.

For such further and other relief as the Court deems proper.
COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiff Kip Cashmore ("Cashmore") hereby counterclaims against defendant Kerry
Pipkin ("Pipkin") and alleges as follows:
PARTIES
1. Cashmore is and was at all times relevant to this action an individual residing in
Weber County, Utah.

2. Upon information and belief, Pipkin is and was at all times relevant to this action an
individual residing in Weber County, Utah.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
3. In December 1997, Pipkin and Cashmore executed an Agreement ("Pipkin
Agreement") providing for Pipkin to sell his 50% membership interest in Quick Cash to
Cashmore. See Pipkin Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit A.
4. The Pipkin Agreement states that Pipkin agreed to "indemnify and save [Cashmore]
harmless from against and any and all claims . . . and from and against any and all liabilities,
losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees and other expenses of every nature and character
arising by reason of or resulting from . . . litigation involving [Pipkin], [Quick Cash] or the
Business . . . relating to an event occurring existing prior to the Closing Date." See Pipkin
Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit A, at 1 9.a.
5. Pipkin's Complaint herein is based on events that occurred prior to the closing date
prior to the Pipkin Agreement.

Pipkin asserted causes of action for fraud, negligent

misrepresentation, intentional interference with economic relations, rescission and accounting
against Cashmore based on alleged statements that Cashmore and Randy Haugen, Pipkin's
previous business partner, made to Pipkin prior to the closing of the Pipkin Agreement. See
Pipkin Complaint, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
6. Cashmore has incurred counsel fees and other litigation expenses as a result of the
Pipkin Complaint.
7. Induced by and in reliance upon the indemnity provision in the Pipkin Agreement,
Cashmore entered into the Pipkin Agreement.

8. Pursuant to the terms of the indemnification provision, Pipkin is required to pay
Cashmore all expenses resulting from litigation arising out of events occurring prior to the
closing date of the Pipkin Agreement and, further, to indemnify Cashmore for any liabilities,
losses, damages, costs and charges which may be imposed upon Cashmore as a result of this
litigation.
9. By letter dated June 26, 2001, Cashmore demanded payment from Pipkin for the
litigation expenses and demanded that Pipkin acknowledge his duty to indemnify Cashmore for
any losses suffered by Cashmore as a result of this litigation.
10. Pipkin failed, or otherwise expressed or indicated an inability, to promptly and
properly pay Cashmore's claim and failed to acknowledge his contractual duty to indemnify
Cashmore. As a result, Cashmore has been required to pay these amounts and, in addition, has
incurre4 various costs and expenses in investigating, defending, paying, settling, or otherwise
resolving the claim and may incur additional losses as a result of the litigation.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Agreement of Indemnity)
11. Cashmore reallages and incorporates herein the preceding allegations in this
Counterclaim.
12. Under the terms of the indemnity provision in the Pipkin Agreement, Pipkin is liable
to Cashmore for the total of all losses and expenses (including attorney's fees) that Cashmore has
incurred or will incur as a result of the Pipkin Complaint.
13. Cashmore has performed all of the terms and conditions of the Pipkin Agreement.

14. Pipkin has breached the indemnity provision of the Pipkin Agreement by failing or
refusing to perform his obligations to indemnify and save Cashmore harmless against losses,
expenses and attorney's fees incurred as a result of litigation arising out of event occurring "prior
to the closing date of the Pipkin Agreement.
15. By reason of Pipkin's breaches of the indemnity provision, Cashmore has sustained
damages at least in the amount of $10,000.00.

Cashmore continues to sustained ongoing

damages. The full extent of Cashmore's damages will be established by proof at the time of trial.
WHEREFORE, Cashmore prays for judgment and other relief against Pipkin as follows:
1.

Under his First Claim for Relief for breach of the indemnification provision, for

judgment against Pipkin at least in the amount of $10,000.00, plus such additional sums as may
be established at the time of trial as the total of losses and expenses incurred by Cashmore by
reason of the Pipkin Complaint and by reason of enforcing by litigation the indemnity provision
in the Pipkin Agreement.
2.

For Cashmore's attorney's fees and expenses incurred in connection with this

3.

For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the rates allowed by law.

4.

For such other and further relief as may be just and proper under the

action.

circumstances, including other equitable relief deemed appropriate to protect and preserve
Cashmore's rights under the Pipkin Agreement and the common law.

DATED:

July

,2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

Thomas R. Karrenberg
James H. Tily
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the 29th
day of March, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of Defendants' Amended Answer and
Counterclaim to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070

Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO
ASSERT COUNTERCLAIMS
Civil No. 010901074

JUL 2 7 2001

Judge Roger S. Dutson

Defendants.

Defendants Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore, Quick Cash, LLC, USA Cash Stores, USA
Cash Services, QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company ("Defendants"), by and through
their undersigned counsel, hereby submit this memorandum in support of their Motion to Amend
Answer to Assert Counterclaims for indemnification.
Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants have moved this
Court to allow Defendants to amend their Answer to assert counterclaims. While the parties may

amend their pleading at this stage only by leave of Court or by written consent of the adverse
party, "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). In this
case, neither party will suffer prejudice by allowing the proposed amendment.
Defendants, through their counsel, requested Plaintiff to stipulate to this motion.
Plaintiffs counsel, however, refused to do so. Discovery has barely commenced and Defendants
have not yet received a complete set of mandatory disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The deadline for amending pleadings is not until September 30,
2001. A trial date is not yet set, and the case will not be certified as ready for trial until April 2,
2002. The counterclaim will not greatly expand the scope of the litigation.

Accordingly,

Defendants request that this Court exercise its discretion and permit Defendants to amend their
Answer to assert their counterclaim.
•DATED:

July c ^ , 2 0 0 1 .
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

Thomas R. Karrenberg
James H. Tily
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the <^6 day
of July, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of Memorandum in Support of Defendants1
Motion to Amend Answer to Assert Counterclaims to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

THOMAS R. KARRENBERG
JOHN T. ANDERSON
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STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY
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JOHN P. MULLEN
JON V. HARPER
NATHAN B. WILCOX
STEPHEN P. HORVAT
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JAMES H. TILY

700 BANK ONE TOWER
5 0 WEST BROADWAY
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TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700
TELECOPIER (801) 364-7697

July 23, 2001

Clerk of the Court
Second District Court, Weber County
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Re:

Kerry Pipkin v. Randy Haugen, et al.
Civil No. 010901074

Dear Clerk:
Enclosed please find the original and one copy of each of the following
pleadings:
1.

Motion to Amend Answer to Assert Counterclaims; and

2.

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Answer to Assert
Counterclaims.

Please file the originals in the above-referenced action and date-stamp and return the
copies to the undersigned in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope.
Thank you for your assistance.
Very truly yours,

Michelle R. Somers
Secretary
Enclosures

ETAN E. ROSEN, ESQ. - CBN: 173728
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916) 369-9750
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Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801)576-1400
Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,

vs.

DECLARATION OF ETAN ROSEN IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 010901074

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH STORES,
USA CASH SERVICES, QC INSTANT
CASH, RKT HOLDING COMPANY, and
DOES 1-50, inclusive.

Judge Roger S. Duncan

Defendants.
I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice before all courts of the State of
California, pro-hac vice' in this case and am attorney of record for Plaintiff Kerry Pipkin, herein.
1.

Everything contained in this declaration is matter of my own personal knowledge

and I will testify in accordance therewith if called to testify at a hearing or trial.

2.

I conducted a search in the Superior Court of the State of California in the County

of Sacramento regarding any of the Defendants in the case of Pipkin v. Haugen, et al. We located
a case named Virginia McQueen v. U.S.A Cash Stores, Inc. where Kipley Cashmore and Randy
Haugen were one of the Defendants. The case caption is 99AS04703.
3.

Apparently, U.S.A. Cash Stores, Inc. and Kipley Cashmore and Randy Haugen

were sued by certain employees for sexual harassment. On or about September 5, 2000 in the
law and motion department of the Sacramento Superior Court, Defendant Randy Haugen's
Motion to Quash Service of Summons based on lack of jurisdiction was heard. It is my
understanding the that court denied the motion to quash service of summons based on the fact
that Mr. Haugen appears to have retained an ownership interest in the business that he supposedly
sold to Mr. Cashmore. I managed to retrieve the court's tentative ruling on that matter which
became the ruling of the court. A true and correct copy of that ruling is enclosed herein as
Exhibit *4A" and incorporated herein by reference.
4.

Through my research into that specific case I also found a copy of a check made

by Q C Corporation under the name of Randy Haugen to Amanda Lewis, one of the Plaintiffs in
99AS04703, (the Sacramento County case). Apparently, Randy Haugen was signing checks
under QC or (Quick Cash) after the supposed purchase of his interests by Kip Cashmore. A true
and correct copy of that check is enclosed herein as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by
reference.
5.

I also managed to find a W-2 form for wage and tax statement for the year

1998 which was issued by January 31, 1999. This W-2 wage and tax statement for 1998 is in the
name of Quick Cash, LLC. Randy Haugen, General Partner. A true and correct copy of that W2 is attached hereto as Exhibit " C and incorporated herein by reference.

6.

It appears as if Mr. Haugen retained an interest and an active role in Quick Cash,

LLC even though he claims that he did not pursue the business further after he sold his interest to
Kip Cashmore.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the

~

foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed at Sacramento, California this
jH

, July, 2001.

/

jr-i

Etan E. Rosen
Attorney for Plaintiff- Kerry Pipkin

hic^. ••* vvw, ^courtv m^sn »-irm>mv'trulingv<teptf) -^pOXd*,*

Department 53
September 3, 2000
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99AS04703 VrEGINIA MCQUEEN, ET hi VS. U.S.A. CASh 3TOKE;), INC, EI AL
Nature of Prccecdincj: MOTION TO QUASH S£F.YTC£ Or SUWKO^?
TiieCJ 5y: MCDONPXD, MELISSA L.

Defendant Haugen*3 motion tc quasn for iacK or personal
juriadicticn is DEMTEn. There is arple evidence cf co-itazr.* by t»v; s
defendant to support both general and special jurisdiction.
Defendant declares he sold his interest in £viic.-: Cash in December 199"?
befcr* tne Acts complained of by plaintiffs occurred. Attachsc to h±s
declaration ie a copy of the purchase agreement between defsndart and
Cashmere dated December 1597. The agreement provides for * down peyner.i
with tna remainder of the purchase pric* tc? bo mace in installments.
Defendants forner partner declares that Haugen d^d not recieve th*
installment payments frc* purchaser Cashmere anc* that .Haugen needec 3
business to invest his menay. Thus he appears to hav« reta-ned an
ownership interest in the business for personal financial reasons. This
is consistent with the declarations of the plaintiffs. They each st.*tc:
(I) rhey were tcld Haugen was one of the owners.. (2J the manager ^^d
fcu*;nes.* relied conversations with Kajger., (J; tr.e iranagtr contacted
Kajge.n for advice or. important decisions, anc [*, their w-2 forms to1998 indicated Ksugen wa3 their employer. In addition Hsucen js'j
ri'Strlbutcr/sporfsor for taway products ar.d nas sponsored several
California residents as w*ll as visiting California tc cencurt Jtawav
J
meetings.
This minute Drier is effective iwediatelv. Nc formal cdpr is
required :h* tentativa ruling being sufficient notice.
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ETAN E. ROSEN, ESQ. - CBN: 173728
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916)369-9750
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801)576-1400
Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,

;
)
])
)
;)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH STORES,
USA CASH SERVICES, QC INSTANT
CASH, RKT HOLDING COMPANY, and
DOES 1-50, inclusive.

AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF KERRY
PIPKIN IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

;

) Civil No. 010901074
;
;) Judge Roger S. Duncan
;
;

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF WEBER

)

Kerry Pipkin, beingfirstduly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

Randy Haugen and myself each owned afiftypercent (50%) interest in Quick

PIPKIN

FPX NO. : 8014755393
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Cash, LLC in 1997. On or about October, 1997 Randy Haugen allowed Kip Cashmore access to
our books and records without my knowledge. It is my understanding that Randy Haugen then
asked Cashnroc to propose a t h i w ^
bemapaitnerdiipwfc^

In response to my refusal to partner wta Mr. OshmDre,

Mr, Haugen indicated to me that he wanted to sell the partnership to Mr. Cashmore and did not
want anything to do with Quick Cash. L L C He indicated to me that he wanted to fccus his
energies on his Amway Distributorship instead.
2.

Mr. Haugen asserted repeated pressure on me to sell myfiftypercent (50%)

Interest in Quick Cash, LLC to Mr. Cashmore. This pressure was substantial because I was
involved in the Amway business with Mr. Haugen, and as my sponsor in the Amway business, Mr.
Haugen had substantialfinancialauthority andfinancialpower over me. I specifically felt that if 1
did not sell myfiftypercent (50%) interest in Quick Cash, LLC to Mr. Cashmore, my Amway
business with Mr. Haugen would be effected
3.

The sale of Quick Cash, LLC happened around December, 1997. On or about

May 11,19981 received infonnarion that Randy Haugen and Kip Cashmore both signed new
signature cards for the continued business of Quick Cash, LLC. L of course, understood Mr,
Randy Haugen to have sold half of his interest to Kip Caahn*>re. 1 questioned Randy Haugen
repeatedly about the new bank signature cards and hefinallyinformed me, after a lot of pressure,
that ha never received monthly payments fiom Mr. Kip Cashnxre, Therefore I understood that
he decided to continue his business with Kip Cashmore In direct opposition to what he told m* in
inducing me to sell to Mr. Kjp Cashmore. Mr. Haugen specifically toldroethat the signature cari
allowed him access to Quick Cash, LLC money at any time.
4.

On or about May 12,19981 learned again that Mr. Randy Haugen and Mr. Kip

Cashmore were indeed partners.
5.

On or about October, 19981 received thefrontpage only of the 1997 tax return

relating to Quick Cash, LLC. On that page a question was asked "Did the LLC or its subsidiary
have transfer of acquisition of more thanfiftypercent (50%) in control of ownership?" Mr.
Cashmore's tax attorneys* answer to that was clearly "No.H
6.

On or about late 19991 found documentation indicated that Mr. Cashmore and

Mr. Haugen were partners in cash stores. Quick Cash, LLC also doing business as USA Cash
Stores, Inc. This entity us nothing more than a name change of my old business.
7.

On or about M>; 2000,1 met with Mr. Cashmore over issues relating to taxes

relating back to 1997 and then learned that Mr. Haugen had afiftypercent (50%) ownership and
Mr Cashmore had anotherfiftypercent (50%) ownership in the cash stores.
8.

From approximately December, 1997 until July, 2001 the initial stores that I and

Mr. Haugen allegedly sold to Mr. Cashmore grew from seven (7) stores to around seventy (70).
1 would have never sold had I not been told that Mr. Haugen was intending on exiting the
business. I did not intend to sell to Mr. Cashmore so that he and Mr. Haugen can continue doing
business. 1 would have never sold had Mr. Haugen not pressured me to sell telling me he is
getting out of the business.
DATED; July ^ 3 > 2001

ry?if

A/
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

JUU
UE MCCAFFEaTY!
1344 West 4«?75 So»ith
Ogden, V\zr> 8-V.C5
My Commission Exoires
June 13, 2002

EtanE. Rosen SBN 173728
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
Telephone: (916)369-9750
Facsimile: (916)369-9760
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Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801)576-1400
Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive.
Defendants.

Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Defendants Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore, Quick Cash, LLC, USA Cash Stores, USA
Cash Services, QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company come now with a summary judgment

motion prior to conducting any discovery in this case and prior to even scheduling the depositions
of Plaintiff and Defendants.
As seen in the affidavit of Plaintiff Kerry Pipkin and the declaration of his counsel, the
'"undisputed material facts" are indeed disputed and therefore defendants motion for summaryjudgment must fail.

II. DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Plaintiff does not dispute statement number one.

2.

Plaintiff does not dispute statement number two.

3.

Plaintiff does not dispute statement number three.

4.

Plaintiff highly disputes statement number four. As seen in the affidavit of

Plaintiff, which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference, Cashmore paid Plaintiff
$375,000.00 but did not pay defendant Haugen anything. This is specifically the reason why
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Haugen and Defendant Cashmore conspired to defraud him by
informing him that Defendant Cashmore is paying $375,000.00 to Defendant Haugen when
indeed Defendant Haugen did not receive any money but instead continued doing business with
Defendant Cashmore. Evidence of the continued dealings is attached to the declaration of
attorney Etan Rosen in Exhibits "B" and "C".
5.

Plaintiff does not dispute statement number five even though it is not relevant to

this action whatsoever.
6.

Plaintiff does not dispute that he received $375,000.00 from Defendant Cashmore.

7.

Plaintiff highly disputes statement number seven. As seen in his declaration,

attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. Defendant Cashmore did not perform under

the Haugen agreement and did not pay $375,000.00 to Defendant Haugen but instead went into a
continued business with Defendant Haugen after inducing Plaintiff to sell to Defendant Cashmore.
8.

Plaintiff does not dispute statement number eight.

9.

Plaintiff highly disputes statement number nine as seen in his affidavit.

10.

Plaintiff highly disputes statement number ten as seen in his affidavit. While

Defendant Cashmore never promised or agreed to include Plaintiff Pipkin in any of his future
business ventures, it was understood that Defendant Cashmore and Defendant Haugen would not
continue with the same check cashing business amongst themselves. Plaintiff would have never
exited the check cashing business if it was not for Haugen's misrepresentations. See attached
affidavit of Plaintiff attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
11.

Plaintiff disputes statement number eleven as it is irrelevant.

12.

Plaintiff disputes statement number twelve as seen in his affidavit.

43.

Plaintiff specifically disputes the statement in number thirteen as seen in is his

affidavit.
14.

Plaintiff is unable to dispute or to affirm statements made in Defendants Statement

of Undisputed Material Facts number fourteen aside from the fact that Defendants Cashmore and
Haugen are co-owners of RKT Holding Company.
15.

Plaintiff disputes statement number fifteen as it has no relevance to this litigation.

16.

Plaintiff highly disputes statement number sixteen as to the fact that Defendant

Cashmore is the only member of QC Instant Cash. Plaintiff believes that QC Instant Cash is
owned by both Defendant Cashmore and Defendant Haugen. Evidence on that fact is enclosed as
Exhibit "B" to the declaration of Etan Rosen.
17.

Plaintiff highly disputes statement number seventeen as to the fact that Defendant

Cashmore is the only member of QC Instant Cash. Plaintiff believes that QC Instant Cash is
owned by both Defendant Cashmore and Defendant Haugen. Evidence to that fact is enclosed as
Exhibit "B" to the declaration of Etan Rosen.
III. ARGUMENT
18.

Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be denied as there are many

genuine issues of material facts that are in dispute. While defendants are correct in stating the
standard for summary judgment, it is clear from reviewing the issues still in dispute in this case
that several issues, which are crucial, are actually disputed. Specifically, Plaintiff plead with great
specificity fraud, negligent misrepresentation, intentional interference with economic relations and
recessions against various defendants. In the very essence of Plaintiffs complaint he claims that
Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore conspired amongst themselves to defraud Plaintiff by "squeezing"
him out of the check cashing business which he was involved in with Defendant Haugen only to
learn afterward that Defendants Haugen and Defendant Cashmore continued with the business.
Plaintiff submitted enough evidence, in the form of two declarations, to show on its face that
Defendants Haugen and Cashmore continued with the business, even though Defendant Haugen
claims that he sold his entire interest to Defendant Cashmore. Plaintiff claims that he sold his
interest to Cashmore at a discount based on the fact that Mr. Haugen, his partner of several years
and his sponsor in the Amway business, told him that he is exiting the check cashing business.
Plaintiff claims that he would have never sold to Defendant Cashmore and certainly not for the
amount that he did without the misrepresentations made by Cashmore and Haugen.
19.

Defendants now come and argue, supported only by their declarations, that

Plaintiff does not have a case. Of course Plaintiff disagrees and attached is his declaration and
exhibits that were discovered that fly in the face of the declarations of defendants. Therefore,

PlaintiflF respectfully requests their summary judgment be denied.
IV, CONCLUSION
20.

For the reasons stated above PlaintiflF respectfully request that the summary

judgment be denied.

Respectfully submitted,
BEYER, PQNGRAT? & ROSEN

DATED: J u l y / U 2 0 0 1
L I

By:
Etant. Rose*
Attorney for PlaihtiflF

pEtanE. Rosen SBN 173728
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
Telephone: (916)369-9750
Facsimile: (916)369-9760
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Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY OF
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive.
Defendants.

Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

Etan E. Rosen, BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN, counsel for Plaintiff, hereby certifies
that on the 25th day of July, 2001, he caused to be served upon all counsel of record, by first-class
mail, postage prepaid. Plaintiff Kerry Pipkin's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment.
DATED this

•31

4

day o
ONGRATZ & ROSEN
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and
correc copy of the foregoing instrument
nd correct
i
was
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this
2001, to the
following:

Denver Snuffer
Nelson, Snuffer, Dohle & Pulsen
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
James Tily
Anderson & Karrenberg
One Tower
padway
84WT-2006

Sandra Smith

ETAN E. ROSEN, ESQ. - CBN: 173728
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916) 369-9750
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Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801)576-1400
Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
)
;)
)
])

Plaintiff,
vs.

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH STORES,
USA CASH SERVICES, QC INSTANT
CASH, RKT HOLDING COMPANY, and
DOES 1-50, inclusive.
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO AMEND
ANSWER AND TO ASSERT
COUNTERCLAIMS

) Civil No. 010901074
;
]l Judge Roger S. Duncan
]
;

r
STATEMENT

This honorable Court is already familiar with some of the facts of this case as a summary
judgment and its opposition were recently filed.
Regardless, Defendants now come four months after filing their answer in this case and

requests leave to file an amended answer, and more importantly a counterclaim for
indemnification or breach of agreement of indemnity on behalf of Defendant Kip Cashmore.
For the reason stated below Plaintiff respectfully requests that Defendants not be allowed
to amend their answer.
II.
ARGUMENT
Defendants filed their initial answer to their complaint on behalf of all the named
Defendants, including Mr. Kip Cashmore on March 29, 2001. The complaint was signed and filed
approximately the end of January, 2001.
There are no facts in this case that have changedfromthe time Defendants filed its initial
answer to this complaint that would justify the Defendants neglect to file a counterclaim for
indemnification at this late date. Defendants, were in possession of the supposed indemnification
agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Kip Cashmore at the time they filed their answer to
the complaint but neglected for some reason to file a cross-complaint. Defendants now come to
Court, without any justification or explanation as to why they should be able to file a cross-claim
at this late date. Short of an inadvertent error, excuse, or neglect Defendants should not be
allowed to do so. No such excuse was given.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons as stated above Defendants' Motion To Amend Answer to Assert
Counterclaims should be denied.
Dated: ~

c>

.. - —

, July, 2001.
Eton E. Rosen
Attorney for Plaintiff- Kerry Pipkin

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY I am a member and/or employed by the lawfirmof BEYER,
PONGRATZ & ROSEN, 3230 Ramos Circle, Sacramento, CA 95827, and that on the ^jQ day
of July, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion
to Amend Answer and to Assert Counterclaim to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon:
Denver Snuffer
Nelson, Snuffer, Dohle & Pulsen
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
James Tily
Anderson & Karrenberg
700 Bank One Tower

ETAN E. ROSEN, ESQ. - CBN: 173728
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916) 369-9750
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Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)

NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801)576-1400
Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
)
)
)
)

'Plaintiff,

vs.

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS MOTION TO AMEND
ANSWER AND TO ASSERT
COUNTERCLAIMS

) Civil No. 010901074
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH STORES,
USA CASH SERVICES, QC INSTANT
CASH, RKT HOLDING COMPANY, and
DOES 1-50, inclusive.

) Judge Roger S. Duncan

Defendants.
_

STATEMENT
This honorable Court is already familiar with some of the facts of this case as a summary
judgment and its opposition were recently filed.
Regardless, Defendants now come four months afterfilingtheir answer in this case and

requests leave tofilean amended answer, and more importantly a counterclaim for
indemnification or breach of agreement of indemnity on behalf of Defendant Kip Cashmore.
For the reason stated below Plaintiff respectfully requests that Defendants not be allowed
to amend their answer.
II.
ARGUMENT
Defendantsfiledtheir initial answer to their complaint on behalf of all the named
Defendants, including Mr. Kip Cashmore on March 29, 2001. The complaint was signed and filed
approximately the end of January, 2001.
There are no facts in this case that have changedfromthe time Defendantsfiledits initial
answer to this complaint that would justify the Defendants neglect tofilea counterclaim for
indemnification at this late date. Defendants, were in possession of the supposed indemnification
agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Kip Cashmore at the time theyfiledtheir answer to
the complaint but neglected for some reason tofilea cross-complaint. Defendants now come to
Court, without any justification or explanation as to why they should be able tofilea cross-claim
at this late date. Short of an inadvertent error, excuse, or neglect Defendants should not be
allowed to do so. No such excuse was given.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons as stated above Defendants' Motion To Amend Answer to Assert
Counterclaims should be denied.
Dated: ^ TJuly, 2001.

^^—

^y

V HJ
Efo^ji E. Rosen
Attorney for Plaintiff- Kerry Pipkin

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY I am a member and/or employed by the law firm of BEYER,
PONGRATZ & ROSEN, 3230 Ramos Circle, Sacramento, CA 95827, and that on the *JJQ day
of July, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Plaintiff s Opposition to Defendants' Motion
to Amend Answer and to Assert Counterclaim to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon:

Denver Snuffer
Nelson, Snuffer, Dohle & Pulsen
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
James Tily
Anderson & Karrenberg
700 Bank One Tower
^roadway
UT84101-20C

Sandra Smith

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
Defendants.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

]

I hereby certify that on the r day of August, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of
Defendant Kip Cashmore's Responses to PlaintifPs Amended Request for Production of
Documents and Defendant Randy Haugen's Responses to Plaintiff's Amended Request for
Production of Documents to be served via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070

Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
DATED:

August

,2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

'/

lomas R. ^rrenberg
fames H. T\t
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the

/

day of August , 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Certificate of Service
was served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827

I A W OFFICES

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

700 BANK ONE TOWER
50 WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101-2006

THOMAS R. KARRENBERG
JOHN T. ANDERSON
FRANCIS J. CARNEY
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY
SCOn A. CALL
JOHN P. MULLEN
JON V. HARPER
NATHAN B. WILCOX
STEPHEN P. HORVAT
SHAYNE R. KOHLER
JAMES H. TRY

ZCOi

TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700
TELECOPIER (801) 364-7697

August 8, 2001

Clerk of the Court
Second District Court, Weber County
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Re:

Kerry Pipkin v. Randy Haugen, et al.
Civil No. 010901074

Dear Clerk:
Enclosed please find the original and one copy of a Certificate of Service.
Please file the original in the above-referenced action and date-stamp and return the
copy to me in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope.
Thank you for your assistance.
Very truly yours,

Suzanne H. Hurst
Secretaiy to James H. Tily
Enclosures

•q A il'-5°»

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
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Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KERRY PIPKIN,

j

Plaintiff,

;>

NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION

vs.

)I

(Oral Argument Requested)

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

;
])
;
;)

Defendants.

]

Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

The following matter is now at issue and ready for decision of the Court. The documents
indicated have been filed with the Court.
1.

(a)

Type of motion:

Motion for Leave to Amend Answer
to Assert Counterclaims

(b)

Date

filed:

July 25,2001

(c)

Partyfilingmotion:

(d)

[X] Memorandum in support

Defendants

(g)

[X] Memorandum in reply: Date Filed: August 9, 2001

(i)

[] Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify):

(j)

[X] Hearing requested? Yes X

DATED:

August J*

No

, 2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

Thomas R. Karrenberg
James H. Tily
Attorney for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the j £ day

AtAksf

of-Jtrty, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of Notice to Submit for Decision to be served,
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,

;
1
]1
1
)•

Plaintiff,
vs.
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
Defendants.

]>
;
;
;>
;
>
]

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
AMEND ANSWER TO ASSERT
COUNTERCLAIMS
(Oral Argument Requested)

Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

INTRODUCTION
Defendants have sought this Court's order allowing amendment of their Answer to assert
counterclaims in this action. This motion comes less than four months after Defendants initially
answered the Amended Complaint. Further, no trial date has been set and the case will not be
certified as ready for trial until at least April 2, 2002. The deadline for amending pleadings is
not even until September 30, 2001. Further, the parties have conducted little discovery; Plaintiff

has served only one set of requests for production of documents on Defendants and have taken no
deposition. Defendants have still yet to receive complete Rule 26 disclosures from Plaintiff.
Close examination of Plaintiffs objections reveal that the objections are without merit. In
Utah, "[the rules of civil procedure] must all be looked to in the light of their even more
fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are
afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their
dispute." Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 211, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963). Plaintiffs objection
to Defendants' motion reveals a disregard for this fundamental purpose.

The amendment

Defendants seek will allow for that and do so without prejudice to either party and the Plaintiff
has claimed no prejudice whatsoever in his opposition.
FACTS
1.

The deadline for amending the pleadings is September 30, 2001. Defendants'

Motion to Amend was filed on July 23, 2001.
2.

No trial date has been set and it is likely the case will not be certified as ready for

trial until April 2, 2002.
3.

The discovery cutoff is not until December 31, 2001. The only discovery which

has taken place in this case has been by Plaintiff who has served requests for production of
documents. Plaintiff has not taken a single deposition.
4.

Defendants have still yet to receive complete Rule 26 disclosures from Plaintiff.
ARGUMENT

Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend a pleading
shall be freely given when justice so requires.

Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a); see also Timm v.

Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993) ("Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments
to the end that cases may be fairly and fully presented on their merits.")- Utah courts consider the
following factors in determining whether to allow amendment: (1) the timeliness of the motion;
(2) the justification for the delay; and (3) any resulting prejudice to the responding party. Swift
Stop. Inc. v. Wright, 845 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Of these requirements, the third
is the most important: "A prime consideration in determining whether an amendment should be
permitted is the adequacy of an opportunity for the opposing party to meet the newly raised
matter." Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981); see also Bekins Bar V Ranch v.
Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983) ("A primary consideration that a trial judge must take into
account in determining whether leave should be granted is whether the opposing side would be
put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for which he had not had time to
prepare.")
In this case, Plaintiff has plenty of time to respond to the counterclaim and they will
suffer no prejudice if the Court grants the Motion to Amend. Plaintiff has served only one set of
requests for production of documents.

No depositions will have to be retaken; no written

discovery will have to be re-served. Defendants' Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures identify witnesses and
documents which support their counterclaims, so these matters are already known to Plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Defendants should be allowed leave to amend their answer to assert their counterclaims in
this action. First, there has been no bad faith delay. Second, there will be no prejudice to either
party-there is plenty of time remaining for discovery and neither party has engaged in significant
discovery which would have to be repeated. Third, forcing Defendants to bring their claims in a

different action would be contrary to the efficient resolution of judicial disputes. Accordingly,
Defendants respectfully request that they be permitted to amend their Answer to include the
counterclaims attached as Exhibit "A" to the opening memorandum.
DATED:

August

0

, 2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

ThoAias R. karrenberg'"
James H. Tily
Attorney for Defendants

/
'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg., 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the 0 _ day
of-Ju^r, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of Reply Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Amend Answer to Assert Counterclaims to be served, via U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants
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IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KERRY PIPKIN,

;

Plaintiff,
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;

REQUEST FOR HEARING AND ORAL
ARGUMENT

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
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Civil No. 010901074

Defendants.

]

vs.

Judge Roger S. Dutson

Pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Defendants,
by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby request a hearing and oral argument on their
Motion for Leave to Amend Answer to Assert Counterclaims.
DATED:

August

/) , 2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

(L i'. k
Tftbmas R. Karrenberg
James H. Tih/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the J)_ day
of August, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Request for Hearing and Oral Argument
to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants
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REQUEST FOR HEARING AND ORAL
ARGUMENT

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
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;
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Civil No. 010901074

Defendants.

]

Plaintiff,
vs.

Judge Roger S. Dutson

Pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Defendants,
by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby request a hearing and oral argument on their
Motion to Compel Disclosures and for Sanctions and Attorney's Fees.
DATED:

August /j?

,2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

L i i$
Tffomas R./4jCarrenberg
James H. Tily

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the/^_ day
of August, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Request for Hearing and Oral Argument
to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827

iuL

I

A

\S<tirlLc^

EtanE. Rosen SBN 173728
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
Telephone: (916) 369-9750
Facsimile: (916)369-9760
Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AMENDED
PLAINTIFF KERRY PIPKIN'S
RULE 26
INITIAL DISCLOSURES
Civil No. 010901074

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive.
Defendants.

Judge Roger S. Dutson

Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1), plaintiff hereby provides initial
disclosures as follows:
The following individuals are likely to have discoverable information.
1.
2.
3.

Kerry Pipkin, 1024 E. 5275, South Ogden, UT 84103
(Plaintiff)
Randy Haugen, 2488 Bonneville Terrace Drive, Ogden. UT 84403
(Defendant)
Kip Cashmore, 2522 Bonneville Terrace Drive, Ogden, UT 84403
(Defendant)

4.

Mark Nelson, 2316 East 5950 South, Ogden UT 84403
(801)476-9276
(801) 721-9603
(Witness)

5.

Terry Semrow, 3605 West 5700 South, Roy UT 84067
(801)985-9097
(Witness)

6.

Laurie Pipkin, 1024 Ease 5275 South, South Ogden, UT 84403
(801) 940-1466
(Witness)

7.

Ron Jenson, 3250 North 100 West, Pleasant View, UT 84414
(801) 782-7375
(Witness)

The following documents are provided to support the allegations of the plaintiff;
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Membership Interest Purchase Agreement
Amended Articles of Organization of Quick Cash, LLC 10/96
Resolution of Members of Quick Cash, LLC 11 /97
Amended Articles of Organization of Quick Cash, LLC 3/98
Articles of Organization of QC Instant Cash, LLC 5/98
West Star Investment Company, LLC Annual Report 10/98
Quick Cash LLC Company Annual Report 8/99

The following are the damages claimed by Plaintiff:
1.
2.

Actual damages $1.5 million. [Based on estimated value of 14 interest less
amount received]. Documentation in recorded conversation.
Punitive damages in the amount of $ 1,000,000.00.

DATED this,_

w

_ _ _ _ _ _
JRATZ & ROSEN

Etan E. Rosen
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the^egoing instrument was
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this J~J
day of ffJ&JSf 2001, to the
following:
'

Denver Snuffer
Nelson, Snuffer, Dohle & Pulsen
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
James Tily
Anderson & Karrenberg
700 Bank One Tower
50 West firoadway ,
Salt Lake Cj# UT 841^1-2006

Jftm
J#f/^
Sandra Smith

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
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Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
Defendants.

j
;>
>
;)

MOTION TO COMPEL DISCLOSURES
AND FOR SANCTIONS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES

])
;
;
;)
;
)
]

(Oral Argument Requested)

Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

Pursuant to Rule 37(f), Defendants move the Court for an order that Plaintiff be
compelled to disclose the damage information required by Rule 26 and for sanctions, costs and
attorney's in bringing this motion. Defendants have already requested the damage information
required by Rule 26 in two separate letters following the Plaintiffs failure to disclose the
required damage information in their initial disclosures. (See Letters and facsimiles from James
H. Tily to Etan E. Rosen dated July 18, 2001 and August 7, 2001, attached hereto as Exhibit A.)

Rule 37(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "if a party fails to disclose a
witness, document, or other material as required by Rule 26(a)(1), that party shall not be
permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose." Utah R. Civ. P.
37(f). That rule further provides that in addition to or lieu of the sanction, "the court may order
payment of reasonable costs and attorney fees" to the party forced to bring the motion. Utah R.
Civ. P. 37 (f). Because Plaintiff has still failed to provide the required information on damages
pursuant to Rule 26, this Court should issue an order that Plaintiff be compelled to produced such
information and for sanctions, and awarding costs and attorney's fees to Defendants in bringing
this motion.
DATED:

August /

,2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

Thomas R. Karrenberg
James H. Tily
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the / V
day of August , 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Compel
Disclosures and for Sanctions and Attorney's Fees was served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid,
upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
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LAW OFFICES

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
A «OnSS»OKAi COtPOtATlON

THOMAS R. KARRENBERG
JOHN T. ANDERSON
FRANCIS J. CARNEY
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY
SCOTT A. CALL
JOHN P. M U U f N
JON V. HARPER
NATHAN B. WILCOX
STEPHEN P. HORVAT
SHAYNE R. KOHLER
JAMES H. T1LY

700 BANK ONE TOWER
50 WEST BROADWAY
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101-2006
TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700
TELECOPIER (801) 364-7697

July 18, 2001

Via Facsimile and First Class Mail
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
Re:

Kerry Pipkin v. Randv Haugen, et al.

Dear Etan:
I received your Rule 26 Initial Disclosures on Tuesday, July 17, 2001. The disclosures
are seriously deficient in that they fail to provide any damage calculations as expressly required
b\ Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C). Please supplement your disclosures immediately so that they
conform to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or we will be forced to seek the appropriate
relief.

Contact me if you have any questions.
Sincerely,

James H. Tily
sh

cc:

Thomas R. Karrenberg

LAW OFFICES

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
A ftOfESSIONAl C O t f O t A D O N

700 BANK ONE TOWER

THOMAS R. KARRENBERG

50 WEST BROADWAY

JOHN T. ANDERSON

SALT lAKE CITY, UTAH S4101-2006

FRANCIS J. CARNEY
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY
SCOn A. CALL

TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700

JOHN P. MULL£N

TELECOPIER (801) 364-7697

JON V. HARPER
NATHAN B. WILCOX
STEPHEN P. HORVAT
SHAYNE R. KOHLER
JAMES H. T1LY

August 7, 2001

Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
Re;

Kerry Pipkin v. Randv Haugen. et al.

Dear Etan:
By letter and facsimile of July 18, 2001, I informed you that your Rule 26 disclosures
were seriously deficient in that they failed to include damage calculations as required by Rule
26. You indicated you would supplement your Rule 26 disclosures statement and send them to
us immediately with the included damage information. We have not yet received any such
supplement. Please supplement your Rule 26 disclosure statement immediately or we will be
forced to file a motion to compel such disclosures and for sanctions and attorney's fees in
bringing the motion.
Please contact me if you have any questions regarding the above.
Sincerely,

ames H. Tily
sh
cc:

Thomas R. Karrenberg

KRIS' NOTICE TO SUBMIT
Pats
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Judgs_

f

_

A motion/order ie being submitted to you for decision/signature.
MOTION
The time for responses has expired and the motion is ready for decieion.
A hearinq ie requested on this non-dispositive motion. Fleaee indicate if you would
\ like a hearinq Scheduled,

YeS

No

(If yee. p\eaee return to echedullnq clerk)

_ There ie no certificate of mailing on the motion.
_ There was a delay in submitting this notice to you because:

Other

ORDER
The time has expired for opposing party's objections.
An objection has been filed. Fleaee indicate if you would like a hearinq scheduled.
YeS

No

(If yee, pieaee return to echeduWnq clerk)

There ie no certificate of mailing.
There was a delay in submitting this notice to you because:

^W
Other.

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,

]

Plaintiff,

j>

NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION

vs.

]>

(Oral Argument Requested)

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

]
])
;
])
;

Defendants.

]

Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

The following matter is now at issue and ready for decision of the Court. The documents
indicated have been filed with the Court.
1.

(a)

Type of motion:

Motion for Summary Judgment

(b)

Date

July 16,2001

(c)

Party filing motion:

(d)

[X] Memorandum in support

(f)

[X] Memorandum in opposition: Date Filed: Julv 25. 2001

filed:

Defendants

(g)

[X] Memorandum in reply: Date Filed: August 16, 2001

(i)

[X] Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify):
(1) Affidavit of Kip Cashmore filed July 17, 2001
(2) Affidavit of Randy Haugen filed July 17, 2001

(j)
DATED:

[X] Hearing requested? Yes
August j}0

X

No

, 2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

Uk

Tfiomas R/Karrenberg
James H. f ily
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the r£_ day
of August, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Notice to Submit for Decision to be served,
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,

)

Plaintiff,

])
)
]

REQUEST FOR HEARING AND ORAL
ARGUMENT

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

;)
]
]>

Civil No. 010901074

Defendants.

]

vs.

Judge Roger S. Dutson

Pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Defendants,
by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby request a hearing and oral argument on their
Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED:

August

\»

,2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

N

iL

TMrnas R. Kfcrrenberg
James H. Tily
•f~-. r \ _ r

a

J.-

xk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the/_tf_ day
of August, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Request for Hearing and Oral Argument
to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. * \[i^H^J
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
EtanE. Rosen
f)l\j''%fj-">'££-'
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KERRY PIPKIN,

RANQY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

)
1
)l
1
)1
1
]
;)
;
;)
;

Defendants.

]

Plaintiff,
vs.

MOTION TO STRIKE DECLARATION
OF ETAN ROSEN, PORTIONS OF THE
DECLARATION OF ETAN ROSEN
AND PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT
OF KERRY PIPKIN
Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

Pursuant to Rule 56(e), Defendants move to strike the Declaration of Etan Rosen,
portions of the Declaration of Etan Rosen, and portions of the Affidavit of Kerry Pipkin, all of
which are offered to support Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment. The
"Declaration1' is not a proper document that can be considered by the Court in ruling on
summary judgment. Rule 56(e). Furthermore, statements contained in the Declaration and
Affidavit should be struck, because they are hearsay, lack foundation, lack personal knowledge

or are legal conclusions and therefore inadmissible evidence that cannot be considered on a
motion for summary judgment. The grounds for Defendants' motion are more fully set forth in
the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities.
DATED:

August jV

, 2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

US

Thomas R./Karrenberg
James H. Tily
Attorney for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson &
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the / ^
day of August, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO STRIKE
DECLARATIONS CONTAINED WITH PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
/
/
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
James H. Tily (#8809)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)

KERRY PIPKIN,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

)

)

Plaintiffs memorandum filed in opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion is
not only deficient under the Utah rules, but also fails to raise a genuine issue of fact that would
preclude Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claims.
I. PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES
Plaintiff fails to respond to the Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Fact individually and
disputes a number of facts without any particular reference to the fact in dispute. (See Plaintiffs
Memorandum, responding to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts Nos. 9, 11, 12, 13 and

15.) In addition to improperly responding to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts, Plaintiff fails to provide any material facts or cite a single case or rule from any
jurisdiction that would preclude Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Furthermore,

Plaintiffs attached "Declaration of Etan Rosen" is not material that can properly be considered
by the Court on summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Because Plaintiff has failed to
provide affidavits or other supporting materials satisfying Rule 56(e) in support of Plaintiffs
opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants' motion for summary
judgment should be granted.
II.

THERE ARE NO MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE PRECLUDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
For the reasons set forth in the Defendants' principal memorandum, under the undisputed

material facts of this case, Pipkin cannot provide any set of facts that would support his Causes of
Action for Fraud, Negligent Misrepresentation, Intentional Interference with Economic
Relations, Rescission or Accounting against any of the Defendants. Pipkin's claims therefore fail
as a matter of law, and should be dismissed pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56. Pipkin has provided
not a single legal argument in response to Defendants' memorandum. Rather, Pipkin attempts to
dispute the material fact that Defendant Haugen sold his ownership interest in Quick Cash, LLC
("Quick Cash") to Defendant Cashmore by making conclusory statements that Haugen still owns
an interest in Quick Cash and by attaching documents that purport to show that Haugen
maintained an ownership interest in Quick Cash.

For the reasons, discussed below, neither

Pipkin's Affidavit nor any of the documents attached raise a genuine material fact regarding
Haugen's sale of his ownership interest to Defendant Cashmore and summary judgment should
therefore be granted in favor of Defendants.

A.

The Attached Documents in Support of Pipkin's Opposition Memorandum
Do Not Preclude Summary Judgment.

Even if Plaintiffs proffered evidence could be considered and was viewed in light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence still does not preclude summary judgment. Plaintiff offers a
January 5, 1998 check with the name Randy Haugen under the letters "QC." Plaintiff offers a
1998 IRS W-2 form issued from Quick Cash to an employee, Amanda Lewis, with the name
Randy Haugen listed as a general partner of Quick Cash. Plaintiff further attaches a minute entry
from a September 8, 2000 proceeding in an employment law case that was pending in California
against USA Cash Services.
None of Plaintiffs proffered evidence raises an issue of material fact that would preclude
summary judgment. The check and W-2 form do not raise an issue of material fact. At the
most, the W-2 form shows only that Randy Haugen had not yet been taken off official IRS
records in early 1998. The sale of Haugen's ownership interest in Quick Cash occurred on
December 31, 1997. It would be expected that Randy Haugen's name would continue to be on
IRS documents in 1998, when the sale occurred on the last day of 1997. The W-2 form is thus
meaningless with respect to Haugen's ownership interest.
Similarly, the check attached is meaningless relative to Haugen's ownership interest. The
check only shows that in January 1998, Randy Haugen's name was still on checks issued by
Quick Cash. Even if Randy Haugen's name were still on official checks issued by Quick Cash
on January 5, 1998, this does not dispute the Defendants' uncontroverted evidence that Haugen
sold his ownership interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore on December 31, 1997. Indeed, the
signature on the check is Cashmore's signature despite that Rosen uses the check to erroneously

state in his "Declaration" that, "Randy Haugen was signing checks under QC or (Quick Cash)
after the supposed purchase of his interests by Kip Cashmore." (See Rosen Declaration at 14).
The document indicating a minute entry in a sexual harassment case against USA Cash
Services in California also does not raise an issue of material fact regarding Haugen's ownership
interest in Quick Cash. The minute entry shows only that it was accepted as true for the purpose
of the hearing on Haugen's motion to quash service in that action. Plaintiffs allegation in that
proceeding that Cashmore purchased Haugen's ownership interest in Quick Cash by installment
agreement. Indeed, this minute entry verifies that Haugen sold his interest in Quick Cash to
Cashmore at the time of the agreement in December 1997. Even if Haugen sold his membership
interest by installment agreement, that is irrelevant to the fact that Haugen sold his membership
interest to Cashmore. In other words, when Haugen was to be paid for his interest is irrelevant
to the fact that Cashmore owned Haugen's interest. Thus, the minute entry fails to raise any
material issue of fact regarding Haugen's ownership interest after the sale and does not preclude
summary judgment.
B.

The Statements Contained in Rosen's Declaration and Pipkin's
Affidavit Do Not Preclude Summary Judgment.

The statements made in the Rosen Declaration simply refer to the documents attached,
which documents have already been discussed above as failing to preclude summary judgment.
The statements made in the Pipkin Affidavit, for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum in
Support of the Motion to Strike Portions of the Pipkin Affidavit, are inadmissible as hearsay,
lacking foundation, lacking personal knowledge, and are conclusory.

For this reason, the

statements made in the Pipkin Affidavit should not be considered by the Court in deciding
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Furthermore, even if they were to be considered, Pipkin's conclusory allegations and
legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not suffice to prevent the granting of a motion for
summary judgment. See Campbell v. San Antonio. 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995); see also
Dwares v. Citv of New York. 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2nd Cir. 1993). Thus, even if considered,
Pipkin's statements that Haugen still has an ownership interest in Quick Cash, LLC are
conclusory and lack and foundation and these mere conclusory allegations cannot preclude
summary judgment. See id.
HI. CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiffs

opposition to Defendants'

Motion for Summary Judgment

demonstrates that there are no material facts in dispute precluding summary judgment,
Defendants respectfully request that this Court grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
DATED:

August

fe

,2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

ju W
Thdjnas R. K&rrenberg
James H. Tily
Attorney for Defendants
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day of August, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was served, via U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
Etan E. Rosen
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, California 95827
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RANDY HAUGEN, KTP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,
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1 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
]) MOTION TO STRIKE THE
> DECLARATION OF ETAN ROSEN
]1 AND PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT
) OF KERRY PIPKIN
;
]> Civil No. 010901074
;
;) Judge Roger S. Dutson
;
;

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The declaration and portions of the affidavit attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Opposition to Summary Judgment should be stricken, because declarations are not a proper form
of evidence that can support a motion for summary judgment and Pipkin's Affidavit is rife with
inadmissible statements. Rule 56(e) states, "supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence . . . . When a

motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). There is nothing in Rule 56 that allows for declarations to
support a motion for summary judgment and the Declaration of Etan Rosen should therefore be
stricken as inadmissible and not considered by the Court. See Rule 56(e).
When Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed and supported by affidavits,
Pipkin had an affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or other materials allowed by Rule
56(e). D&L Supply v. Saurini. 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989); Thavne v. Beneficial Utah. Inc.. 874
P.2d 120 (Utah 1994). Pipkin has not responded with material allowed by Rule 56(e). The
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was properly supported by affidavits.

Plaintiffs

opposition merely contained a single, primarily inadmissible affidavit and no other material
allowed by Rule 56(e), despite that Plaintiff had an affirmative duty to provide such materials to
oppose Defendants' summary judgment motion. See id. These materials should therefore be
stricken and not considered by the Court in ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment.
I.

EVEN IF THE DECLARATIONS WERE PROPER TO SUPPORT
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION. THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE
DECLARATIONS ARE INADMISSIBLE AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED BY THE COURT.
A.

The Declaration of Etan Rosen and Portions Thereof Should Be Stricken.

In order for an affidavit to be of effective use in the determination of a motion for
summary judgment, it must set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence. Preston v. Lamb.

436 P.2d 1021 (1968); Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). An affidavit that does
not contain facts that would be admissible in evidence is subject to a motion to strike. Ho wick v.
Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d 352 (1972).
1.

Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Etan Rosen's Declaration
Contain Inadmissible Statements and Should Be Stricken.

Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Rosen Declaration contain inadmissible statements and
should therefore be stricken. Testimony that would not be admissible if testified to at trial may
not be properly be set forth in an affidavit supporting summary judgment. Western States Thrifty
& Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 504 P.2d 1019 (1972); Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp..
508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973). Statements in an affidavit that are largely conclusory in form, and
would not be admissible in evidence, may not be considered on motion for summary judgment.
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 587 (Utah 1983).
\n paragraph 2, Rosen asserts, "we located a case name Virginia McQueen v. USA Cash
Stores, Inc. where Kipley Cashmore and Randy Haugen were one of the defendants."

(See

Rosen Declaration at 1 2.) This statement is hearsay, because it is based on a "search" from
which Rosen purportedly gathered the information and the information is offered for the truth of
the matter asserted.

Furthermore, Rosen referred to "we," however, the declaration is

supposedly based on Rosen's personal knowledge and the "we" is never elaborated upon.
Rosen states in paragraph 3, "apparently, USA Cash Stores, Inc. and Kipley Cashmore
and Randy Haugen were sued by certain employees for sexual harassment."

Paragraph 3

continues, "it is my understanding that the court denied the motion to quash service of summons
based on the fact that Mr. Haugen appears to have retained an ownership in the business that he

supposed sold to Mr. Cashmore." Those statements are pure hearsay and are merely Rosen's
interpretation of a minute entry in another proceeding.
paragraph 3 lack personal knowledge.

Furthermore, Rosen's statements in

Rosen's lack of personal knowledge is demonstrated

plainly by his use of the terms "apparently" and "it is my understanding." Because paragraph 3
contains hearsay statements and statements that lack personal foundation, paragraph 3 should be
stricken.
Paragraph 4 of the Rosen Declaration lacks any foundation whatsoever and should be
stricken. In fact, the statement made therein are false as demonstrated by Pipkin's own attached
documents.

In paragraph 4 Rosen states, "apparently, Randy Haugen was signing checks under

QC or (Quick Cash) after the supposed purchase of his interest by Kip Cashmore." In fact, the
signature on the attached check is Kip Cashmore's signature. There is absolutely no foundation
provided for Rosen's statement that, "Randy Haugen was signing checks under QC or (Quick
Cash)." Rosen's lack of personal knowledge and foundation to make the statement is evidenced
by his use of the term "apparently" and the fact that the statement is complete false. Paragraph 4
should therefore be stricken.
Paragraph 5 of the Rosen Declaration also contains hearsay statements and statements
lacking foundation or personal knowledge and should be stricken accordingly. Rosen states in
paragraph 5 that a "W-2 Wage and Tax Statement for 1998 is in the name of Quick Cash, LLC.
Randy Haugen, general partner." This statement is hearsay, because it taken entirely from a
hearsay source, an entirely separate document. No foundation has been laid for the document
and not only does Rosen lack personal knowledge of the contents of the W-2 Statement, but

Rosen further lacks any foundation to make conclusions based on the W-2 Statement. For these
reasons, paragraph 5 should be stricken.
Paragraph 6 of the Rosen Declaration is patently inadmissible. In paragraph 6, Rosen
states, "it appears as if Mr. Haugen retained an interest and active role in Quick Cash, LLC even
though he claims that he did not pursue the business further after he sold his interest to Kip
Cashmore." This statement lacks any foundation as evidenced by Rosen's use of the term "it
appears as if." Rosen has no personal knowledge regarding Haugen's ownership or rather, lack
thereof, in Quick Cash and further has absolutely no foundation for stating that Haugen retained
an interest in Quick Cash. Furthermore, Rosen has no basis for stating that Haugen "claims that
he did not pursue the business further after he sold his interest to Kip Cashmore." Rosen offers
Haugen's statement for the truth of the matter asserted and the statement is therefore hearsay.
The statements contained in paragraph 6 are inadmissible as evidence and likewise should not be
considered by this Court.
II.

PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF KERRY PIPKIN
SHOULD BE STRICKEN. BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN INADMISSIBLE
STATEMENTS.
Paragraphs 2 through 8 of Pipkin's Affidavit contains inadmissible statements and should

therefore be stricken. Pipkin states in paragraph 2, "on or about October, 1997 Randy Haugen
allowed Kip Cashmore access to our books and records without my knowledge." Plaintiff thus
affirmatively admits he had no personal knowledge of any alleged access. Thus, this statement
lacks personal knowledge and should be stricken. Pipkin then states in paragraph 1, "it is my
understanding that Randy Haugen then asked Cashmore to propose a three-way partnership
which did not materialize as I did not want to be in partnership with Mr. Cashmore." Again,

Pipkin's use of the phrase "it is my understanding" evidences that he does not have personal
knowledge of what Randy Haugen asked Cashmore, if anything, and this statement is therefore
inadmissible and should be stricken.
In paragraph 3 of Pipkin's Affidavit, he states, "On or about May 11, 1998, I received
information that Randy Haugen and Kip Cashmore both signed new signature cards for the
continued business of Quick Cash, LLC." Pipkin states merely that he "received information"
without stating from where or from whom such information was received. This statement is
patent hearsay and inadmissible.

Thus, Pipkin's statement based on this information is

inadmissible and should be stricken. Pipkin further states in paragraph 3 that, "I questioned
Randy Haugen repeatedly about the new bank signature cards and he finally informed me, after a
lot of pressure, that he never received monthly payments from Kip Cashmore. Therefore I
understood that he decided to continue his business with Kip Cashmore . . . ." This statement
lacks any foundation whatsoever.

Pipkin's conclusion that Haugen continued to retain an

ownership interest in Quick Cash because Haugen had a "signature card" lacks any foundation
whatsoever, is inadmissible and paragraph 3 should therefore be stricken.
In paragraph 4 of his Affidavit, Pipkin states, "On or about May 12, 1998 I learned again
that Mr. Randy Haugen and Mr. Kip Cashmore were indeed partners." This statement is again
completely without foundation, lacks personal knowledge and is hearsay. Pipkin never states
how he "learned" that Haugen and Cashmore were partners. The statement is thus inadmissible
and paragraph 4 should be stricken.
Paragraph 5 of the Pipkin Affidavit contains a statement that is classic hearsay. In
paragraph 5, Pipkin states, "On or about October 1998 I received the front page only of the 1997

tax return relating to Quick Cash, LLC. On that page a question was asked 'Did the LLC or its
subsidiary have transfer of [sic] acquisition of more than fifty percent (50%) in control of
ownership?' Mr. Cashmore's attorneys answer to that was clearly 'no.'" Pipkin's statement as
to what Cashmore's tax attorney said is hearsay, inadmissible and paragraph 5 should be stricken
accordingly.
Paragraph 6 of the Pipkin Affidavit contains statements for which Pipkin lacks personal
knowledge and are without foundation. Pipkin states that, "On or about late 1999 I found
documentation indicated [sic] that Mr. Cashmore and Mr. Haugen were partnership in Cash
Stores, Quick Cash, LLC also doing business as USA Cash Stores, Inc. This entity us [sic]
nothing more than a name change of my own business." Pipkin's statement that he "found"
documentation indicating that Cashmore and Haugen were partners in Cash Stores is hearsay and
Pipkin provides absolutely no foundation for the discovered "documentation." Furthermore,
Pipkin concludes that the entity, Quick Cash, LLC, is "nothing more than a name change of my
old business." This statement lacks personal knowledge, foundation and is an inadmissible legal
conclusion.

Paragraph 6 contains entirely inadmissible statements and should therefore be

stricken.
Paragraph 7 of Pipkin's Affidavit is also completely without foundation and inadmissible.
Pipkin states that he, "learned that Mr. Haugen had a fifty percent (50%) ownership and Mr.
Cashmore had another fifty percent (50%) ownership in cash stores." Pipkin provides absolutely
no foundation or any other basis for how he "learned" this alleged information. Without any
foundation, these statements are conclusory, based on hearsay and therefore inadmissible.
Paragraph 7 should be stricken accordingly.

Paragraph 8 contains statements by Pipkin for which Pipkin has no personal knowledge
and absolutely no foundation to make. Pipkin states that the number of stores "grew from seven
(7) stores to around seventy (70)." Pipkin provides absolutely no foundation for this statement.
Pipkin's other statements in paragraph 8 of his Affidavit are otherwise completely irrelevant.
Pipkin states that he, "would never have sold had I not been told that Mr. Haugen was intending
on exiting the business" and that Pipkin "did not intend to sell to Mr. Cashmore so that he and
Mr. Haugen can continue doing business" and that Pipkin "would have never sold had Mr.
Haugen not pressured me to sell telling me he is getting out of the business." These statements
by Pipkin relating to Pipkin's and Haugen's preferences for business partners and his reasons for
selling his interest are completely irrelevant to the present action. Paragraph 8 contains entirely
inadmissible statements and should be stricken.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Declaration of Etan Rosen should be stricken,
paragraphs 2 through 6 of the Rosen Declaration should be stricken, and paragraphs 2 through 8
of the Affidavit of Kerry Pipkin should be stricken.
DATED:

August _ft

, 2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

[chilli
Tti6mas R. K^irenberg
Jajnes H. Tily
Attorney for Defendants
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KERRY PIPKIN,
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NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION

vs.
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive,

Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

Defendants.
The following matter is now at issue and ready for decision of the Court. The documents
indicated have been filed with the Court.
1.

(a)

Type of motion:

Motion to Strike Declaration of Etan Rosen,
Portions of the Declaration of Etan Rosen and
Portions of the Affidavit of Kerry Pipkin

(b)

Date filed:

August 16,2001

(c)

Partyfilingmotion:

Defendants

(d)

[X] Memorandum in support

<M9

COURT

(f)

n Memorandum in opposition: Date Filed: None filed

(g)

[] Memorandum in reply: Date Filed: None filed

(i)

0 Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify): None

(j)
DATED:

• Hearing requested? No
September

<(] , 2001.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

Uf

Thomas R. Karrenberg
James H. Tify
Attorney for Defendants
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KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE

vs.
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RKT HOLDING COMPANY
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Defendant,
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ROGER S. DUTSON
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Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
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JAMES H TILY
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HEARING
This is before the Court for a telephone conference.
Counsel are requesting Oral Argument. Court grants. All
pending motions will be argued. Those motions are:
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Declaration of Etan Rosen and
Portions of Affidavit of Kerry Pipkin; Defense Motion to
Compel Disclosures for Sanction and Attorney Fees;
Defense Motion for Summary Judgment; and Defense
Motion to Amend Answer and to Assert Counterclaims.
Argument set 11-05-2001 at 1:30 p.m. Mr. Snuffer's
appearance will be excused as Mr. Rosen is available and
will be present.

Case No: 010901074
Date:
Oct 10, 2001
ORAL ARGUMENT is scheduled.
Date: 11/05/2001
Time: 01:30 p.m. ,
Location: 3rd Floor Northwest
Second District Court
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
before Judge ROGER S. DUTSON
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2525 Grant Avenue
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Civil No. 010901074
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1:30 p.m. on all pending motions in the above-captioned matter.
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Mail, postage prepaid, upon
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
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SECOND DISTRICT c W T
October 10, 2001

Clerk of the Court
Second District Court, Weber County
2525 Grant Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Re:

Kerry Pipkin v. Randv Haugen, et aL: Civil No. 010901074

Dear Clerk:
Enclosed please find the original and one copy of a Notice of Hearing. Please file the
original in the above-referenced action and date-stamp and return the copy to me in the
enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope.
•Thank you for your assistance.
Very truly yours,

(M*>
Suzanne H. Hurst
Secretly to James H. Tily
Enclosures

ETAN E. ROSEN, ESQ. - CBN: 173728
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
A Professional Law Corporation
3230 Ramos Circle
Sacramento, CA 95827
(916)369-9750
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032)
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, UT 84070
(801)576-1400
Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KERRY PIPKIN,
Plaintiff,

vs.

RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH STORES,
USA CASH SERVICES, QC INSTANT
CASH, RKT HOLDING COMPANY, and
DOES 1-50, inclusive.

)
)
)
)
)
)
;
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;
;)
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO STRIKE THE
DECLARATION OF ETAN ROSEN AND
PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF
KERRY PIPKIN
Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dudson
Hearing Date: November 5, 2001

Defendants.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Defendants state in their Motion to Strike that the affidavits in support of plaintiffs
Opposition to Summary Judgment should be stricken because "declarations are not a proper form
of evidence that can support a motion for summary judgment..." Defendants' contention is in

direct contravention of Utah R. Civ.P. 56(e) which allows for affidavits to be submitted in
support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and is in direct contravention of
defendants' own argument that ^Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was properly
supported by affidavits." (See page 2, Defendant's Motion to Strike). Defendants simply cannot
have it both ways by arguing that it is proper to support their motion with affidavits but it is not
proper for plaintiff to do the same.
ARGUMENT
A.

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION WAS PROPERLY SUPPORTED BY TWO
AFFIDAVITS WHICH SET FORTH SPECIFIC FACTS SHOWING THAT
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE FOR TRIAL.

1.

The Statements Made In The Declaration of Etan Rosen Are Admissible.

Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires affidavits submitted in support
of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment to be made on personal knowledge, to set
forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and to show affirmatively that the person
making the affidavit is competent to testily as to those facts. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).

The

Declaration of Etan Rosen satisfies these requirements and supports plaintiffs contention that
defendant Haugen retained an ownership in the business that he purported sold to defendant
Cashmore. The statements in Mr. Rosen's declaration at Paragraph 3 are not hearsay but are
founded on public records. Those public records revealed a lawsuit against defendants Haugen
and Cashmore in their capacity as owners of USA Cash Stores and also contained a ruling by the
court, attached to the declaration as Exhibit "A'\ stating that defendant Haugen did indeed retain
an ownership in the business. Furthermore, the statements in Paragraph 5 of the declaration
regarding Haugen being listed as "general partner" on a W-2 form are founded on a public record

and are admissible as non-hearsay as well.

Additionally, defendants would like the Court to

believe that because the declarations contain terms such as "apparently" and uit is my
understanding" that they show a lack of personal knowledge and use this argument throughout
their motion. This argument has no substance and is based on semantics alone. Defendants use
the same logic to argue that statements in Paragraph 4 regarding the check (attached to the
declaration as Exhibit "B") should be stricken. Because the use of the word "apparently" was in
the statement regarding Randy Haugen signing checks under QC or (Quick Cash) after the
supposed purchase of his interest by Kip Cashmore defendants argue that the statement is false
and lacks personal knowledge. Defendants argument that Cashmore's signature is on the check
lends even more support to plaintiffs contention that Ilaugen still maintained ownership because
Cashmore signed his name to a check from Haugen's account.
2.

The Statements Made In The Declaration of Kerry Pipkin Are Admissible.

Again defendants' arguments regarding the Declaration of Kerry Pipkin are based on
semantics and not substance. Plaintiffs states in Paragraph 2,4fcon or about October, 1997 Randy
Haugen allowed Kip Cashmore access to our books and records without my knowledge."
Defendants' argue that this statement is an affirmative admission that plaintiff had no personal
knowledge of any access. Nothing is further from the truth. Plaintiff indeed had knowledge of
Cashmore's access to the stores and the books however plaintiff never gave his permission to
allow such access.
Defendants' arguments regarding Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are equally baseless. The
statements contained in these Paragraphs are not hearsay but are based on admissions by Haugen
and Cashmore and on non-hearsay business records. Plaintiffs declaration contains the specific
facts that are required for a showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and that plaintiff is

competent to testify to the matters stated in the declaration. Plaintiffs complaint is based on
the same facts that are stated in his declaration which clearly indicates that there are many issues
in dispute especially when compared to the alleged facts offered in the defendants' declarations.
Therefore defendants' summary judgment motion and motion to strike should be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Declarations of Etan Rosen and Kerry Pipkin should
stand in their entirety and defendants' motion should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN

Dated

\o

idof
Etan E. Rosen
Attorney for Plaintiff
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James Tily
Anderson & Karrenberg
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, 17^4101-2006
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

The Court, having received and considered all pleadings submitted by the parties and
having heard oral arguments thereon, and after considering the applicable law, hereby makes and
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Prior to Cashmore's purchase of Quick Cash, LLC ("Quick Cash") in December

1997, Randy Haugen ("Haugen") and Kerry Pipkin ("Pipkin") each owned a 50% membership
interest in Quick Cash.

2.

Kip Cashmore ("Cashmore") purchased Haugen's interest in Quick Cash in an

arms-length transaction for $375,000 ("Haugen Agreement").
3.

Cashmore purchased Pipkin's interest in Quick Cash in an arms-length transaction

for $375,000 ("Pipkin Agreement").
4.

Cashmore, Haugen and Pipkin have each fully performed under the Quick Cash

purchase agreements.
5.

Pipkin received and retained $375,000 in consideration for the Pipkin Agreement.

Pipkin has not tendered back nor offered to tender back any of this amount to Cashmore.
6.

Cashmore never promised nor agreed to include Pipkin in any of his future

business ventures as a condition of the Pipkin Agreement. There is no provision in the Pipkin
Agreement entitling Pipkin to any future royalties or profits from Quick Cash or any of
Cashmore's other business ventures. Cashmore is the only member of Quick Cash.
7.

Haugen did not sell his interest in Quick Cash in order to replace Pipkin as his

partner with Cashmore. After Haugen sold his interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore, Haugen has
had no interest in Quick Cash or in any other check-cashing businesses with Cashmore. RKT
Holding Company is a Utah company that does not operate any check-cashing or similar
businesses and is entirely separate from any of Cashmore's check-cashing businesses.
8.

Neither Cashmore nor Pipkin made any untrue statements or negligent statements

of material fact to Pipkin in connection with the sale of Quick Cash.
9.

All the material statements made by Cashmore or Haugen that Pipkin alleges are

false or negligent are, in fact, true statements.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The following conclusions of law are based on the foregoing findings of fact and those
factual findings inherent or implied in these conclusions.
1.

There is no question as to any material fact that would preclude granting summary

judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
intentional interference with economic relations, rescission or accounting against any of the
Defendants.
2.

Pipkin suffered no legal injury as a result of Cashmore's purchase of Quick Cash.

3.

Pipkin's claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation fail, because Pipkin

identifies no untrue or negligent misrepresentations of any material fact made by either Defendant
necessary to support such a claim.
4.

Defendants did not act with an improper purpose or motive in selling Quick Cash

to Cashmore and Cashmore did not act with an improper purpose or motive in purchasing Quick
Cash, and Pipkin's claim for "intentional interference with business relations" lacks any legal
basis.
5.

Pipkin has made no showing that legal remedies would be insufficient even if he

had a valid claim and Pipkin is therefore not entitled to the equitable remedies of accounting or
rescission.
6.

Pipkin has no legal claim against any other named or unnamed Defendants,

because Pipkin has not identified any actions by any such Defendants that would give rise to any
legal claim.
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day of November, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon:

Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
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RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE,
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Defendants.

;

ORDER

DEC J 1 2
Civil No. 010901074
Judge Roger S. Dutson

On November 5, 2001 at 1:30 p.m., the Court conducted oral argument on all pending
motions. Plaintiff was represented by his counsel, Etan E. Rosen of Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen,
and Defendants were represented their counsel, Thomas R. Karrenberg of Anderson &
Karrenberg.

The Court having read and considered all the parties' papers relating to the

motions, having heard and considered the arguments, having announced in open court its ruling
on the motions, and good cause appearing for the entry of an order formally embodying the
same, it is hereby

4 51

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

Defendants' Motion for Sanctions for Plaintiffs failure to make timely disclosures

under Rule 26 is DENIED
2.

Defendants' Motion to Strike the Declaration of Etan Rosen and Portions of the

Affidavit of Kerry Pipkin is DENIED.
3.

Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend to Assert a Counterclaim against

Plaintiff is DENIED.
4.

After thoroughly considering all the parties' submitted papers, alleged facts and

legal arguments, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiffs claims is
GRANTED. For the reasons set forth in Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Summary
Judgment and for the reasons set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court
finds that there is no dispute as to any material fact that would preclude summary judgment in
favor of Defendants.
DATED:

DEC 1 0 2001,
,2001.
November
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District Court Judge
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The appeal is taken from the entire judgement.
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Kerry Pipkin,

ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellant,

District Court No. 010901074

Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore,
Quick Cash, LLC, USA Cash
Stores, USA Cash Services, QC
Instant Cash, RKT Holding
Company, and Does 1-50,
inclusive,
Defendants and Appellees.

This matter is before the court on its own motion to
transfer the appeal pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is transferred to the
Utah Supreme Court because it is taken from an order, judgment or
decree of a district court in a civil case, not involving
domestic relations, and is not within the original appellate
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)(1996). See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3) (j) (1996) . A case number will be assigned by the Utah Supreme
Court.
Dated this 31
FOR THE

COURT:
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Paulette Stagg,/
Clerk of the Court
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and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below:
Second District, Ogden Department
2 525 Grant Avenue
Ogden UT 84401
Dated this

3 1

da

By / W ^ u /

Y

of

December, 2001.

foXjLj^jdb^C)

^ S e p u t y Clerk
D i s t r a c t Court No. 010901074

Page 2 of 2

^vcpxBxm Cmtrt of ptaij

Cl|uf Justice

450 &avdl\ gtai* £>txzzl
Tfi&.&BX 140210

Associate GH|i*f Justice

£ a l t ?Iake Cttg, ^talj 84114-0210
Cljrtstin* $L Purljain
<Appelixle

Court <Aoranri«trai0r

<&ppeilat* CUrts' Office
tKcIeplfmtt (801) 5 7 8 - 3 9 0 0

Justice

(Clerk

Justice

m ^ ( 8 0 1 ) 578-3940
Supreme (Gmtri ^Reception 238-7967

Justice

January 3, 2002
ETAN E. ROSEN
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
3230 RAMOS CIRCLE
SACRAMENTO CA 95827
RE: Pipkin v. Haugen Supreme Court Case No. 20011028-SC
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Dear Counsel:
On December 31, 2001, the notice of appeal was received by the Utah Supreme Court. The case
number is 20011028 and should be indicated on any future filings or correspondence.
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that within ten days after filing the
notice of appeal, the appellant must submit a transcript request or a certificate that no transcript is
required. The transcript request should be directed to the court executive and the managing court
reporter.
The docketing statement and attachments, consisting of an original and two copies, is due within
21 days of filing the notice of appeal in the trial court. Therefore, the docketing statement is due
on January 10, 2002. The court, without prior notice, shall enter an order dismissing the appeal
for failure to file a docketing statement.
This court will permit documents of up to 10 pages (including attachments) that do not require a
filing fee to be filed by fax. The faxed document, which must bear a facsimile of the required
signature, will be accepted as an "original" document until the true original and any required
copies are received by the court. The original must be received by this court within 5 business
days from the date of the transmission by fax. If the original is not received within that period,
the court will treat the filing as void. A faxed filing is considered "received" when stamped by

Case No. 20011028-SC
Page 2
the clerk's office. The time for stamping is limited to regular office hours (weekdays, 8:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m.). All risks associated with thefilingby fax are borne by the sender. The fax number for
this court is 578-3999.

Sherri Neeleman
Deputy Clerk
cc: DENVER C. SNUFFER JR.
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG
JAMES H. TILY
SECOND DISTRICT, OGDEN DEPT, #010901074
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Kerry Pipkin,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
No, 20011028-SC
010901074
Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore, Quick
Cash, LLC, USA Cash Stores, USA
Cash Services, QC Instant Cash,
RKT Holding Company and Does 1-10,
inclusive,
Defendants and Appellees

ORDER
Pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated,
this matter
is transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. All
further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to that
court.
The address of the Utah Court of Appeals is:
Utah Court of Appeals
Office of the Clerk
450 S. State St.
PO Box 140230
Salt Lake City UT 84114-0230

FOR THE COURT:
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Pat Bartholomew
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February 5, 2 0 02
DENVER C. SNUFFER JR.
NELSON, SNUFFER & DAHLE
10885 S STATE ST
SANDY UT 84070-4104
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ETAN E. ROSEN
BEYER PONGRATZ & ROSEN
323 0 RAMOS CIRCLE
SACRAMENTO CA 95827
RE: Pipkin v. Haugen

Case No. 20011028-CA

Dear COUNSEL:
Please be advised that this case has been assigned to the Court
of Appeals. Further proceedings will be handled by this court.
Please note that the case number will remain the same as it was
in the Supreme Court, with the exception that it will have a -CA
after the number.
The Supreme Court file that accompanied the pourover indicates
that you requested the transcript on December 26, 2 001. Over
thirty days have passed and the transcript has not been filed,
nor has the court reporter filed a motion for an extension of
time.
As the appellant's counsel and party requesting the transcript,
it is your responsibility to ensure that the transcript is filed
pursuant to Rules 11 and 12, Utah R. App. P. Please contact the
court reporter and arrange for the transcript to be filed in the
trial court.
If the court reporter is unable to file the transcript, the court
reporter must file a motion for an extension of time. Pursuant
to Rule 12(a), Utah R. App. P., the court reporter must seek the
extension from the clerk of the appellate court. An extension
request from a party to the appeal is improper.

February 5, 2 002
Case NO.20011028-CA
Page 2
If the transcript is not timely filed, the briefing schedule may
be established without benefit of the transcript.
Please note, failure to perfect an appeal at any time during the
appeal process may result in dismissal of the appeal.
Sincerely,

anet Alexander
Deputy Clerk
cc:

THOMAS R. KARRENBERG
JAMES H. TILY
SECOND DISTRICT, OGDEN DEPT, 010901074
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OGDEN, UTAH, NOVEMBER 5, 2001
HONORABLE ROGER S. DUTSON PRESIDING
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

All right.

The first matter on the

calendar is Kerry Pipkin vs. Randy Higen or Haugen and others.
Mr. Rosen, which one is Mr. Rosen?

You're Mr. Rosen

and, let's see, you're Mr. ?
MR. KARRENBERG:
THE COURT:

Karrenberg, then?

MR. KARRENBERG:
THE COURT:

Karrenberg.

Yes, sir.

All right.

Let me just preliminarily

indicate I've carefully reviewed all the pleadings and
arguments and files and there was an objection to the affidavit j
i

of Mr. Rosen and some of the assertions in Mr. Pipkin's

!
i
!

affidavit.

The summary judgment being a request to finalize

j

some very important issues is the thing that needs to be very
carefully considered on all of the seriously possible facts

j

that might exist because if there is any serious or material
fact that is controverted that may,have an affect on legal
liability then that needs to be considered by this Court.

j
j
j

I'm very, I guess you'd call be very conservative on
granting summary judgments and very, therefore very liberal on j
considering what might be provable at a trial.
basically my approach to summary judgment.

That's

I think it's a

!
j

proper approach because of the finality of terminating a claim j

ii
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at a very early stage in a proceeding.

And so though some of

j

the assertions of Mr. Rosen's pleadings are certainly hearsay

|

and although he has checked first hand on getting what he has

|

asserted, the conclusions he wishes the Court to draw, I

j

recognize are something that really rather than to cut out

j
I
completely the allowing that to come in, I will take a look at j
it.

In other words, it's certainly not evidence that would be j

permitted at this, at a trial but at this stage of the

j

proceedings I'm very liberal in looking at what might really bej
there to be proven.

j
i

On the other hand, I do have to find some substantial i
|

value in that and determine whether it has the intended impact ;
that an asserting party might have weighing it and so forth and j
so I'm not going to preclude him discussing and arguing what he |
thinks is there because he has attached some support for those j
positions.

Now, what probative value they may have is a whole !
I

other story.

So, I'll allow both sides very liberal argument

j

about the issues but I'm not going to cut off a person on the

j
i

defense or defending against a summary judgment motion from

j

presenting that evidence or to argue that evidence that's been j
presented by affidavit and I'll accept the affidavit for what
it says and is and as well as Mr. Pipkin's.
j
Now, that being said, I suppose that may help each of j
you to know where to argue, given that ruling.

I was going to j
l

rule on that as I told you in the telephone conference here

I

2j
r. n o Kfcs
u u C DO i

today after hearing argument but I really don't need to, I've
reviewed the file.

|

I know what you're each asserting and so

we'll proceed accordingly.

;

Now, as far as the amendment of the pleadings, I'm
also very liberal in allowing amendment of pleadings but,

j
I

again, I think that's something that ought to wait until we seej
where the ruling comes down on the summary judgment. And I've

j

reviewed everything in relation to the amendment of the

j

pleadings including the language of the agreement signed

j
j

between Mr. Pipkin and Mr. Cashmore and so I know exactly what !
it says and I can tell you, you know, I know where we are on

|

that and we'll talk about that later if need be and probably

j

will be talking about that.

j

first.

But I don't want to address that

There is a motion for summary judgment that's really

the most important issue.

Then I'd like to hear then in that

j
!

order the motion for summary judgment argument and then if need j
be we'll proceed to consider some of these other issues
including the issues of sanctions for noncompliance with the

j

rules and discovery and so forth but we'll move accordingly.

j

i

MR. KARRENBERG:

Your Honor, Thomas Karrenberg of

Anderson and Karrenberg on behalf the defendants.

Thank you

j
j

for the guidance.
THE COURT:

j
Excuse me just one minute here.

j
I
t

Bailiff, I've scrapped myself and opened an old
wound.

Would you bring me some Kleenex?

I've got a bleeder

j
|
3 ;
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here on the top of my hand and it's kind of annoying.

Thank

|
i

you.

It happened a couple of weeks ago and it just keeps

getting bumped.

All right.

MR. KARRENBERG:

Proceed.

j
j

Thank you, your Honor.

As I said,

j

Thomas Karrenberg from Anderson and Karrenberg in Salt Lake

j

City on behalf of all of the defendants.

j

Judge, I appreciate

the guidance you gave me and I appreciate the fact that you

j

obviously have had a chance to review the papers.

j

And let me

j

touch on a few relevant facts that I think goes right to the

|
I
!

meat of this argument.

j

As the Court I'm sure is aware, this dispute stems

j

from the sale of a check cashing business in December of 1997. j
In fact, specifically, the sale by the plaintiff and one of the I
defendants of their fifty percent ownership interest in a

I

limited liability to one of the defendants in the company that ;
i

operated the check cashing business.

So, just selling a fifty

percent interest in a limited liability company.

|

The plaintiff, Mr. Pipkin, and the defendant, Haugen, !
i

!

each were fifty percent owner in that LLC which operated the

j

business, Quick Cash, L L C , just a check cashing business with !
a number of stores.

They sold to the each of them of separate j

agreements, as the Court has seen, using, all three of them
using the same lawyers in North Carolina. So they all had
advice of counsel. Sold the business, sold their interest to

j
j
I
j

defendant Cashmore.
i

4j
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Now, four years later after trial, after the sale,
excuse me, Mr. Pipkin decides to attack that sale.
both individuals, both the purchaser and the seller.
the LLC which was not a party to any agreement.
D.B.A. of one of the LLC's.

He sued
He sued

He sued a

j
j
I
|

He sued a wholly owned California i

i

subsidiary, another LLC, owned by the LLC that operated the

j

business and he sued a third party real estate development

I

company of which Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore each hold an

j

interest that has nothing to do with the cash business.

And

j

For fraud in the

•

what did he sue all of these entities for?
sale of his interest.

Yet most of these people had nothing to |

do with it.

j

He sued fraud, Judge, if we look at this, this is
important.

It's labeled as intentional misrepresentation but

it's fraud against all the defendants.

i
i

Every one of them.
i

Though throughout the complaint and throughout these papers

j
i

you're hard pressed.to find anything alleged to have been

j

represented by most of these defendants, in other words,

j

everybody but the individuals.

Negligent misrepresentation

j

Accounting and recession against

j

against all the defendants.
all of the defendants.

But as we pointed out in the papers,

j

Judge, you haven't seen anybody tender any money back and
intentional interference with the business, presumably with
business relations, presumably the relationship between Mr.
Haugen and Mr. Pipkin because it's not made clear in the papers
5

but that's the only business relationship that's even

|

identified.

|

Now no way that most of these allegations could even |
satisfy a Rule 11 Motion, Judge.

But rather than go through

that we just came for a summary judgment motion.

An example,

|
|

how did the LC itself, Quick Cash, LC or its sub or its D.B.A. j
make any representation in connection with the deal of which

;

Mr. Pipkin was selling his interest?

j
i
j

It's not in the

complaint, it's not in the affidavits, it's no where to be

i
i

found whether intentional or negligent.
fraud and negligent misrepresentation.

Yet they've sued for

Not even an attempt to j

make an allegation that they said anything.
they, your Honor?

And how could

Because prior to the sale Mr. Pipkin had a

controlling interest in those three.

j

!
j

How could the partnership!

that does the real estate development have made THE COURT:

Let me, let me stop you. My

understanding was there was a 50/50 interest.
MR. KARRENBERG:

j

Well, it was, your Honor, but it

was-

j
!

THE COURT:

It isn't, yeah, it isn't totally

controlling, it's equally controlling.
MR. KARRENBERG:
still controlling.

j

It's equally controlling but that's j
\

I mean, he could -

THE COURT:

. j

Well, - -

MR. KARRENBERG:

- veto anything.

Nothing is going

|
6!
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1 I to happen without the two of them agreeing 2 !

THE COURT:

That's right

3 I

MR. KARRENBERG:

4 ;

THE COURT:

- in the business.

But my understanding was he did not have

5 j a greater interest than the other party.
6 j

MR. KARRENBERG:

Well, that's true, your Honor.

But

7 | the companies were not involved in this transaction.
8 |

THE COURT:

|

I understand but I just, I just wanted to!

9 I know if there was something I had missed.
10 |

MR. KARRENBERG:

Okay.

All I meant was in a fifty

|

j
j

i

11 | percent interest he has as much to say about what goes on this j
12 j company as anybody else and, Judge, the companies were not

j

13 j involved in this transaction.

i

These are transactions, two

14 I separate transactions between two, between two individuals, Mr. j
15 | Cashmore and Mr. Pipkin, Mr. Cashmore and Mr. Haugen

!

16 ! separately.

I

|

!

17 j
Now, how did this RKD Holdings, the real estate
18 j development company, have anything to do with it? We put
19 | affidavits in that Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore have been in

j
j
j

!

I

20 I this real estate development company for a number of years.

j

21 j That they have 22 ;
THE COURT: Mr. Rosen, let me just ask you before we
23 ; spend time on this. Are you seriously pursuing the RKT Holding
24 | Company in this matter?
I
25 I
MR. ROSEN: Let me explain our frustration, your
7

i

Honor.

When, if your Honor is asking are we seriously

|

pursuing, obviously THE COURT:

j
Well, let's take your theory to it's

J

fullest extent and that is that somehow this RKT Holding

!

Company got the full half interest that was originally owned

j

and let's say that that full amount went into the RKT Holding

\

Company, how would this be involved in your suit.

j

In other

words, MR. ROSEN:

And, your Honor -

THE COURT:

- what would be the connection because if j

you're serious, yes, I'll let you argue it.
I'll cut it off now.

!

If you're not then;

I just wanted to know if you after you'vej
i

discovered and done some preparation for this -

j
I

MR. ROSEN:

Right.

!

THE COURT:

- if you're intending to seriously pursue:

the RKT Holding Company claim.
MR. ROSEN:

I
The truth of the matter, the evidence we j
i
l

have at this early in the game and we haven't taken depositions I
i

i

but from what we've been able to agcomplish today we understand!
i

that Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore are involved in an entity

j
i

named as Weststar Investment Company, LLC, and then a new

J

company called USA Cash, also known as USA Cash Services, Inc., j
Kip Cashmore individually, Randy Haugen individually.

These

!

entities seemed to have existed before and one of them seems to ;
be a continuation -

j
8!

1 I

THE COURT:

Well, I take your answer is yes, you are

2 | intending to pursue RKT?
3 |

MR. ROSEN:

I'm getting to this.

To this date we

4 | have no direct evidence in our hands that RKT is an entity that
5 | we can pursue based on the evidence.

At the same time we found;

6 | other entities that these gentlemen own together and we might

I

7 j have to substitute them in as substituting some (inaudible)

j

8 ! but-

!

i

9 |

THE COURT:

All right.

j

i

i

10 j

MR. ROSEN:

- not RKT.

j

11 j

THE COURT:

I think your answer is yes.

Go ahead

j

12 ! then.
13 |

MR. KARRENBERG:

And assuming that's what the answer ;

14 | is, your Honor, the question is it is time for summary judgment j
15 | motion, Judge, and, your Honor, you know I understand your
i
I

j
;
i

16 j position on the motion to strike and how you'd like to view
'

j
i

17 j yourself as liberal on granting. Rule 56(e) does require that '
18 j at summary judgment time if the evidence of the moving parties
19 j supported by affidavit on personal,knowledge - which every bit •
20 ; of ours is - that the defendant has the obligation to come in
:

i

21 ! with evidence that's admissible in court.

j

Now, Judge, I just

22 | heard Mr. Rosen complain and he complained to us in the
23 | telephone conference that it's early in the proceeding.

j
But,

j

24 : Judge, no one has made a Rule 56(f) motion whatsoever, your

j

25 ! Honor.

j

No one has done that.

No one has attempted any

I
!

!

9
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discovery up to this point to deal with it.

!

Judge, so it is time to come forward with evidence

j

that's admissible at trial rebutting what we've put in which is!
all admissible at trial.

RKT Holdings by the affidavit has

i

absolutely no interest whatsoever in the check cashing
business.

I

Never has, does not, and is not intended to.

they could be in the lawsuit I don't know.

]

How

There is nothing ini

there that Quick Cash, L.C., made any representations, not even
claimed in the complaint.

Nor that the other entities, the

j

wholly owned subsidiary in California or the D.B.A. do they.

j

Another claim against all these defendants including Mr. Haugen ;
is that he interfered with business relations.
Now, Judge, the law is clear in this State.
cannot interfere with your own contracts.
relations did Mr. Haugen interfere with?
Mr. Pipkin?
here.

It's not legally cognizable.

You

:

What business
His relationship with \
There is no claim on:

What we're really down to is a fraud claim or a

j

negligent misrepresentation claim made, supposedly made by

|

against Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore in connection with the
sale.

But, Judge, we went through the complaint carefully as

we looked at the papers and we looked at what is alleged and
there hasn't been anything else changed about what the alleged
fraud is at this point.
they say my clients did.

Paragraph 17 is one of the allegations
Mr. Cashmore specifically.

That he

offered $750,000 jointly for each of their interests, half to
10

one, half to the other.

Well, Judge, it's absolutely true.

Not only did he offer it, he did it.

It wasn't a

!

misrepresentation and he paid it. A lot of money.

j

Secondly, your Honor, in paragraph 17 of the

j

Complaint, the other allegation - and this is all we're allowed!
to deal with because this is what he sued on.
to amend.

He hasn't moved j

Haugen told Pipkin that Haugen no longer wanted to

own the check cashing business.
that's absolutely true.

Well, as the affidavit says,

It is not a misrepresentation.

j
j

He did;
j

not want to be in the check cashing business.

He wanted out of!

itParagraph 23 indicates there was an omission that

!

Haugen somehow secretly wanted Cashmore to be his partner.

j

Well, Judge, we've came through with the evidence, admissible

|

evidence, Mr. Haugen both on both their affidavits has no
interest whatsoever in the check cashing business with
Mr. Cashmore, none. Absolutely zero.

!

It's in affidavits.

We

have the originals, the original agreement to sell the interest i
and Mr. Cashmore has paid the money for that interest.

They

!

are in this real estate development business that has nothing

|

to do with this.

j

So, what was omitted?

Nothing.

Paragraph 19, 21, and 23 of the Complaint, the

!
I

plaintiff claims that Haugen is still involved in the check
cashing business.
is not.

Again, the affidavit is admissible show he

\
!

Now, what evidence has come back?

As I indicated,

j

Judge, while I appreciate your concern about summary judgment, j
it is under the rules time to come in and present your

!
i

!

evidence.

Now, Judge, I'm on that rules committee, the

|

advisory committee for the Supreme Court and we take great care j
in writing those and there is an option.

If you don't like

what, if you don't believe you've had enough chance to do
discovery.

It's called Rule 56(f).
THE COURT:

You move the Court -

j

But is still ends up being discretionary j

with the Judge, doesn't it?
MR. KARRENBERG:

j
I
Judge, I have no doubt about that.

I have no doubt about whose courtroom I'm in and who is in

j

charge here.

j

I've been around long enough to know otherwise.

But, your Honor, it also is, should be discretionary with the
judge when the claim has no merit and the plaintiff has not
come forward with any admissible evidence.
reason to indulge such claims.

There is no good

You have better things to do.

The clerk's office has better things to do.

My client's have

better things to spend their money ,on, your Honor, and I've got
plenty of business.
with bad claims.
none.

We don't need to be subsidized dealing

And it is, if there is no evidence there is

Now, what did they come up with? And, your Honor, it's

actually in the motion to strike.

Mr. Rosen files a

preliminary ruling in California on a case dating back for
events prior to the sale on a sexual harassment case in

j

California and he attaches the preliminary ruling.

;

Now, Judge, I know, I use to practice in California

j

years ago when I first started out and I came back home and a

I

preliminary ruling is just, what they do in California to save [
I
time is the judge will issue preliminary ruling, just like you |
sort of did except it will be a little bit in writing so that

j

when you come in in the morning and you go to the motion

j
i

calendar, you can look at what the judge's preliminary decision!
is and you can direct your arguments at it.

It's not even a

final ruling.
MR. ROSEN.

j
I
j
I

I'd object to that as being not a

statement of truth, your Honor, and I (inaudible).
MR. KARRENBERG:

|

j

I understand when you ask him to

j

interrupt the argument but I'd rather have the courtesy of
having my argument go on until under his turn and I won't

!
I

!

interrupt his, as well.
THE COURT:

j

Continue.

MR. KARRENBERG:

j

Thank you, sir.

j

Now, Judge, but in any event there is a rule.

If youj

want an official document there is a rule of evidence that

j

shows how you get it in.

j

take it.

You don't go into the file and just

The preliminary ruling is full of hearsay in the

first place and it was on a motion to quash a subpoena.
wasn't anything conclusive.
even argued.

It wasn't res judicata.

It

It's not

It wasn't even argued as collateral estoppel and
00 28613

it wasn't argued that there was evidence.

It was just whether j
|
i

or not the subpoena should be quashed and it's not even a final!
ruling.

Now, is this certified in accordance with the Utah

Rules of Evidence?

No.

And what even if it was, Judge?

consider like you want to say.
quash.

|

You'd!

It's nothing but a motion of

Nobody, there is no finding in there.

j

If this was such |

a great piece of evidence, why don't we have the evidence that
says he is there?

And if you look what's in there, what the

!
i

Court made its ruling on in the preliminary ruling, it's

j

manufactured evidence. It says Mr. Haugen's former partner.

;

Well, there is only one, Mr. Pipkin.
he's involved.

The plaintiff here claims!

That's manufacturing your own evidence, Judge,

and he has no foundation for it.
What else?

j

A W-2 form for '98. The tax records had j

to be changed in '98 for a x97 form.

Again, it's not, it

|
i

wouldn't be admissible.

I'd object to this at trial.

The

I

Court would have no choice but to keep it out because it has
not been properly authenticated but so what?

A W-2 form?

Then

he has a check dated in January of /98 and he says it's got Mr.
Haugen's name still on it.

Of course, it's from the business,

Quick Cash, L.C., and here is exact proof of why we have these
rules that you have to have proper foundation, your Honor,
because the signature on that check is Mr. Cashmore's.

The

fact that they're still using old checks from the business
doesn't mean anything.

It has raised no evidence, no weight

!

whatsoever, Judge.

j

And look at the other evidence.
affidavit.

Mr. Pipkin's

What does he say in paragraph 1?

i

My understanding j

is that Haugen and Cashmore, that Haugen asked Cashmore to

!
i

propose a three way partnership.

Well, it's his understanding, j

That's hearsay, Judge, by any definition plus Haugen proposed, j
j
it doesn't say it was done that way. So what?
!
Number 2, that Haugen allowed Cashmore access to the
books.

Not on personal knowledge.

It's on, it's only on

j
i

hearsay information and so what?

What does have, any

j

misrepresentation by any of my clients?

j

Number 3, on 5/11/98 he writes, paragraph 3, I

j

received info that both defendants signed new signature cards
for Quick Cash.

I received.

Where are these signature cards? !
i

Where is the proper foundation?
does this prove?

Where is the evidence?

What

Nothing.

j

5/12/98, in paragraph 4, he says I learned that the
defendants are indeed partners.
he hear this?

Not any foundation.

Where did he learn t;his.

!

Where did!

The uncontroverted

j
i

evidence is they're not.

!

Paragraph 5, I received a ^95 front page of a tax

I
i

return when an attorney answered his question that, i.e.,

J

before the sale no one had 100 percent interest.

I

That's the

year it was sold as well as, again, hearsay evidence.

j
i

Paragraph 6, I found documentation that Cashmore and

\

15 I

Haugen were partners.

Where is the documentation, Judge?

Where is the authentication?
Paragraph 7, Pipkin claims he learned that Haugen had
50 percent and Cashmore had 50 percent.
Where?

Claims he learned?

Judge, those are just allegations.

That is not

evidence.
Haugen, here's another one, paragraph 8.

He claims

that the number of stores grew from seventy to, from seven to
seventy.

It's not even true, your Honor.
Now, what is he rely on?

It's not even true.

The only thing in the

Motion to Strike is he says the business record.
Honor, there is rules.
in.

Again, your

It says how you get a business record

None of these are certified by the custodian.

these are established as a business record.

None of

We are dealing

with nothing but rankest hearsay and nothing but allegations
and we have submitted sworn affidavits saying it is not true,
Judge.

There was nothing opposing this Motion for Summary

Judgment that would be at all closest to competent evidence to
say that there any misrepresentations that were relied on to
anybody's damage.
And, Judge, one other thing, he's received $375,000.
There is not one allegation that he's given it back for a
recission for a fraud claim which is the preferred remedy.
Judge, my client, Mr. Cashmore bought a business from the two
of them.

The documentation is there.

For some reason and I
16

for the life of me can't figure out what it is, Mr. Pipkin

j

seems to think that somehow these gentlemen are in business

I

Your Honor, we have put sworn affidavits in they are j

together.
not.

Mr. Haugen receives no business, no monies whatsoever out!

of this business outside of the note on his $375,000.

It was

i

an arms-length transaction where everybody was represented by

!

counsel.

j

LC.

He sold his personal property.

His interest in an

None of these companies had anything to do with it and

j

there is not one alleged misrepresentation or omission of

j

material fact that should withstand this motion.

!

Thank you,

your Honor.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. KARRENBERG:

j

And, again, your Honor, I will

j

submit, since the Court has read the papers, I'll submit the

j

Motion to Amend.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

You may proceed.

I
i

MR. ROSEN:

Thank you, your Honor.

My name is Etan

|

Rosen and I appreciate the Court al/lowing me to practice here

j

Pro Hac Vice and I have the Utah Rules and I studied them and I :
understand many things about your jurisdiction. I understand j
that the motion for summary judgment is in its essence treated |
as a motion for summary judgment in California which means you j

i
still have to show that there are materials, that there are
matters, (inaudible) material fact that are in dispute.

It's

i

17 I

1 I not who has better evidence, it's do I have some evidence that !
I

j

2 1 is in dispute that is material to the case?

That by itself

j

3 | does not change between California and Utah even though there

j

4 j are changes since my learned colleague here, Mr. Karrenberg on |
5 ! practice in California and I'll get into it.
I
6 !

j
|

One thing that I wanted to bring out in my affidavit j

7 | as it regards to Exhibit Number C of my declaration was a W-2

i

8 | Wage and Tax Statement for 1998.

j

I made a mistake by getting

9 ; by the "L" slot that in 1998 the Wage and Tax Statement is
10 | given in 1998.

j

Well, in 1998 Wage and Tax Statement the W-2

11 i Form is given in the year 1999, the year after.

j

It is given by j

12 | January 30th or January 31st as the year may be to an employee. I
13 j In this case I found Amanda Lewis and this is straight from

!

i

14 | Court records that I found it.

i

Amanda Lewis in 1999, January

15 | 30th, received a W-2 Wage and Tax Statement and it said Quick
16 ! Cash, LLC, Randy Haugen, General Partner.

This is not only a

j

17 ! month after the sale, this is a year and a month after the
18 | sale.
j
19 |
Regarding the check that ,we presented, Q.C., Randy
20 j Haugen, check number 1214. Now, the interesting part of that
i

21 | check is that it is signed, the handwriting on that check is
i

22 j Mr. Haugen's handwriting. The signature is Kip Cashmore's
23 ! signature. It's dated January 5, 1998, well after the sale.
i

24 j And the question is why is Mr. Randy Haugen signing, writing
25 j checks if he sold the business. Why is he still writing checks
18
P r\

^ 1*1 1

and why is he on the tax return?

Not tax return but why is he

Now, I can understand that argument, you I

on the W-2 Statement?

know, that a few months after the sale they just didn't catch

j
j

this but this is a year after.
And here comes the issue of the tentative ruling that j
came in Sacramento County.
practice.

Now, that's a County where I

j

We only have two law and motion departments and

that's all they do. And the new rule for the last year has

\
j

been that a minute order which you have in front of you becomes!
effective immediately.

There becomes no formal order.

has been just too much law and motion.
order of the court.

There

This then became the

j
j

And what has happened in this case is that;

a jurisdiction was, this attorney and her name is Wendy York,

j

tried to establish jurisdiction over Mr. Haugen in California
regarding a Cash store in California, in Sacramento.

Mr.

j

Haugen, of course, came in and said, Well, I sold my interest

!

in 1997.

;

I have no interest.

There was, there were a lot of

papers, there were a lot of pleadings that went back and forth |
and this is the judge's ruling.

Th,e judge ruled and this is

Department 54 which, I'm sorry, Department 53 which would be

j

Judge Coupiarchi, ruled that it appears that Mr. Haugen has
retained an ownership interest in the business for personal

j

financial reasons.

I

j

So he might have or he might have not.

It's still a material issue of fact that has to be determined.
Now, these are only issues.

That doesn't win a case. I

no

;?7^L9i

I sit here and I hear Mr. Karrenberg say granted $375,000 is a j
lot of money.

Well, it is and it isn't.

First of all, in

j

California it doesn't even buy a small house and, second of

j

all, our claim is that Mr. Haugen who had power over our client I
because he was above him in the AMWAY business told our client j
we were partners in Quick Cash, LLC.
was ours.

It was our business.

We built it to seven stores.

by the first one that they have here.

It j

In fact, I just drove I
I want out of this

I

I
business.

I don't want to be involved in it anymore.

you to meet this guy.

I want

j

He's going to buy us out but I don't

want to be involved in this.

!

THE COURT:

Let me ask you, Mr. Rosen.

j

MR. ROSEN:

Yes.

|

THE COURT:

Get right to the heart of this thing.

If!

I were to accept all of your arguments, how did that rise to

j
i

the level that you're claiming of misrepresentation or

j

inducement to enter into this agreement?

i

Are you saying that

by him being in a superior position in AMWAY somehow translates i
i

to him influencing your client's decision to the degree that h e !
did not have his own free will to decide what he wanted to do?
MR. ROSEN:
Honor.

This is only part of the argument, your

My client indicated and it's in the pleadings that he

did not want to sell.
THE COURT:

It says in his declaration Well, let's suppose he didn't want to

sell and let's just suppose that Haugen wanted to get him out

j
j
j
20 j

1 I of the business and he told him that, you know, I'm tired of
2 I doing business whether it's with you or what and that, in fact,
3 | he's still a partner.

Let's say that your claim is absolutely

] true 5

MR. ROSEN

Right.

6 |

THE COURT

- that he is a partner with Cashmore.

7 !

MR. ROSEN

Right.

8 |

THE COURT

How does this all rise to the level of

9 ' your claims?
10 !

MR. ROSEN:

It was worth a lot more that $375,000.

11 ;

THE COURT:

Well, but your client is a grown man.

12 | He's been involved in business for years. Are you saying he is
13

j

so naive that he couldn't make decisions on his own?

I

!

14 |

i

MR. ROSEN:

The decisions that the cards were

i

i

15 I stacked, your Honor.

And that's -

|

1

!
!

|

16 |

THE COURT:

Well, tell me how they were stacked.

How!

17 | was he forced or compelled or mislead to the degree that he did j
18 i not act freely and voluntarily in entering into his contract?

I

19 ; How did that happen?
20 !

MR. ROSEN:

Mr. Haugen, again, was his superior in

21 j the AMWAY business and this is at the level that they were in, |
j

!

I

j

22 | at the level that they were in they were generating well in

j

i

!

23 | advance of four to $500,000 a year from their businesses.
J
24 |
THE COURT: Isn't that all the more reason that your I
25 ; client should be aware of business dealings?

I
i

21 i
^ -J * ( 4

MR. ROSEN:
business.
own.

Said to him, I'm getting out of this

|

You've got to, my client could not run this on his

There were seven stores.

j

His partner and his mentor and j

his supervisor, so to speak, in the AMWAY business THE COURT:
AMWAY.

No, but just a minute.

How does that work?

|
i

Supervisor in

!

Tell me what exactly your evidence !

would be that he was in such a controlling position that he

i

would have been able to compel or to influence your client's

j

decision making on this collateral side business to the degree j
that you claim that I ought to set aside the original
transaction and look beyond that.

Now how could that happen?

j
\

Tell me.
MR. ROSEN:

Well, if you want to know the evidence,

j

the evidence will be my client's testimony and also the people
that were in his organization.

That will, of course, be the

j

evidence and whether or not he's believable or not THE COURT:

Well, but what's it going to show if you |

prove everything you intend to prove with it?

What would it

show?

j
|

MR. ROSEN:

It would show the following.

It showed

that there was an attempt to take fifty percent off the

j
j

business that was worth substantially more than $375,000, naive j
or not, away from client and move his position THE COURT:

j

I can see the result you're after but I'm;

saying at the time of the transaction is what we have to look
i

22 i

at.

j
MR. ROSEN:

Right.

It was worth then more that

j

$375,000.

j
THE COURT:

Well, let's say it was but at that time, j

how is his position in AMWAY in relation to your client going
to impact that?

|

I'd like to know just what your evidence wouldi
i

be.

|
MR. ROSEN: All right.

AMWAY works, if I understand

j

correctly, on an organization basis and you go up the chain of !
command. Mr. Haugen was superior to my client in his chain of
I
command.
j
THE COURT:

True.

MR. ROSEN:

He had substantial retribution mechanism j

towards my client.

j

In fact, my client will testify that this

I

has been happening and his income, because of this lawsuit is
income that has gone from about $15,000 a month, has shrunk to
close to $3,000 a month from the AMWAY side.

I
|

Now, Mr. Haugen

i

has the ability to exclude my client from AMWAY dealings if he j
so wishes because he is higher above him in the command.
can -

He

i
I

THE COURT:

Well, but doesn't your client in the

j

AMWAY business get those working under him to generate the

j
i

money for him?

j

MR. ROSEN:

Correct.

I

THE COURT:

Then how then does someone else above him |

23

1 I influence that?
2 J

MR. ROSEN:

Because he is in such a superior position

3 J and he is in his organization which means he can contact 4 | which he has done - people in his organization and say from now I
i
I
5 | on we do not work with the branch that involves Kerry Pipkin
6 I and he has done that.

And we, in fact, have taped

7 | conversations of this.
8 I

Now, to bring the case in summary judgment motion

9 | three, four months after it started when I had discussions with
10 ! the office of Mr. Karrenberg, when Mr. Tily' s office said we
11 ; really need to take some depositions here.

We need to get this

Ii

12 J thing out. If you think at the end of the depositions - and we
13 I only have three depositions here. We have Mr. Cashmore, Mr., j
j

|

14 ; Mr., sorry, Haugen, and my client.

If, after the depositions

j
\

15 | are taken you do not believe we have a case then you bring a
16 ! summary judgment.

But, no, this had to be done this way and I J

j

i

17 j thought at least I showed enough evidence to survive the

j

18 | summary judgment so we can establish the depositions and start

\

19 | discovery because all we've done 1§,

I

of course, get some

20 ! records but - and then they have prejudice.

They can bring

j

21 ! their summary judgment at a later date. In fact, I'm sure that I
!
i
22 I they will if they think there is still no case. Our case is
j
23 | simply one of money.

That's all it is.

We believe that these ;

24 ! gentlemen, Haugen and Cashmore, are involved in.
25

;

I

found?

What have I

Haugen International, Freedom Associates, Dream

i
;
24 <

Builders, Inc.
alone.
in.

There's fifteen different lawsuits I found herej

I found four different entities that they're involved

Aside from the 63 Cash stores that they seem to be

j
j

operating together and, yes, they say in the declaration that

|
l

they're not continuing doing business together.

j

But what has

happened here is a typical squeezing out of a partner.
can say how naive is my client?

I don't know.

Now you \

I don't know.

It seemed to have been, one, that he was just squeezed out.

j
j
I
!

Now, he says $375,000 and what I got from my fifty percent
1
interest is simply not enough and I have evidence that can show j
i

that it was worth more than that and I would have not moved if j
Mr. Haugen had not told me to do this.
I don't know how the case will turn out, your Honor.
I don't know how it will turn out.

I don't know if my client

will prevail on the merits because he has the burden of proof
but I know as we speak we have evidence.

Now, it might not be

in the most beautiful way but we have a check and we have a W-2 I
showing that they were involved and now this morning I found

j

some partnership share in Kl Schedules that fly in the face of j
what I was told.

And for my little research this morning I

j

found another business that they're involved in, Weststar
Investment Company, LLC.

j

I mean, your Honor, I agree with you as you speak

\

that I probably don't have any evidence right now RKT Holding
Company.

When we filed the complaint we had enough information j

f; n
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to think that these guys have enough evidence.
West Star Investment in front of me.

(Inaudible) not

And I have the Articles

of Organization signed by Mr. Haugen, Mr. Cashmore and a
gentleman called Troy Thompson and then it looks like he was
taken out.

This is of 1996.

At the very minimum my client was

not disclosed to when he entered this deal that these gentlemen
have such an extensive relationship between them that he needs
to look into it.
mislead.

He was simply, he was simply mislead.

He was

He basically gave away a fifty percent interest in a

check cashing business for $375,000.

With all due respect, I

understand it's a lot of money but it's really not.

It's

really not.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. KARRENBERG:

Your Honor, may I respond?

THE COURT:

Do you have anything further, Mr. Rosen?

MR. ROSEN:

Yeah.

Yes, I do.

There were two issues,

again, that I have discussed, not with Mr. Karrenberg because
he assigned a lot of the work for Mr. Tily to do.

I discussed

with Mr. Tily my need to take depositions in this case and Mr.
Tily and I agreed the depositions will be taken after the
summary judgment motion.

Of course, assuming we are

successful, we basically agreed to that.
There is another issue.
Now, the Rule 26 disclosures
myself.

The Rule 26 disclosures.

is one that I place fault on

I've read your local rules.

There was one issue in

the local rules that we needed to, that we needed to disclose

|

our proposed damages or at least what we thought at the time

j

were our damages.

We did that.

Mr. Tily and I agreed that he j
In fact, he called \

is going to drop that motion off calendar.

me and told me he's dropping that motion off calendar.

If that I

motion was dropped off calendar, I do not see why the Court
should rule on that motion.

I agree, Rule 26 disclosures was

|
i

lacking.

It was supplemented but that motion should have been

dropped off calendar by a call from Mr. Tily to myself. That's!
all I have to say.

j

MR. KARRENBERG:

Your Honor, briefly.

There has been;
!

some absolute misstatements to the Court.

As far as

depositions, Mr. Rosen and I spoke directly.

j

He tried to have j

his secretary call me to schedule them and I called back and

j

said I need to speak to him directly because scheduling is too
difficult and I keep my own calendar.

We spoke, he tried, he

asked from certain dates for my clients.
weren't available.

I told him they

I gave him alternative dates.

In the

meantime we had filed our motion fpr summary judgment.

agreement.

j
j

On his \

choice he chose to wait and see what happened on the summary
judgment before taking the depositions.

j

|

It was not an

If he wants to notice up depositions and do it

properly under the Rules, he is free to do so.
not notice them up, he's free to do so.

Rule 56(f) motion, he's free to do so.

If he wants to |

If he wants to follow j
i
I
j
i
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As far as the Rule 26 Motion, we have not withdrawn
that motion.

Judge, we talked about that in the telephone

conference, scheduling conference.

And, your Honor, listening

here today proves the need for that motion.
said.

Those weren't disclosed.

company who are going to testify.
witnesses.

I have tapes, he

I have employees of the old
Those weren't disclosed as

He has employees within the organization.

not disclosed.

That's

He now says he's got different entities and

lawsuits and evidence where it said that the company was worth
more than $750,000.

That wasn't disclosed.

what Rule 26 was meant to stop.
why we wrote that rule that way.

That's exactly

That kind of stuff.

That's

Not to come in here and not

do it.
Now, Judge, here is why I made the motion to strike
and I think Mr. Rosen's argument proves the point.

I tell you

that the check that he puts in that we've objected to is Mr.
Cashmore's signature.

Mr. Rosen now, not with the handwriting

expert of any affidavit says it's Mr. Haugen's handwriting.
Where does that come from, Judge? .What, he can't be
testifying.
And, Judge, we haven't heard anything about these
other LLC's, these other partnerships, but, Judge, even if
that's true and they exist, what difference does it make?
Since when, where was the representation that someone said you
have, Pipkin, you have to sell the Cashmore because I want

CO 2 S 1 2

nothing to do with Cashmore and I don't have anything to do
with them.

They're allowed to have other businesses.

There is

not even any claim in the complaint that there was an omission
that he relied upon that he thought was material that they had
no relationship together.

Do you want to know why, Judge?

Because they couldn't do it.

Mr. Cashmore was involved in

AMWAY with these gentlemen, too.
had a relationship.

He knew that these gentlemen

And even if he didn't, so what?

Now, Judge, the claim here as I went through in the
beginning is fraud, negligent misrepresentation.

You just

listened to Mr. Rosen say that the reason it's no longer that
there's misrepresentation or omission, that there is some sort
of duress in connection with the AMWAY relationship.

Well,

Judge, there is no duress claimed in the pleadings.
Secondly, your Honor, we haven't addressed this in
the papers because it's not in the pleadings.
economic duress in Utah.
clear on that.

There is not

The Utah Supreme Court is crystal

It doesn't exist.

sort of control relationship.

Now he claims there is some

Well, under the Vonhockev case

there could be possibly a confidential relationship that could
lead to a breach of fiduciary duty though I can't imagine this
would withstand that but that's not plead.

Judge, we have him

come up here and argue a whole different case.

We have

submitted evidence that on the representation claims whether
they were intentional or negligent that there were no

vO 2$ 2
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misrepresentations of material fact and that there were no

|

omissions of material fact.

J

We have supported it with

competent evidence that is admissible at trial.
nothing opposing that.

There has been |

Your Honor, I respectfully submit that

the motion should be granted.

Thank you for your time, Sir.

appreciate it.

I I
j

THE COURT:

Thank you.

|

Mr. Rosen, I'm going to allow you to respond if you

|

wish.
i

MR. ROSEN:

Is defendant infliction duress claim for j
t

what he has done from what Randy Haugen could have inflicted on j
my client such as maybe in California would be intentional
infliction of some kind of a distress?

No, there isn't.

|
Therej

I
isn't in California a business dealing.
his position.

What we're saying is

He was the source of my client's income.

j
|

Without him, without his sponsorship in AMWAY my client's

j

income is minimal and this is actually a fact.

j

So, what this

gentleman did, he said to him, Hey, as your sponsor in AMWAY

;

I'm selling, you're selling, too. ,And this is what it is.

j

Now, is this fraud?
facts.

It is fraud if he didn't tell him all the !

If you get into a business deal, yes, you're not THE COURT:

Okay.

j

Now, let me just stop you there.

|
j

Let's suppose that Mr. Haugen had all of the intentions that

j

you attribute to him and that is he was going to get right back j
into a full blown business relationship with Mr. Cashmore and
PO

OO °

10

!
!

1

proceed to do everything that he and Mr. Pipkin had been doing,

2

let's suppose in a hypothetical argument, at least, that's the

3

case.

4

some duty or responsibility by not disclosing that?

Are you arguing then that that is, in fact, a breach of

5

MR. ROSEN:

The problem here is that he specifically

6 | disclosed the opposite.

My client claims that he -

7 !

THE COURT

What if he changed his mind?

i

8 j

MR. ROSEN

He changed his mind the day after?

j
j

9 j

THE COURT

10 '•

MR. ROSEN

i

11 I

THE COURT

What if he did?

j

Well, I mean -

I

Let's suppose that, you know, originally

12 j one intent existed and another intent emerged at a later point !
13 j in time and let's suppose that he continued to represent that

j

j

i

14 | he wanted to get out of the check cashing business.

That's thej

i

i

15 j strongest that you have, I believe, is that's what his
16 I representation was.

He wanted to get out of the check cashing j

17 I business and that wasn't true.

Let's suppose that wasn't true. \

18 |

MR. ROSEN:

All right.

19 |

THE COURT:

But let's suppose that there was another j

20 ] motive.

He just didn't want to continue to do business with

I

!

j

21 | your client and he was telling him that. Now does that rise to I
22 | the level in this case of improper misrepresentation to the

]

23 i degree that I should step in and set aside the agreement that

|

j

24 I was reached?
25 j
MR. ROSEN:

I

!

;

I
;

Well, your Honor, first of all, the
/^ 0
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$375,000 that my client received we'll have to deal with at

j

some point because obviously you can't have your cake and you

j

can't eat it as well.

So, what we're saying is the following:

let's assume that the Court's hypothetical is such that it's

j'

true that the gentlemen actually, Mr. Haugen said to my client, j
you know something, Mr. Pipkin, you know, I don't want to be, ij
don't want to be your partner anymore.
with you.

We're not getting along.

I just don't get along ;

I don't want to be your

|

partner.
THE COURT:

No, but that isn't what happened.

MR. ROSEN:

Right.

No, nof

but let's assume

j
that

j

that's what happened.
i

THE COURT:

Well, there's no evidence that that

happened.

I
I

MR. ROSEN:

No, no, but let's try to see why that is I

different than what actually happened and why we are THE COURT:

j

Well, I can understand the argument then |

that may have caused your client to look at it a little
different.
MR. ROSEN:

And, of course, he wouldn't have sold.

j
i
!
i

He wouldn't have sold.

He wouldn't have sold to Kip Cashmore. j

At least that what he says.

He said he wouldn't have sold.

And if he would have sold he wouldn't have sold to Kip Cashmore1
or he would have looked at it to such an extent that he would
have seen what the lost value is in his price.

That -

THE COURT:

How do you get around the fact that had

things gone soft with Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore, he had an
agreement also that would have left him out in the cold?

I
i
i
i

How

do you get around that?
MR. ROSEN:

Excuse me, your Honor.

\

I don't

i

understand that.

j
i

THE COURT:

How do you get around the basic fact that j
I
they entered into exactly the same agreement and if after the
transaction took place Mr. Cashmore said, sorry, Mr. Haugen,
you're, I really don't want to do business with you.

You know, j

this man, Mr. Haugen, who you claim was misleading your client, ;
entered into exactly the same agreement that your client

j

entered into.

,

MR. ROSEN:
the same agreement.

Well, that's the thing.

On paper it's

j

But, your Honor, if you read the

declarations that they submitted, it's very interesting because;
we claim and I think in the declaration of Kerry Pipkin THE COURT:

Well, but wouldn't Mr. Haugen have been

bound by that agreement?
MR. ROSEN:

This is a sham.

THE COURT:

And Mr. Cashmore?

j
In other words,

j
'

Agreements, agreements are only as good

as the people who write them, your Honor.

j
:

everybody was bound by these agreements.
MR. ROSEN:

j

j

I know my client got j

$375,000 but if you look even at their own declarations, your

f• H
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Honor, look at the declaration of Randy Haugen and this is
attached to the opposition.

It says here around October

A

j

97 I I

decided I no longer wanted to be in the check cashing business j
and so on and so forth and it says Cashmore offered $750,000 toj
purchase Quick Cash, to purchase Quick Cash.
interest in Quick Cash

I sold my

i

(inaudible) for $375 by individual

j

agreement.

That agreement has been fully performed by Cashmore I
i
I
and myself. No where does he say that my client actually, that !
he actually received the money.

Then in exhibit number -

j
l

THE COURT:

Well, let's suppose that he didn't just

J

for argument sake and that he transferred that asset into some j
other business negotiation - or business dealing with Cashmore. j
MR. ROSEN:

Then the agreement would be null and void;
i
t

i

for lack of consideration.
THE COURT:

Not if he still had that value set forth j

in that agreement that he could claim on.

Okay.

Anything

j

further?

j
j

MR. ROSEN:

Okay.

Here we go.

This is the

I
j

declaration of, this is the declaration of Kip Cashmore.
That's also attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
paragraph 3 now it says:

j
In

I
j

I executed an individual agreement in

j

December

j

^97 with Pipkin providing for

Pipkin to sell his $50,000 ownership in
Quickcash to me in consideration for

!
|
34 !

$375,000.

1
2

Both parties have fully performed that agreement.

3

says:

And then he

4

Pipkin has been fully paid under that

5 !

agreement and has never tendered back nor

j

6 |

offered to tender back any part of the

|

i

i

7 !

consideration he received for his interest

;

8 !

in Quickcash.

j

9 | And then he says as to the agreement he reached with Haugen:

j

10 I

I executed an individual agreement in

11 |

December 1997 with Haugen providing for

;

12 |

Haugen to sell his 50 percent ownership in

j

13 ;

Quickcash to me in consideration for

j
j

14

!

$375,000.

15

!

under that agreement.

Haugen and I fully performed

j
I

I
16 j No mention whatsoever that he paid him.

The fact that he

17 \ doesn't mention it specifically in light of the fact that he

i
j

18 | mentions the fact that he paid Kerry Pipkin is a problem to me. J
19 |

THE COURT:

Well, let's suppose he came up with

20 j $375,000 more and invested it in RKT.

j

What's wrong with that? !

21 !
MR. ROSEN: None of this was disclosed to my client, j
22 | None of this was disclosed. None of these business dealings
23 ; amongst them. None of their future plan. You see the future \
i

'

j

•

24 \ plans that they had apparently started a day or two right after j
•

i

25 i my client sold out.

I

!

!
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1

THE COURT:

Maybe, maybe, but what's wrong with that?

2

MR. ROSEN:

It doesn't address the (inaudible), your

3

Honor, and there is too many material issues of material fact.

4

THE COURT:

5

Well, I've try to see if there is any

material fact, supported by any substantial evidence and I

6 | can't find any.
7 | judgment.

I'm going to grant the motion for summary

!

I grant it on the basis of the argument that has

j

i

i

8 | been presented by the defendants but I believe that the Court

j

9 - could even go beyond that, although it's not totally before the j
10 | Court, and state that even allowing maximum conjecture and

j

11 j speculation as to what the evidence is and even accepting all

|

12 i of your arguments, Mr. Rosen, I don't believe it would meet the I
13 j standards to resist a summary judgment motion even speculating
14 j as you've asked the Court to do.

So, I frankly just can't see ;

15 | how this case could proceed even speculating on what the

j

16 | evidence might be.

j

17 ; that.

But that's, I'm being asked to rule on

I'm being asked to rule based upon the motion that has

18 | been presented and I certainly grant the motion for summary

!

j
j

i

19 | judgment in favor of the defendants in this case.
i

j
i

20 !

j

Now, as to the issue of allowing you even at this

21 | stage to amend your complaint, Mr. Karrenberg, I've reviewed

I

22 | the agreement that existed between Mr. Pipkin and your client

j

23 | and I, frankly, can't see any kind of a legal basis where you

\

24 j would be able to pursue legal fee, attorney's fees and costs

!

25 I against Mr. Pipkin in that agreement because, frankly, that

;

I
i
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\

agreement relates to seller breaches.

It very specifically

j
l

lists all of the seller's breaches of the agreement that would j
give him a basis for pursuing that in claims but I don't see

|

anything there.

|

i

So, your motion would be denied even if we

were to pursue that.

j
I

As to the Rule 26, I'm very liberal.

It's liberal in!

Utah and I still am allowing the attorneys to, you know, to get |
extra time to respond to things.
case.

That's not an issue in this I

I don't hold that against Mr. Pipkin in this matter at
i

i

all.

It's a hard rule, frankly.

It's a good rule but it's

kind of a hard rule for people to get use to.
struggling going on with Rule 26.

There's a lot of !

So, I'm trying to help all I

attorneys that run into Rule 26 problems avoid being kick out

;
I

of court because of a Rule 26 violation.

!

I usually make them

violate two or three times before I rule against anybody on the |
Rule 26.

So, that's not an issue in this case.

j

I just might comment on the evidence that Mr. Rosen
has attached to his affidavit.

I discount the check that

fortunately was made out by Mr. Haijgen and signed by Mr.
Cashmore.

I considered it based on the fact that Mr. Haugen's

name was still on it.

I just really don't find, however, that |

that is any substantial evidence.

The '98 W-2fs still having

|

Mr. Haugen's name on it, a former business owner, I don't think |
i
that is substantial evidence to show the fact that it's

j

supposed to be showing a court docket entry in California is a [j
37

motion to quash service against Mr. Haugen and it is very self j
serving.

It's based and denied and I would have probably

!

denied it as well had I been the judge down there on trying to i
terminate service against Mr. Haugen.

\

I'd certainly want to

have substantial evidence eventually presented in the case and j
I'd give them a chance to do so and the claims were probably

j

enough to prevent a dismissal for not having a basis for

\

serving.

j

That's a very preliminary type of motion and they

shouldn't be granted easily.

But even looking at what is said

in that docket order, I don't find that that is substantial

j

evidence that support the plaintiff's claim in this matter.
I just in reviewing the allegations of your

j

affidavit, Mr. Rosen, I just don't find that those are enough.
They're just not supported by any substantial evidence in my
opinion.

j

So, I have carefully considered it and I've carefully;
\

considered your affidavit because I don't think that it is

proper for a court to quickly grant a summary judgment but as I :
look at the law that would be applicable to the issues that are j
raised in your pleadings and the f^cts that have been presented j
some eight months now after this case has been filed, there is j
just no substantial evidence to support your claims, therefore
I'm granting the motion.
MR. KARRENBERG:

All right that will be all.

!

Judge, I'll prepare and Order and the j

Findings and submit them by Mr. Rosen and to the Court.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

j
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